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Cover
The Naval War College’s Patriots Memo-
rial, dedicated on 9 September 2002 to
the memory of the ten students and
alumni of the College who were killed in
the terrorist attack on the Pentagon on 11
September 2001. Constructed through
donations from students, faculty, and
friends of the College, the memorial
stands in a grassy area between the Col-
lege’s McCarty Little Hall and Conolly
Hall (pictured in the background). It
comprises, beside two benches and in-
scription blocks, a pentagon of hand-laid
bricks surrounding a five-foot block of
Indiana limestone recovered from the
Pentagon’s west facade, which was
severely damaged in the attack. The
bronze plaque reads, over the names of




Who Gave Their Lives
While Serving the Nation.
The Patriots Memorial is a vivid re-
minder of the global challenges for which
the Naval War College plays an impor-
tant role in preparing officers of the U.S.
armed forces—a role addressed by this
issue’s lead articles, by Paul Wolfowitz,
Major General William F. Burns, U.S.
Army (Ret.), and Admiral Gregory G.
Johnson, U.S. Navy.
Photograph by PHC Jon H. Hockersmith, U.S. Navy
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 35
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/35
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI  02841-1207
Winter 2004
Volume LVII, Number 1
3
War College: Winter 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW ADVISORY BOARD
Professor Inis L. Claude, Jr.
Dr. Norman Friedman
Professor Colin Gray
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy, Ret.
Professor Paul M. Kennedy
Professor James R. Kurth
The Honorable Robert J. Murray
Professor George H. Quester
Professor Eugene V. Rostow
Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, U.S. Navy, Ret.
Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor,
U.S. Marine Corps, Ret.
Professor Russell F. Weigley
The Honorable G. William Whitehurst
PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route, U.S. Navy
PROVOST AND DEAN OF ACADEMICS
Professor James F. Giblin
DEAN OF NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES AND
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Professor Alberto R. Coll
Professor Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Editor
Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor
Patricia A. Goodrich, Associate Editor
Phyllis P. Winkler, Book Review Editor
Lori A. Almeida, Secretary and Circulation Manager
Frank Uhlig, Jr., Editor Emeritus
EDITORIAL OFFICES
Naval War College Review
Code 32, Naval War College
686 Cushing Rd., Newport, RI  02841-1207
Fax: 401.841.1071
DSN exchange, all lines: 948
Website: http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press









Essays and Book Reviews
401.841.6584
bookreviews@nwc.navy.mil
Other Naval War College Offices
401.841.3089
The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 as a forum for discus-
sion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The thoughts
and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are
not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or
the Naval War College.
The journal is published quarterly. Distribution is limited generally to com-
mands and activities of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; regu-
lar and reserve officers of U.S. services; foreign officers and civilians having a
present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; selected U.S. gov-
ernment officials and agencies; and selected U.S. and international libraries,
research centers, publications, and educational institutions.
Contributors
Please request the standard contributors’ guidance from the managing editor
or access it online before submitting manuscripts. The Naval War College Re-
view neither offers nor makes compensation for articles or book reviews, and it
assumes no responsibility for the return of manuscripts, although every effort is
made to return those not accepted. In submitting work, the sender warrants
that it is original, that it is the sender’s property, and that neither it nor a similar
work by the sender has been accepted or is under consideration elsewhere.
Permissions
Reproduction and reprinting are subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and ap-
plicable treaties of the United States. To obtain permission to reproduce ma-
terial bearing a copyright notice, or to reproduce any material for commercial
purposes, contact the editor for each use. Material not bearing a copyright
notice may be freely reproduced for academic or other noncommercial use;
however, it is requested that the author and Naval War College Review be
credited and that the editor be informed.
The Naval War College Review is listed in Ulrich’s International Periodicals
Directory, Military Media Database, Free Magazines for Libraries, and by
Oxbridge Communications; it is microformed by UMI® (Bell & Howell Infor-
mation and Learning); it is abstracted in International Political Science Abstracts,
in the Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature, and in the
Joint Warfighting Center Futures Database. It is indexed in the Air University
Index to Military Periodicals, in Historical Abstracts and America: History and
Life (both ABC-CLIO), the International Bibliography of Periodical Literature,
the International Bibliography of Book Reviews, and selectively in the American
Foreign Policy Index and INFO-SOUTH. An index of articles and essays from
1948 through the last complete publishing year is available on compact disc
from the editorial office; an annual index is printed in each Winter issue. A
current index is also available online. Book reviews (beginning with Spring
1994) are indexed in the Gale Research, Inc., Book Review Index and online for
recent years.
The Naval War College Press is listed in the Gale Research, Inc., Directory of
Publications and Broadcast Media. A catalog of Press offerings is available
online.
Periodicals postage paid at Newport, R.I. POSTMASTERS, send address
changes to: Naval War College Review, Code 32S, Naval War College, 686
Cushing Rd., Newport, R.I.  02841-1207.
ISSN 0028-1484
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 35
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/35
CONTENTS
From the Chief of Naval Operations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5
President’s Forum .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9
Professional Military Education
“The Greatest Deeds Are Yet to Be Done” .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 13
The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
The Deputy Secretary of Defense assured the June 2003 graduating Naval War College class that
their studies had prepared them to bring fresh ideas to the process of innovation and to study new
developments from a critical perspective. The most important development during their year in
Newport, of course, was the Iraq campaign—the ultimate classroom for the military profession, with
lessons that point to lasting changes in the way the U.S. armed forces will operate in the future.
The Education of “a Modern Major General” .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 20
Major General William F. Burns, U.S. Army, Retired
Gilbert and Sullivan’s fictitious Major General Stanley would have had little or no opportunity for
formal professional military development. The U.S. military has evolved senior service colleges,
including the U.S. Army War College, at which that nineteenth-century “modern major general”
would find no place. These colleges must sustain their vital role in educating officers to meet the
challenges of the emerging and future world.
A Larger Meaning, a Larger Purpose .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 35
Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, U.S. Navy
The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe,
in remarks delivered on 19 June 2003 to the graduating Naval War College class, recalls the
decisions early in his career that kept him in the Navy and sent him to the College—and the benefits
that the “spirit and legacy of inquisitive and critical study” of that institution brought him.
The Casualty-Aversion Myth .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 39
Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., U.S. Army
It has been, since Vietnam, conventional wisdom that the American public will not accept military
casualties. There is, however, no evidence that the public is intrinsically casualty averse. It is a myth
that distorts policy making and execution, and it is a issue that in itself has no place in professional
military advice and judgment.
5
War College: Winter 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
Corbett in Orbit
AMaritimeModel for Strategic Space Theory .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 59
Lieutenant Commander John J. Klein, U.S. Navy
“Where,” it has been asked, “is the theory of space power? Where is the Mahan for the final
frontier?” Both can be found in the past. The theory of space power is implicit in thinking about
the maritime environment, and its exemplar is the early-twentieth-century theorist Sir Julian
Corbett.
China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions
Seeking Truth fromRumors .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 77
Ian Storey and You Ji
For a decade, the media has been rife with apparent evidence that the People’s Liberation Army
Navy wishes to operate an aircraft carrier. However, the aircraft carrier today has no champion in
the Chinese navy. Strategic priorities, costs, technical difficulties, and the likely reaction of
neighboring countries all now argue against a Chinese carrier battle group. However, the PLAN
has not abandoned the idea altogether—merely shelved it.
Debate & Response
Small NaviesDoHave a Place in Network-CentricWarfare .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 95
Rear Admiral Patrick M. Stillman, U.S. Coast Guard
StillWorth FightingOver? A Joint Response .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 102
P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel
Commentary
National Security Book List .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 109
Congressman Ike Skelton
Review Essays
AReflection of Saddam’s Biography .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 113
Saddam Is Iraq: Iraq Is Saddam,
by Jerrold M. Post and Amatzia Baram
reviewed by Brenda L. Connors
The KoreanWar Remembered .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 117
Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History,
by William Stueck
Unexpected Journey: A Marine Corps Reserve Company in the Korean War,
by Randy K. Mills and Roxanne Mills
Their War for Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and
Civilians, 1945–53,
by Allan R. Millett
reviewed by Donald Chisholm
What the Benefits of Enlarging NATOAgainMight Be .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 122
Coming in from the Cold War: Changes in U.S.-European Interactions
since 1980,
edited by Sabrina P. Ramet and Christine Ingebritsen
NATO Enlargement 2000–2015: Determinants and Implications for
Defense Planning and Shaping,
by Thomas S. Szayna
Growing Pains: The Debate on the Next Round of NATO Enlargement
edited by Tomas Valesek and Theresa Hitchens
reviewed by Joyce P. Kaufman
In My View .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 125
2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 35
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/35
Book Reviews
Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power,
by Roger W. Barnett
reviewed by James A. Russell .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 135
El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi,
by Joseph T. Stanik
reviewed by James Stavridis .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 138
Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to
Net-centric Warfare, by Norman Friedman
reviewed by William C. Martel.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 139
The Geopolitics of East Asia: The Search for Equilibrium, by Robyn Lim
Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power, by Thomas M. Kane
reviewed by Bruce Elleman.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 140
Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, by Ahmed Rashid
reviewed by Amer Latif .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 143
Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, by Michael T. Klare
reviewed by Peter Dombrowski .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 144
The Age of Sacred Terror, by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon
reviewed by S. Douglas Smith .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 146
Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace, by Kemal Kurspahic
reviewed by Clemson G. Turregano .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 147
Military Education: Past, Present, and Future,
edited by Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson
reviewed by Judith Stiehm .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 149
Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts, by David H. Hackworth and Eilys England
reviewed by Jon Czarnecki .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 151
Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA and the Hidden Story
of America’s Space Espionage, by Philip Taubman
reviewed by Frank C. Mahncke .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 152
Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan, by John Bledsoe Bonds
reviewed by Robert S. Wood .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 154
Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist, Socialist, edited by Peter Hore
reviewed by Chris Eldridge .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 156
Navies of Europe, by Lawrence Sondhaus
Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond,
by Phillips Payson O’Brien
reviewed by Christopher Bell.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 157
First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country
a World Power, by Warren Zimmermann
reviewed by Cole C. Kingseed .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 159
Books Received .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 161
From the Editors .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 163
Of Special Interest .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 165
Index of Volume LVI
Articles and Essays .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 166
C O N T E N T S 3
7
War College: Winter 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
8Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 35
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/35
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CHANGE OF COMMAND
From the Chief of Naval Operations, 9 July 2003
Admiral Rempt has acknowledged our VIPs, and I just want to say it’s wonderful
to be here in Newport. It’s always fun to come up here and see great friends. If I
started going through the honors and acknowledging all of them, it would take
longer than [we have]. There are a lot of them here this morning. I’m here be-
cause I believe that this tradition, this event that we are here to observe is very
important to our Navy, this thing called the change of command.
Admiral Rempt, Rod, I’m grateful for and I thank you for inviting me to be
here. I wouldn’t have missed it for anything. That’s a fact. This ceremony is im-
portant to our institution. In our Navy, we have taken great care to preserve the
principle that’s embodied in this change of command ceremony. This Naval War
College is now a joint war college, and each of the services does this event in its
own unique way. For us, it highlights a sacred trust that we give to individuals in
command in our Navy, to commanders, to leaders. In this case, we are here to ac-
knowledge Admiral Rod Rempt and that sacred trust that he has held here for
the last twenty-three months as the president of this institution.
Of course, trust is an important word, and with trust comes a trust in his abili-
ties. We laid it on his shoulders. I never apologize for that. In fact, I’m proud of the
fact that we give authority to individuals and assign them responsibility. Some-
times the other part of that leadership triangle that people like to shy away from is
the accountability part of it. But we believe in it. Rod, we’re very proud of the job
that you have done up here in Newport. You have absolutely performed superbly.
By my calculations, I’ve been to this site more than any other in the Navy since
I’ve been the CNO. I appreciate the history, the people. But most of all, when I
come up here, I love seeing the powerful teamwork that occurs and exists here in
Newport, Rhode Island, and that exists here in this world-class institution. I of-
ten speak about the asymmetric strength of the United States Navy. Too often we
speak in terms of the capability of our enemies, but our asymmetric strength is
the selective genius of our people. The Naval War College is the nucleus of that
genius, a place where leaders stretch their minds to improve themselves and our
Navy and other services. The College has formed leaders like Nimitz and Halsey.
9
War College: Winter 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
But equally important, it has formed thousands of leaders around the world
today who are fighting the global war on terrorism. I’m very proud of what the
War College does, because it creates leaders and operational concepts needed
to face the challenges that we all are confronted with in this twenty-first
century.
Now, we birth future leaders of commands around the United States, places
like Great Lakes Officer Candidate School, Naval ROTC—seventy-one universi-
ties around the United States, by my count—and, of course, the Naval Academy.
These places create beginnings for our people, our bedrock. The Naval War Col-
lege, on the other hand, is a place for our people to grow and mature and create
the vision of who we will be, the future Navy. This place is very, very important
to our Navy. I’ve come to believe that leaders serve an institution and that part of
that service requires the establishment of a vibrant legacy. The Naval War Col-
lege does exactly that. It educates. It inspires naval, joint, international leaders. It
broadens their horizons and exposes them to new ideas. The students here of ev-
ery service are the men and women who will lead our institution when people
like me and these two individuals, the principals of this ceremony, are long gone,
and I’m thankful for that.
Now, to the officers in our Navy, I frequently say things like, “If you’re not
growing, you’re dead.” The Naval War College brings life into the officer corps of
this institution. It’s vital to the intellectual health of our Navy. So this morning, I
just want to be on record as saying: The importance of the Naval War College
cannot be overstated. Our future leaders also need the tools, the warfighting ca-
pabilities. Let’s see. I was here in June last, when I described a road map for the
future Navy called Sea Power 21. Since then, I didn’t know you were going to call
it Team Newport, but Team Newport has worked nonstop to move that vision to
reality. The synergy here in Newport between the War College and the Navy
Warfare Development Command and the Strategic Studies Group is incredible,
and it’s unique within the Navy.
In summary, the Naval War College is a national treasure. The output of this
institution is vital to our nation—not just to our Navy but to our nation. While
we’re very proud of your accomplishments here, I believe when we look back on
your leadership, we’ll talk about it as a time remembered for great team building
marked by incredible spirit of enthusiasm. Under your leadership, this institu-
tion has taken its place as the center of strategic thinking. I like to say that as
leaders we get to talk about policy and put structure and mechanisms in place.
You’ve created mechanisms and forums to advance our visions, and you’ve
stretched the minds of hundreds of young Americans and leaders of other na-
tions of the world. These are the tools that our Navy must possess to remain the
greatest Navy that has ever sailed the sea.
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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As is always the case, success brings with it a lot of responsibility, and there are
a lot of rumors about Rod Rempt’s future. When you’re the object of one of these
rumors, sometimes it puts you in a difficult spot. I remember one time when I
was in such a position, and a salty retired admiral walked up to me and said,
“Congratulations on the rumor,” and walked on.
On Monday, the rumors were confirmed and the president of the United
States nominated Admiral Rod Rempt to become the superintendent of the U.S.
Naval Academy. When confirmed, Rod will have the high honor again of leading
one of our most important organizations in the Navy, and I should say one of
our most important developmental organizations in our Navy, instilling the spirit
of naval service and the essence of naval leadership in our future leaders—again,
building upon the legacy of that great institution and the United States Navy.
So my wish for you today is simply this: I wish you a speedy confirmation.
Pam, a special thanks to you, a key player, and I know Rod’s teammate in every
single respect. You made everyone here feel like a part of the family. You’re a
wonderful friend and a real leader. Your spirit of service is legendary, donating
your time and your enthusiasm to students and staff, volunteer organizations,
and the like.
Admiral and Mrs. Route, welcome aboard to the Naval War College team. You
didn’t have to come too far, Ron. I know that you will be the first to say that you
have issues and challenges. But I am absolutely confident that you will do an
equally superb job here at this institution. Ron comes to this job very well pre-
pared. He’s a sailor, a surface warrior. He commanded the USS Lake Erie and the
George Washington battle group. He’s a scholar, holds a graduate degree from the
Naval Postgraduate School, and is a member on the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions. He’s an innovator, serving as commander of the Navy Warfare Development
Command. He has demonstrated a knack for getting new ideas to the forefront,
and more importantly, getting them out into the fleet. Ron, I know you’re ready to
take the reins. Now, I confess to you in front of this audience, as a matter of record,
that when we assigned you to the NWDC last September, almost a year ago now, I
had this day, this event, in mind. I know that you’re ready to do this.
I’m grateful for the wonderful work that your tenure has produced. I’m a
great believer in output. I’m very grateful for the work that your team has pro-
duced at NWDC, and I promise you that I will have a relief up here for you for
that part of your assignment soon. My challenge to you and this great faculty
and this staff is simply this: Challenge our young men and women. We need the
creative thought of this place, and we need to keep this War College at the fore-
front of the Navy’s intellectual lessons, and to create for our Navy a robust legacy
at this vital institution, leading it to even greater heights.
Ron, help us see the future.
F R O M T H E C H I E F O F N A V A L O P E R A T I O N S 7
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Rear Admiral Route reported in July 2003 as President,
Naval War College after duty as Commander, Navy
Warfare Development Command. Prior to arriving in
Newport in September 2002, his assignment was Direc-
tor, Navy Programming Division (N80), Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations.
Rear Admiral Route commanded Cruiser Destroyer
Group 2 and the George Washington (CVN 73) Battle
Group from May 1998 until April 2000. He also com-
manded USS Lake Erie (CG 70), homeported in Pearl
Harbor, from July 1994 until July 1996. During this pe-
riod, Lake Erie deployed for six months to the Western Pa-
cific and the Persian Gulf as a unit of the Constellation
(CV 64) Battle Group. Lake Erie won the Battle Efficiency
“E” and CINCPACFLT Golden Anchor Award for 1995.
Other assignments at sea included command of USS
Dewey (DDG 45); surface operations officer for Com-
mander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 2 and the America
(CV 66) Battle Group; chief staff officer for Com-
mander, Destroyer Squadron 4; executive officer in USS
Halsey (CG 23); weapons officer in USS Roark (FF
1053) and later USS Wainwright (CG 28); aide and
flag lieutenant to Commander, Cruiser Destroyer
Group 2; and antisubmarine warfare officer in USS
Barry (DD 933).
Ashore in Washington, D.C., Rear Admiral Route
served as Director, Politico-Military Affairs Division
(N52), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, his first
assignment as a flag officer. Other Pentagon assign-
ments have included Executive Assistant to the Assis-
tant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs) for three assistant secretaries in two adminis-
trations; long-range planner and surface ship readiness
analyst in CNO’s Program Resource Appraisal Division
(now N81); and naval warfare analyst in the Joint
Analysis Directorate (now part of J-8), Organization of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A native of Denver, Colorado, Rear Admiral Route at-
tended the U.S. Naval Academy, graduating in 1971
with a bachelor of science degree in systems engineering.
He was awarded a master of science degree in operations
research from the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California, in 1976. Selected to a Navy Fed-
eral Executive Fellowship, he completed a year-long as-
signment as a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York City in June 1997. He became a
Council member in June 1998.
Rear Admiral Route’s personal decorations include the
Legion of Merit (six awards), the Defense Meritorious
Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (four
awards), the Navy Commendation Medal (three
awards), and the Navy Achievement Medal.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
The quality of a person’s life is in direct proportion to their commit-
ment to excellence, regardless of their chosen field of endeavor.
VINCENT T. LOMBARDI
WHEN I ASSUMED THE PRESIDENCY of the Naval War College last July, Iwas tremendously impressed by the commitment to excellence I en-
countered in personnel at all levels of the command. I found this commitment
in everyone I met, from senior educator to junior groundskeeper. Everyone be-
lieved in the value of what the College does and in the importance of his or her
contribution to mission accomplishment.
A large degree of the credit for creating this “culture of excellence” goes to my
predecessor, Vice Admiral Rodney P. Rempt, USN. His tenure as the forty-ninth
President of the Naval War College was marked by careful analysis of alterna-
tives, data-driven decisions, and tireless advocacy of increased professional edu-
cation for the service’s officer corps. Within weeks of assuming command in
August 2001, Admiral Rempt established a “skunk works” team to study gradu-
ate and professional military education. The team’s resulting report, “Trans-
forming Graduate and Professional Military Education,” became the road map
for a series of new initiatives that, once implemented, will substantially improve
the professional preparation of the Navy officer corps. After 9/11, he also mobi-
lized the College’s impressive research, analysis, and war-gaming resources to fo-
cus on combating terrorism and defending the homeland. This resulted in dozens
of point papers and crisis-management games that have helped establish the na-
tion’s new Homeland Security posture. The College and indeed the nation owe
Vice Admiral Rempt a debt of gratitude for his service here in Newport.
The “state of the College” is certainly strong, and all indications are that we
will grow even stronger in the months and years ahead. One of our primary mis-
sions is to prepare future leaders to face the evolving challenges of ensuring na-
tional and global security. Technological advancements, political changes, and
the rise of “nonstate actors” all increase the complexity of the security solutions
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that must be generated and sustained around the world. They also demand a
new breed of enlightened “warrior-scholars” to lead the increasingly sophisti-
cated military services and other security-related agencies. No school is better
suited to producing these leaders than the Naval War College. The hallmarks of
all of our educational programs have been, and will continue to be, their:
Rigor. Our academic programs demand intellectual engagement from our stu-
dents and skillful mentorship from our faculty. As a fully accredited graduate
school, NWC meets (and exceeds) the standards established by the New England
Association of Schools and Colleges. The College will stand for reaffirmation of
the accreditation of its master’s degree program in September 2004. In recent
months, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has reaffirmed the accredita-
tion of both our resident and nonresident professional military education pro-
grams to award Joint Professional Military Education Phase I credit for another
five years.
Relevance. NWC’s academic programs are focused primarily on achieving one
outcome—improvement of the ability of our graduates to make sound deci-
sions in command and in staff positions. We do this by producing graduates
who are “passionate about dispassionate strategic analysis”; understand the
challenges inherent in leading change in large, complex organizations that deal
with national security; and are practitioners of operational art. Readings, case
studies, and guest lectures are directed toward the practical application of the
leadership and management skills required to provide for the common defense,
to deter wars when possible, and to win wars when necessary. We educate future
leaders in the techniques of joint warfare, as seen from a maritime perspective.
Quality. NWC’s seminar-based teaching methodology encourages active learn-
ing and places a premium on developing the student’s ability to communicate
orally and in writing. Exams, exercises, and war games serve to assess the stu-
dent’s progress and to provide opportunities to synthesize the lessons learned.
Our nonresident programs strive to duplicate, to the maximum extent possible,
the quality of the educational experience found on our Newport campus.
These are the same traditions established by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce,
our founding President, and reiterated by Admiral Stansfield Turner, the Col-
lege’s thirty-seventh President, whose “revolution” over three decades ago estab-
lished the academic foundations upon which our current programs are based.
The strategic traditions established by these two officers are the College’s “an-
chors to windward.” One of our greatest challenges will be to maintain these
bedrock principles while improving access to our programs for a larger segment
of the Navy officer corps. We envision both increased participation in our
1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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resident programs and skillful employment of distance-learning technologies to
reach every officer with demonstrated future leadership potential.
The state of our research, analysis, and war-gaming programs is also very
strong, with a potential for significant growth. Our research programs are
closely aligned with, and often embedded within, our academic programs. They
are also scientifically rigorous, relevant to fleet needs, and qualitatively superior.
The faculty and staff of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies are doing leading-
edge research in a multitude of areas, including Seapower 21, international law,
regional studies, and advanced concepts. Increasingly, the Navy is looking to
Newport as a primary source for unbiased research and analysis on the most
complex issues. We will have more to say about this important aspect of the Naval
War College’s dual mission in future issues of the Review.
On a personal level, my wife Kip and I are thrilled to return to Newport. Our
previous assignments on a destroyer homeported here, followed by various
courses at the Surface Warfare Officers School, have been rather brief but very
enjoyable. We are looking forward to putting our roots down for an extended
stay in beautiful and historic New England. Our thanks go to the wonderful men
and women who make up the “greater NWC family” for their warm welcome,
and to Rod and Pam Rempt for providing us with a great foundation upon
which future successes will be built.
RONALD A. ROUTE
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 1 1
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Dr. Paul Wolfowitz became the twenty-eighth Deputy
Secretary of Defense on 2 March 2001. For the previous
seven years, he was dean and professor of international
relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. From
1989 to 1993, Dr. Wolfowitz served as Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy with major responsibilities for the
reshaping of strategy and force posture at the end of the
Cold War. For three years during the Reagan adminis-
tration, he was U.S. ambassador to Indonesia. Prior to
that posting, Dr. Wolfowitz’s government service also in-
cluded tours as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, head of the State Department’s Policy
Planning Staff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Regional Programs, in the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, and as a management intern at the Bureau
of the Budget.
Dr. Wolfowitz received a bachelor of science degree from
Cornell University in mathematics and a doctorate in
political science from the University of Chicago, and has
taught at Yale and Johns Hopkins. In 1993 he was the
George F. Kennan Professor of National Security Strategy
at the National War College. He has written widely on the
subject of national strategy and foreign policy and has
been a member of numerous advisory boards, including
those of the journals Foreign Affairs and National
Interest.
These remarks were delivered in Newport to the Naval
War College graduating class on 20 June 2003.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2004, Vol. LVII, No. 1
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“THE GREATEST DEEDS ARE YET TO BE DONE”
The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
It is customary in commencement speeches to say something about the dynamicworld that graduates are about to enter and how that change is going to affect
their lives. But that traditional message does not work on this occasion, with this
audience. You are graduating, but you are certainly not commencing. “To com-
mence,” after all, is “to begin.” When you return to your fleet or to your units you
will not be beginning a brand-new career. You will be going back to the noble
profession to which you have chosen to dedicate your lives. But you will be going
back enriched by what you have learned here and by what you will continue to
learn with the tools that you have acquired here.
There have been dramatic changes in the world during your year at the Naval
War College, particularly in the world of the military. You will be going back to
operational assignments having had a chance to study those developments from
a critical perspective. Your study here has prepared you to bring fresh ideas to the
dynamic process of innovation that is under way in our military today.
One of the most significant elements that you observed was the battle of Iraq.
I expect that, like the rest of the country, you were glued to televisions for much
of March and April. The battlefield—or what we should more correctly call “the
battle space”—is the ultimate classroom for your profession, and we are still
learning the lessons from those crucial weeks. But some of those lessons are al-
ready obvious, and they indicate lasting changes in the way the U.S. armed forces
will operate in the future.
Some of the changes that led to these lessons have been in the works for quite
a long time. I am sure that many of you have contributed to those changes. But in
the last year the whole world has had a chance—thanks in part to yet another
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innovation, the concept of embedded reporters—to see what they are, and the
effect has been dramatic.
The first has been the application of new networking and communications
technologies, which have taken the integration of air and ground forces to an en-
tirely new level and have given our soldiers and Marines on the ground nearly
instantaneous access to precision air support. The presence of those brave sol-
diers and Marines in turn enabled our long-range striking power to find targets
with precision. That too represents a quantum leap. Precision weapons are only
good if you have precision targeting; we can now combine the two in dramatic
new ways.
That new capability, in turn, enabled our ground forces to advance at an as-
tonishing speed over distances far exceeding those of DESERT STORM. It also
made possible the use of Special Forces on a scale that would have been difficult
to conceive of in the past. More than a hundred Special Forces “A teams” were
deployed throughout Iraq in this conflict. That in turn led to the disappearance
of a “front” in the traditional sense, to be replaced by the concept of battle space.
We also saw some remarkable organizational innovations. Who would have
imagined a conventional tank unit under the command of a Special Forces lieu-
tenant colonel? Or the first-ever combined forces land component commander,
integrating Army, Marine Corps, and coalition forces in a single, brilliant land
combat campaign?
We saw revolutionary application of new technologies, such as unmanned
aerial vehicles and hit-to-kill antimissile systems. So the question is not whether
you in the audience today will adapt to these changes. I have no doubt that you
will. You are professionals. The real question is whether the organizations that
we work in will adapt as well.
But adapt they must. The world has changed, both technologically and politi-
cally. The armed forces that many of you joined were organized to fight an en-
emy that no longer exists, along boundaries that were fixed and identifiable. Our
enemy today does not have those attributes. He is elusive and often invisible. He
uses unconventional weapons against unconventional targets, including the
American heartland. The conflict is, in a word, asymmetric, and we must be able
to respond in kind.
The battle in Iraq—like the battle in Afghanistan before it—is a dramatic vic-
tory in the war on terrorism. In the last year there have also been important si-
lent victories, achieved by extraordinary international cooperation among
intelligence, law enforcement, and military authorities of dozens of countries.
These combined efforts have killed and captured terrorists, among them the
mastermind of the 11 September attacks, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad. But these
victories are just battles in the larger war on terrorism. As President Bush said in
1 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq, “The battle of Iraq is
one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11th, 2001—and still
goes on.”
Our purpose is not to “manage” terrorism or simply to arrest and prosecute
terrorists after they have attacked us. Our goal is to destroy and delegitimize ter-
rorism the way slavery and piracy were delegitimized in the nineteenth century.
The global war on terrorism needs to be understood as a two-front war. The
first and most obvious front is the effort to kill and capture terrorists and to dis-
mantle terrorist networks. That is not just a military operation; it is an effort that
requires all the instruments of national power, including intelligence, law en-
forcement, and diplomacy. We are making important headway every single day.
The enemy is on the run. We are destroying his bases of operation, his organiza-
tion, his sources of funds, his ability to move and communicate, and his ability
to strike. That is the first front in the war on terrorism. In the command and staff
positions you will be assuming shortly, you will be on the front lines of that war.
Let there be no doubt, we will win this war.
As the president has said, “We do not know the day of final victory but we
have seen the turning of the tide. No act of the terrorists will change our pur-
pose, or weaken our resolve, or alter their fate. Their cause is lost. Free nations
will press on to victory.” We will win in part because our military is the
best-equipped, best-trained, best-led fighting force on earth, and we have the
support of dozens of other freedom-loving nations that are part of our coali-
tion—many of them represented here today. When we engage militarily, the out-
come is certain.
But there is a second front in the global war on terror—the challenge to build
what President Bush has called “a just and peaceful world beyond the war on
terror,” particularly in the Muslim world. That means helping a liberated Iraq to
become the free and democratic country that it can be. It means resolving the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Winning the peace is an even greater challenge than winning
the war.
But even as the war on terrorism continues to consume our time and atten-
tion, it is vital that we also continue transformation, the initial effects of which
were demonstrated so dramatically in the battle in Iraq. We need to sustain that
effort not only to win the war on terror but to deter the wars of the future, or if
necessary, fight them successfully. The American military has an extraordinary
history of innovation in time of war. Some might even say that we are more in-
novative under the stress of war than in the leisure of peace. We should use the
urgency of the present war on terror to continue transforming our military not
only to win this war but to be prepared to win, or—even better, to prevent—the
next one.
W O L F O W I T Z 1 5
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Needless to say, transformation means profound change. Not only techno-
logical change. Not even primarily technological change. The changes enabled
by new networking and information technology take the potential of joint oper-
ations to a dramatically new and unprecedented level. And that is more than a
mechanical change. It requires a change in the way we think and the way we or-
ganize. It is properly described as a cultural change. If we are going to depend on
one another in wartime, we must forge the bonds of trust in peacetime. That
means our training has to become increasingly joint as well.
With that thought in mind, we are developing a joint national training capa-
bility to create a distributed, global environment in which individuals and units
will receive training and experience in joint operations at the strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical levels. It should include a live training component that con-
nects live training exercises and allows the best practices to circulate among
the services. It should also include a virtual capability to link service training
centers. We want to increase the amount of joint field training that our forces
receive, because we need to train like we fight, as a coherently integrated team.
All of that requires what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has called a cul-
ture of “innovation and intelligent risk taking.”
Someone once remarked on the huge number of failures that Thomas Alva
Edison had suffered in his efforts to develop a new battery. “Some fifty thousand
failed experiments,” this observer said, “with no results.” “Results?” Edison replied.
“Why, I’ve gotten a lot of results. I know fifty thousand things that don’t work.”
I am sure I do not need to tell this audience that military organizations, for all
of their outstanding attributes, are not always the most welcoming of change.
That great American inventor Robert Fulton, best known for his invention of a
successful steamboat, was contracted by a foreign government to try to build a
submarine. After an embarrassing trial of the design he produced, an admiral
from that foreign navy snorted, “Thank God we still fight our battles above the
waves and not beneath them.”
Well, we have to be prepared for change. In the interest of jointness let me tell
a story on the Army—our Army. It is a story of an infantry officer who, here in
the United States in the 1930s, began to write about the future of armored war-
fare. Instead of receiving support, he was chastised by his commander, who told
him that if he published anything that was contrary to what was called “solid in-
fantry doctrine,” he would be court-martialed. That soldier so interested in the
future of armored warfare who was so nearly retired as a colonel was Dwight David
Eisenhower. It took the intervention of General John J. Pershing’s chief of staff to
save his career.
The rest, as they say, is history.
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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In one sense, of course, the successful organization is right to question too
much innovation. There is an old proverb that says, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
Given the high stakes that attach to military decisions, there are good reasons to
be conservative about risk taking. But there is another side to the same story.
Professor Clayton Christensen of the Harvard Business School has pointed out
in his book The Innovator’s Dilemma that the most successful companies—the
ones that seem to have done everything right—have been the most vulnerable
when disruptive innovations come along. As he put it, “The very decision-
making and resource-allocation processes that are key to the success of estab-
lished companies are the very processes that reject disruptive technologies.”*
Today one of our fundamental challenges is to encourage prospective
Eisenhowers, to inspire each of you to think about the war of the future. During
my present tour at the Pentagon, I have been privileged to know some remark-
able innovators—and I am sure there are many in this audience today as well.
The commander of Central Command, General Tommy Franks, is a great exam-
ple. In Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, for example, Special
Forces on the ground took nineteenth-century horse cavalry, combined it with
fifty-year-old B-52 bombers, and, using modern satellite communications, pro-
duced a truly twenty-first-century capability. When Secretary Rumsfeld was
asked what he had in mind by reintroducing the horse cavalry into modern war-
fare he replied, with a big grin, “It’s all part of our transformation plan.”
As I am sure you are all aware, the Naval War College has been one of the great
generators of innovation for the U.S. military. During the period before World
War II, naval officers here first thought about the concept of mass carrier opera-
tions. It was here that Plan ORANGE—the prophetic concept of operations for a
war against Japan—was developed, long before Pearl Harbor. More recently, un-
der the leadership of Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, this college developed
the concept of network-centric warfare. At the same time this institution main-
tains a curriculum that is traditional in substance, with a focus on the Great
Books and history. Some of you probably say it had too much history, because
you had to struggle with it. But that combination of innovative and classical
thought has enabled the Naval War College to produce military leaders who har-
ness an understanding of the past and the potential of technological progress to
produce new ideas for the future.
So as you graduate you will take with you what is in effect a liberal education in
the military art. The capacity for independent, critical thought and reflection and
the ability to question assumptions and previous modes of warfare will give you an
advantage over your adversaries in an age of great uncertainty and rapid change.
W O L F O W I T Z 1 7
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That classical education does several things. For one, it imparts a healthy
skepticism about pat answers or easy solutions. It should make you wary about
received wisdom. Second, it exposes students to a tremendous variety of experi-
ence. As someone once said, “History has more imagination than any scenario
writer in the Pentagon.” In the summer of 2001, who would have dared to pre-
dict that by the end of the year Americans would have been viciously attacked on
their own shores by an enemy without any capital, without any conventional
military force? Who could have predicted that within weeks of that attack Amer-
ica would be at war in landlocked Afghanistan? Or who would have dared to pre-
dict that by the time the last fires of the World Trade Center were extinguished,
U.S. forces would already be in Kabul?
Third, a classical education makes one think differently. It prepares one to
continue self-education. It makes one more intellectually adaptable as circum-
stances change and one confronts surprise. While technology confers many ad-
vantages, it cannot synthesize the value of interpersonal debate and discussion.
There is simply no substitute for face-to-face learning and interaction between
students and faculty, and among students themselves. Keep in touch with your
classmates after you leave. You will cross paths again, and you can continue to
learn from one another.
Education, as opposed to training, teaches us that clichés about war—like the
three-to-one rule for offense—have fallen by the wayside. Unorthodox battle
plans, such as those employed in Afghanistan or in Iraq, cannot be found in any
textbook or manual. They were produced by military leaders who grasped the
lessons of military history and applied them in entirely new circumstances.
Let me mention just one example. In preparing for the urban offensive on
Baghdad, one that many predicted would result in horrendous loss of life, Gen-
eral Franks and his staff developed a brilliant plan that was informed by the les-
sons of the Russian military experience in Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya.
But rather than simply accepting the superficial lesson that urban operations
can defeat advancing conventional armies and therefore should be avoided, they
applied a critical thought process to discern a fundamental difference about
Baghdad—a city with people awaiting liberation and blessed with wide boule-
vards. That was an important distinction from Grozny that could easily have
been missed. No manual could tell you that. It proves that education is not the
same thing as training.
We have entered a period in which discrepancies between militaries are far
greater than at any time in the recent past. The world of homogeneous armed
forces that fought the same way with the same weapons is a recent development.
Asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon. It is the story of our own na-
tional military history—of Continental Army forces firing from behind trees
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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and wearing down a numerically superior, better trained, and better equipped
British force.
Whatever conflicts lie ahead, you can be sure they will be as different from
Iraq as Iraq was from Afghanistan—as Afghanistan was from Kosovo—as
Kosovo was from DESERT STORM—as DESERT STORM was from JUST CAUSE.
Meeting the challenges of the future will require continuous questioning of ac-
cepted truths, a constant pursuit of lessons from history and of lessons from
technology that may have relevance to the contemporary situation. Because of
the premium we place on innovation, we require a joint officer corps that has
studied not only the technique of its profession but the very logic of war as an in-
strument of policy; we require a joint officer corps that is not afraid to ask ques-
tions or to offer answers that seem to violate bureaucratic norms and
conventional wisdom.
It is no accident that the commanders in Iraq include distinguished graduates
of this institution. They include a former commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Ad-
miral Robert Natter, who won the college’s Distinguished Graduate Leadership
Award in 2000. They include a former Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
William Fallon; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Charles
Moore; and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Readiness and Logistics,
Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn, who recently retired. It is a long list.
It has been said that this college made its greatest contribution to winning the
present war ten or fifteen years ago, when it educated the men and women who
are now taking the fight to the enemy. You will be following in their footsteps.
You have been preparing for what we expect will be senior leadership responsi-
bilities. That is the sole purpose of this institution. In the twenty-first century we
need leaders who can both think creatively and carry out orders.
Charles William Elliott had a distinguished career over forty years as president
of Harvard. When he was retiring in the early part of the last century, he was
treated to a dinner by his faculty. The Harvard faculty fell all over themselves offer-
ing praise, one after the other, for the retiring president. One finally said, “Presi-
dent Elliott, during your tenure here, Harvard has become a veritable storehouse
of knowledge.”Elliott replied, “What you say is true, but I can claim little credit for
it. It is simply that the freshmen bring so much and the seniors take so little away.”
You have brought much to this institution, but I am pretty certain you are also
taking a great deal away. So I want to congratulate you, wish you best of luck as
you continue your careers, and in closing leave you with the words of President
Theodore Roosevelt, who walked these very grounds near the turn of the last
century. A man of great vision and courage, Roosevelt said, “We see across the
dangers of the great future, and we rejoice as a giant refreshed. The great victo-
ries are yet to be won, the greatest deeds yet to be done.”
W O L F O W I T Z 1 9
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THE EDUCATION OF “A MODERN MAJOR GENERAL”
Major General William F. Burns, U.S. Army, Retired
For my military knowledge, though I’m plucky and adventury,
Has only been brought down to the beginning of this century;
But still in matters vegetable, animal, and mineral,
I am the model of a modern Major-General.
THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE
Over a century ago, Gilbert and Sullivan developed a caricature of a contempo-rary general officer of the British service in their operetta Pirates of Penzance.
Almost three decades ago, Colonel Donald F. Bletz of the U.S. Army War College
faculty published an article using this caricature, Major General Stanley, as a model
of what should not be the typical general officer of the future.1 Since that future is
now, it is useful to examine the factors that contribute to
and influence the development of a professional military
officer, particularly an officer who has achieved general
or flag rank and so can be considered a strategic leader.
Of course, a number of factors enter into the selec-
tion and development of such officers. This article will
consider only one—the education of potential strategic
leaders. I will discuss a bit about its antecedents and
speculate about its future. In doing this, I will restrict
myself essentially to the U.S. Army. I do this for two rea-
sons: first, the Army is the case with which I am most
familiar; second, the recent evolution of “jointness” in
the U.S. armed forces has made career patterns and
educational requirements converge more and more.
Thus, an examination of the Army model should pro-
vide insights into problems and possibilities in the
other services as well.
Major General Burns was the ninth director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has served as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Mili-
tary Affairs and Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear
Dismantlement, and is judge emeritus of the Court of
Judicial Discipline of Pennsylvania.
General Burns entered the Army in 1954, commissioned
from the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at La
Salle University. He served as a field artillery officer, in-
cluding brigade and battalion command, taught in the
ROTC program, and was a faculty member at the U.S.
Army War College, where he served later as deputy
commandant. He also was assigned as deputy assistant
commandant of the Field Artillery School. After his re-
tirement from government service he continued to teach
at the college level and is currently a Distinguished Fel-
low at the Army War College. He serves on a number of
boards and committees, several involved in professional
education.
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Words are important both for what they mean objectively and for how we
employ them in common and specialized usage. Some terms relating to the de-
velopment of military leaders are used at times rather loosely, and it seems im-
portant to establish their meaning for our purposes here. First, a profession is
defined (by Webster’s Third International) as “a calling requiring specialized
knowledge and often long and intensive preparation including instruction in
skills and methods as well as the scholarly principles underlying such skills and
methods, maintaining by force of organization or concerted opinion high stan-
dards of achievement and conduct, and committing its members to continued
study and to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the rendering of
public service.” Education means “to develop (as a person) by fostering to vary-
ing degrees the growth and expansion of knowledge, wisdom, desirable qualities
of mind or character, physical health or general competence especially by a
course of formal study or instruction.” Training, in contrast, means “the teach-
ing, drill, or exercise by which the powers of mind and body are developed[;] . . .
the development of a skill or a particular group of skills; instruction in an art,
profession, or occupation.”
“Professional” and “professionalism,” then, describe a rather narrow class of
educated people who have embraced particular ways of life, mastered specific
bodies of knowledge, and embarked upon careers—lifelong, in most cases—
that make significant and lasting contributions to the common good. Medical
doctors, lawyers, and “professed” religious immediately come to mind. How-
ever, professionalism has become more loosely construed in the past decades by
commentators and observers who mean (aside from the obvious sense of
“paid”) simply “highly skilled” or “dedicated.” In this way we refer to profes-
sional athletes, professional actors, and professional construction workers.
A true professional of whatever vocation must master the body of knowledge
that provides intellectual and philosophical substance to the profession, as well as
the requisite training for action. According to Webster’s definition, this education
and training is a lifelong endeavor, constantly honing the ability of the profes-
sional to perform at ever-higher levels. These characteristics accurately describe a
military officer today. The system of military education and training of officers is
designed to foster such ability and performance. At the senior service colleges—
which constitute the culmination of the educational rather than the training as-
pects of professional development—officers can find professional fulfillment and
satisfaction to the highest degree their profession offers, short of command in
combat. It is up to the senior military leadership to ensure that this is so.
The interplay of education and training takes place throughout a professional
career, with varying relative emphasis. Both are essential, but one often
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dominates, depending upon the individual’s evolution and progress in the par-
ticular profession.
Success in training is amenable to rote memorization and practice, and
knowledge and abilities thus gained are essential to the prosecution of war.
Close-order drill, disassembly of a weapon, operation of complex electronic
equipment, or the writing of a five-paragraph field order can be learned, prac-
ticed, and tested to an established standard. Curricula supporting such training
can be outlined clearly in terms of tasks, conditions, and standards. Objective
testing, using either a pass-fail or percentage grading system, can at the least es-
tablish whether the student can or cannot accomplish the task. Tactical opera-
tions at lower levels can be studied and categorized in the same way. The Army’s
National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, has developed for this kind of
training an evaluation system that is second to none. The efficiency of compa-
nies and battalions can be assessed and compared, and lessons can be derived.
Educational attainments cannot be so easily assessed. Papers can be graded
and examinations given, but no one can truly determine the future performance
of a senior leader in a classroom. Looking back on four years of experience as a
faculty instructor at the Army War College, I recall a number of officers who
later succeeded to senior posts, including major unified commands. Not many
of these successful strategic leaders had been “honor students.” Certainly, they
were thoughtful, knowledgeable, and active participants in seminar rooms, but
few had made major academic contributions or advanced the profession
through learned articles or books. Those who had were not always selected for
rapid advancement to senior rank.
SENIOR OFFICER EDUCATION BEFORE THE MODERN ERA
Military officers of the past were often amateurs at heart, brought up in an area
of noblesse oblige, dedicated to military service because in their social class it was
the thing to do. Wars were fought with, by modern standards, primitive weap-
ons. Personal courage, stamina, and a bit of luck were part of the mix that re-
sulted in victory on the battlefield, and personal skill and success in arms were
essential prerequisites of a strategic leader. Classic works recounting successes
and failures in past battles were the essential textbooks.
Gilbert and Sullivan’s Major General Stanley of the nineteenth-century Brit-
ish army would have had little or no opportunity for formal professional mili-
tary development. Military schools and colleges existed but provided primarily
precommissioning education. Stanley’s knowledge would have come from as-
similation and practical application, allegedly made easier by his aristocratic
heritage and association with officers of similar upbringing and outlook.
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In the American military too, professional military education in the nine-
teenth century depended very much on individual motivation and study. Given
geographic isolation and, as the century progressed, stability on its land borders,
the growing republic could make do with a small army and limited naval forces.
Most of the U.S. Army was scattered in western outposts. When troubled times
arrived, it expanded by calling upon the states for militia, officered by men cho-
sen and characterized by bonds of friendship, popularity, and politics rather
than professional interests or abilities.
President Abraham Lincoln’s difficulties with senior commanders in the Civil
War were legendary. After the reductions following that war, the Army returned
to its frontier outposts. Officers isolated in small units at widely dispersed loca-
tions in the West had little time for formal professional education. None at all
was provided for senior officers aspiring to high command or staff positions.
The Navy was the first to establish a senior service college, the Naval War Col-
lege at Newport, Rhode Island; education at the senior level for Army officers
did not begin until 1903, with the founding of the Army War College. That col-
lege, however, was an extension of an Army educational system that had devel-
oped, sometimes haphazardly, over the previous hundred years, beginning with
the Military Academy at West Point, New York. Training institutions (“schools
of practice”) for the infantry, cavalry, and artillery were established to meet the
technical needs of the principal branches of the Army during the nineteenth
century; a smattering of professional education through reading and lectures
was provided at these institutions. The advent of advanced military schooling at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1881 established a sound basis for instruction in
command and staff procedures for midlevel career officers.
It seems to have been assumed that professional soldiers would continue their
military educations privately, through reading and observation. The foundation
laid at West Point was only that—a foundation. It was common for officers in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to attend maneuvers of other nations’
armies in peacetime and to participate as observers in wartime, learning about
tactics, strategy, and strategic leadership at first hand. For example, First Lieuten-
ant Douglas MacArthur accompanied his father, General Arthur MacArthur, to
Japan in October 1904 to observe the strategy, tactics, and political underpin-
nings of the Russo-Japanese War. Young MacArthur later asserted that the visit
to East Asia was “to color and influence all the days of my life.”2
Even then, however, it was becoming clear that unorganized learning and
self-education were not enough to develop a professional officer corps.
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THE ROOT REFORMS AND THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICER
Major changes in the Army came about after weaknesses in planning, opera-
tions, logistics, and leadership became evident during the war with Spain in
1898. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Secretary of War Elihu Root
spearheaded reforms that included the establishment of a war college (at
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 1903) to educate officers for senior com-
mand and staff positions. The idea was derived in part from the German
kriegsakademie and the Prussian general staff concept. However, Root’s dictum
that the Army War College was founded “not to promote war but to preserve
peace” is often quoted to this day and was a particularly American adaptation.
Of the officers qualified by education and past assignments for the general staff
on the U.S. model, a number were selected to serve for relatively short periods
and then revert to their regiments. This approach required a greater pool of edu-
cated candidates than a system that assigned an officer once and for all to the
general staff, with periodic experience in command, as was the Prussian prac-
tice. The American model established senior officer education on a broad basis
and created a class of senior officers, identified at least in part by their formal
military education credentials, from which strategic leaders and senior staff offi-
cers could be drawn.
A formal education and training system, culminating in the senior service
colleges, was a necessary precursor to the professionalization of the officer corps
in the twentieth century. Through the Root reforms, particularly as they per-
tained to education, officers became professionals, earning that title through ed-
ucation and practical application, and their calling embodied the same defining
characteristics as the classic professions.
The changing nature of war and the rapid technological advances of the next
century radically affected the way that military officers were required to per-
form. This change, in turn, affected the educational basis of the profession of
arms. Ground commanders evolved from the traditional “man on horseback,”
leading their troops from the front, to leaders who appeared before their troops
from time to time but more than likely spent most of their waking hours in com-
mand posts, in front at first of maps, eventually display screens or computer
monitors. Today, a crucial task for an officer education system is to keep abreast
of changing leadership styles. Napoleon literally sat his horse on a hill overlook-
ing the battlefield while aides-de-camp galloped to and fro delivering messages
and orders. Bands played, and banners waved in the distance. What must we do
today, in the educational system and beyond, to compensate for the gloom of a
van, the flicker of a cathode-ray tube, the hum of an electrical generator? With
what do we replace the bands and the banners?
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The wars of the twentieth century created large army, naval, and air forces in-
volving tens of millions of American citizens. The association of so many Amer-
icans with the armed forces eliminated much of the mystique that had
surrounded the military in the past and, to a degree, became an engine of reassess-
ment and further democratization of the military. This was institutionalized in
the late 1940s by law and regulation, resulting in removal of many of the remain-
ing distinctions between officers and enlisted personnel. However, the realiza-
tion that there were good reasons for preserving a difference between the leaders
and the led, particularly on the battlefield, caused a renewed interest in what
makes this difference.
The rapid development of the officer corps into a professional institution
caught the attention of eminent political and social scientists, who provided
useful analyses of the educational needs of the profession. Morris Janowitz and
Samuel Huntington were in the forefront of such work in the 1950s. Other au-
thors both in and out of uniform have continued to examine military profes-
sionalism since that time.
One of the positive outcomes of the post–World War II reassessment of military
professionalism was the creation of the National War College, the reconstitution
of the Army Industrial College as the Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
and the reestablishment of the Army War College after a ten-year (originally
wartime) hiatus. Today’s structure of five senior service colleges, with the amal-
gamation of the National War College and the Industrial College to constitute
the National Defense University, provides a remarkable and diverse academic
base for continuing professional development at the highest levels. Each service
places a different emphasis on senior service college attendance. However, the
importance of joint operations makes such attendance essential for any aspiring
officer. Arguments among officers are still heard over the status of the National
Defense University as the premier institution, but all recognize that it is at least
primus inter pares. Recent requirements for joint service education as a prerequi-
site for assignment and senior promotion have placed greater emphasis on this
aspect of professional education even at senior service colleges not part of the
National Defense University.
EDUCATIONAL EVOLUTION AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE
The development of the system of senior officer education at the U.S. Army War
College has been cataloged in detail by Colonel Harry P. Ball in two editions of
his definitive history of that institution. The college originally vacillated be-
tween serving as a planning adjunct to the War Department General Staff and
as a purely educational institution. In its planning role, officers learned
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professional skills by actually accomplishing them, through on-the-job training.
Less time was devoted to personal study or professional lectures. In later years,
the development of war plans ceased to be a major focus, and students followed
primarily academic pursuits.
The “Four Army War Colleges”
Ball identifies four distinct phases in the growth and development of the Army
War College.3 The “First War College” began with the Root reforms and lasted un-
til the college suspended operations for World War I. This phase was dominated
by the concept of a senior service college as a planning resource. The “Second War
College” describes the period during the interwar years (when the Army War Col-
lege was known for a short while as the “General Staff College”). Planning for fu-
ture conflicts remained important, but the academic and educational goals began
to dominate the curriculum. The college closed again in 1941 for World War II.
The Army did not reestablish a senior service college until 1951. During this
hiatus, the National War College was founded as the primary joint institution of
higher learning. The Cold War dominated the curriculum of this “Third War
College” for the next forty years. Earlier curricular trends continued, however,
especially that of educating generalists on a broad basis rather than narrow mili-
tary specialists. Senior reserve officers were brought in for short courses, and for
a time senior Department of the Army civilians were provided initial orienta-
tions at the Army War College. A nonresident program was established by which
students not selected for the regular resident course could pursue a war college
diploma by correspondence over two years, in addition to two summer sessions
of two weeks each. The resident course and what became to be known as “dis-
tance learning” operated at the same education level. This early experimentation
with nonresident instruction provided valuable insights into its utility and prac-
ticability on a wider scale.
The “Fourth War College,” the present institution, developed quickly in the
aftermath of the Cold War. The curriculum has been sharpened to educate stra-
tegic military leaders, new technologies have been employed, exercises and war
games complement seminars, and lectures have been reduced in number. The
proportion of civilian faculty has increased, and the capabilities of the faculty to
teach, guide, and evaluate have improved. In these years the faculty developed
from a group that facilitated and advised to a truly teaching faculty. This shift
was driven in part by the educational reforms required by the Goldwater-
Nichols Act in the mid-1980s as well as by congressional concern about the edu-
cation of senior officers. The student body now includes a higher percentage of
non-Army students and a larger number of civilian U.S. government officials,
and therefore represents a more cosmopolitan and diverse assemblage of talent.
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A major innovation in the late 1970s was the enrollment of International Fel-
lows—officers from the armed forces of other nations—in the annual course.
These changes broadened the educational experiences and associations of the
Army students as well as contributed to knowledge about the U.S. Army and
land warfare for people who were not of the Army themselves.
The Army War College Today
The modern Army War College curriculum is the product of thirty years of de-
velopment, the impact of withdrawal from Vietnam, the reconstruction of the
ground forces that followed, and the success achieved by this “new model army”
in the first Gulf War. The revolution in military technology that accompanied
these changes, or is at least partially responsible for them, has been paralleled by
changes in senior officer education. The Army War College mission states this
succinctly:
To prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic
responsibilities in military and national security organizations; to educate students
about the employment of land power as part of a unified, joint, or multinational
force in support of the national military strategy pursuant to a Masters Degree in
Strategic Studies; to research operational and strategic issues; and to conduct out-
reach programs that benefit the USAWC, the US Army, and the Nation.4
The operative words are “prepare,” “educate,” and “research.” The prepara-
tion is academic, social, and psychological. The education at the Army War Col-
lege is comparable to a graduate school, and research by both faculty and
students is encouraged. Emphasis is no more on purely Army matters but on the
employment of the Army “as part of a unified, joint, or multinational force.”5
For the student, completion of the program results in a diploma, a Military Edu-
cation Level 1 certification, and since recently an advanced academic degree.6
The current curriculum supports the mission statement with a multiphased
program. A general overview phase considers the elements of power, national
strategy, national military strategy, force structure and deployments, leadership
and command, and the world environment in which these elements exist. Dur-
ing this phase, students are grouped in seminars, where social bonding takes
place as well as learning. Students prepare regional appraisals, in which the In-
ternational Fellows make a vital contribution.
Two terms of elective subjects follow in which students may select from a
wide variety of courses. These selections are made based on interest, possible fu-
ture assignment, or current military specialty. Electives are at a graduate level
and are of proportionate rigor. Each is designed to advance the professional edu-
cation of the student. A student research program is conducted concurrently
with the elective courses—students with something to say are encouraged to say
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it. Papers are examined carefully by the faculty and are forwarded to applicable
Army and Defense staff agencies as appropriate.
Two programwide events take place during the ten-month course. First, stu-
dents, faculty, and visitors take part in a Strategic Crisis Exercise (SCE) for two
weeks in March each year. The purpose of the SCE is to develop strategic leaders
in two ways: by integrating and applying knowledge acquired during the aca-
demic year, using exercises, automation, and simulations to enhance the experi-
ential learning process; and by pursuing mastery of the strategic and operational
art within the framework of crisis-action planning and execution.
The second event, the Annual National Security Seminar, provides a forum in
which distinguished speakers discuss their views on issues of importance to the
nation’s security and welfare with the students, International Fellows, and fac-
ulty of the Army War College and with invited guests from across the country. It
provides an extended opportunity for a free and candid dialogue between the
college community and a widely representative group of American citizens,
drawn from varied sectors of American life and endeavor. Finally, the Annual
National Security Seminar enables, on one hand, representative citizens to get to
know some of the prospective leaders of their armed forces and government and,
on the other, permits officer students to understand better the society they serve.
Both of these programwide events integrate learning and reinforce educa-
tional objectives. They are complemented by student travel opportunities, prin-
cipally a visit to New York City during which the class is familiarized with the
United Nations. Small groups visit state and local governmental organs as well as
business enterprises to become acquainted with the operations, needs, and rela-
tionships of these elements to national security policy. A “staff ride” over the
Gettysburg battlefield (about thirty miles from the college) is a traditional exer-
cise that relates historical examples to modern strategic leadership concepts. In-
ternational Fellows are offered additional opportunities for travel in order to
become informed about the United States and its military and naval capabilities.
The presence at Carlisle Barracks of the Military History Institute’s vast col-
lection of documents as well as objects of historical interest is an added bonus
for professional research. Together with the Army War College Library, it pro-
vides fertile resources for reflection and professional development.
The Army War College curriculum has developed in an evolutionary rather
than a revolutionary manner. It has taken thirty years to move from a course of
lectures and discussion to a varied approach to learning that includes guided
seminar discussion, electives, lectures, and major exercises. A century has
elapsed since the Root reforms began that evolution. Concurrently, a teaching
faculty has been developed to match the curriculum. Today, a Major General
Stanley would probably find no place at the U.S. Army War College.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR . . .
The changes in the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been dra-
matic, among them international terrorism and unrest. We can expect these
challenges to affect the education of strategic leaders. The future will call for
continuing development of the senior officer education system. The evolution-
ary change described above seems likely to be accelerated. Two “players” must be
particularly involved in this evolution if it is to be effective: the Army Chief of
Staff and the Commandant of the Army War College.
We all woolgather from time to time concerning “what might have been” or
“what we would do in the same circumstances.” We can never place ourselves in
the actual position of another, experiencing all the pressures and insights that go
with it, but we can still examine a problem from a leader’s viewpoint. I offer the
following suggestions in that vein.
. . . The Army Chief of Staff
A periodic review of the Army War College curriculum is now in progress. Per-
mit this review to advance unhindered. It is a great temptation for senior mili-
tary officers to offer advice in informal conversation, but it can be considered
directive in nature. I remember once as a battalion commander mentioning ca-
sually to a first sergeant that I liked the color of blue in which his battery had just
painted a dayroom. Within two weeks, all the dayrooms in the battalion were the
same shade of blue.
Ensure that the location of the Army War College and its educational inde-
pendence are preserved. Over the course of years, the college has been subordi-
nated to various headquarters and staff agencies. A decision was made recently
to remove it from the responsibility of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
(G-3) and place it under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); that
change becomes effective 1 October 2003. The TRADOC staff must adjust to the
difference between the concept of training and the educational experience at the
Army War College, which will be unique among the institutions under its com-
mand. Senior commanders must ensure that this change is not permitted to af-
fect the education of senior officers negatively. The college’s location is
important, since it is close enough to the nation’s capital for easy access but far
enough away not to be a mere adjunct of the Army Staff. These factors should
weigh heavily in any future base-closing scheme.
From time to time, commandants, higher commanders, and the Congress
have raised questions of cost, productivity, and utility concerning senior service
colleges in general and the Army War College in particular. The Army War Col-
lege is situated alone at Carlisle Barracks, whereas the other senior service insti-
tutions are collocated with at least one other educational or training facility. On
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paper at least, this increases the per capita costs for the Army. Further, it would
seem that it would be economical to provide most or all such education as dis-
tance learning, which has been successfully used at the Army War College;
smaller class sizes through more careful selection and evaluation of student po-
tential might also save money. Amalgamation of all senior service education into
one facility—or subordinating all other senior institutions to the National De-
fense University—could be another apparent cost saver. However, cost should
not be the critical factor in the future of senior officer education.
Continue to fund the International Fellows Program at current levels. It is
important that each seminar group have at least two International Fellows from
different regions of the world. It is equally important that International Fellows
be able to make direct contributions to the curriculum and have a reasonable fa-
cility with the English language. We need to invite not only our friends and allies
to send fellows but also nations with which we have or might have differences in
the future.
Ensure that civilian government employees who are enrolled as students are
selected not only for their own career development but also for the contribution
their expertise and backgrounds can make.
Ensure that assignment of students to the various senior service colleges is
balanced with regard to the relative standing of individual officers as assigned by
the selection board. From time to time in the past, at least the perception has been
that the officers on the fastest career tracks attend the National War College.
Assign commandants with great care. The proper combination of acknowl-
edged leader, accomplished educator, and humane, ethically sound soldier is dif-
ficult to find given the limited number of general officers—but not impossible.
The Army War College has been fortunate to have had several commandants in
recent years who possess these qualities to a marked degree. The post of com-
mandant should never go to an individual as a reward for service in another as-
signment or as a holding assignment while he or she waits for better things.
Commandants’ tenure should be a minimum of three years to provide continu-
ity and to allow them to manage change effectively.
The system of academic reports used by the Army is antiquated and of little
use. It often is reduced to a trite, repetitious recitation of basic facts on the cur-
riculum, information found in greater detail in the course curriculum pam-
phlet. In my experience, little is ever said in war college academic reports that
reflects positively or adversely on the specific student; they simply record atten-
dance, in stock phrases drawn from other places. Instead, a knowledgeable
member of the faculty should prepare the academic report for each officer grad-
uate. The officer’s strengths and weaknesses in terms of aptitude for senior as-
signments should be cataloged; specific, positive accomplishments should be
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included.7 The commandant should be required to endorse the report and make
specific comments, positive or negative, concerning aptitude for promotion.
This requires the commandant to be actively involved with students during the
academic year. It will not permit him to spend much time on administrative
matters—but that is why he has a deputy. If the academic report is too burden-
some, it should be abolished, at least at the senior service college level.
. . . the Commandant of the Army War College
The commandant must be a leader, a tutor, and a mentor. This is a tall order
when the student body, from all sources and in several modes of learning, ap-
proaches one thousand each year. Thus, the commandant must be innovative,
accessible, and genuinely interested when engaged with students. He or she must
also understand the distinction between education and training, as well as the
long-term professional impact that senior service college education can have.
The commandant must be dedicated to delivering that education.
For the resident class, an approach found quite useful in the past should be re-
vived. Over a number of years, a program called under several names but most
recently “discussions with the commandant” enabled him to meet during the ac-
ademic year for perhaps two hours with small groups of students at his quarters.
The commandant provided refreshments, and the agenda was completely open.
As a student, I found this event to be one of the most stimulating of the year-long
course. As a member of the faculty, I recall that this program was among the
most popular for each class. It requires a good deal of the commandant’s time,
but it gives him or her a special opportunity to serve as a role model, contribute
to the education of each student, and become aware of what each student is
thinking. Given the size of the present resident class, this could be a tall, even un-
manageable order. However, it might be possible to share the burden with senior
officers from Washington who are amenable, or with retired general and flag of-
ficers in the area.
Encourage student research. Facilitate the work of officers who have always
wanted to write on a professional topic, no matter how esoteric, but have never
had the time. A listing of topics on which research would be immediately helpful
to Army planners encourages students who are not already attached to a particu-
lar subject. Such a list has existed, but it should be screened and pruned to ensure
that the topics are suitable for student research. At the same time, resist attempts
to employ students during their academic year to work on “real world” issues—
even important studies, critical exercises, or crucial missions—that require an-
swers and decisions now. Short-term utility can have long-term cost.
The Army War College is fortunate to have both a civilian professor of ethics
and an Army chaplain on the faculty. For a number of years there has been an
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ethical component in the curriculum. On concerns ranging from just war theory
to right personal conduct and proper understanding of the ethical dimensions of
strategic leadership, future senior leaders need the opportunity to learn, study,
and reflect. The commandant must not only ensure that the curriculum is prop-
erly developed in this regard but provide an institutional atmosphere that sup-
ports high ethical standards. Ethical and moral considerations must permeate
studies.
The utility of distance learning has already been raised, but there is an aspect
that requires special attention. There are five senior service colleges; it should be
possible to develop horizontal distance-learning applications—that is, in com-
mon among the colleges—as well as vertical ones (within each college). At-
tempts have already been made to link activities, particularly exercises, of two or
more war colleges. This seems a fertile area for immediate development: lectures
could be shared, seminar groups could interact, and joint student research proj-
ects could be developed. As the senior service colleges explore and evaluate new
technologies that enable them to export their curricula in new ways to students
not in residence, they should also accelerate exploration of how this technology
will enable them to work more closely together.
MAJOR GENERAL STANLEY WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE US
When this article was in its first drafts, American forces were at the gates of
Baghdad; the international airport at its outskirts had just been seized by ele-
ments of the 3rd Infantry Division. The tasks assigned to ground forces in the
subsequent pacification of the country and its rehabilitation have been contro-
versial if not unique in our military history. Again, strategic military leaders
have been called upon to adapt as they lead hundreds of thousands of soldiers,
marines, sailors, and airmen in harm’s way at the call of our elected officials.
Again, the officer corps is meeting that test masterfully.
How much the military senior education system contributes to the effective-
ness of the officer corps is extremely hard to measure in concrete ways. But if an-
alytical methods are inadequate, common sense suggests that we would be hard
pressed to overestimate the importance of the senior service colleges. The costs
involved are minute compared to most other aspects of U.S. defense expendi-
tures. Nonetheless, the future shape of senior officer education is unclear at this
point. A cost-saving formula—one that necessarily limits the great advantages
of the present system in terms of development of the professional officer—could
be adopted. It is more likely that the present system, in some modified form, will
prevail. In either event, there are certain fundamental requirements that should
be met if a professional officer corps out of which senior strategic leaders can
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arise is to be maintained. This article has offered some ways to address these
requirements.
The education of future senior officers will remain essential for the formula-
tion and execution of national security policy. Senior leaders must keep in mind
and understand the differences between the long-term impact of professional
education and the often short-term, if equally important, purpose of military
training. Attendance at the Army War College (as well as the other senior service
colleges) should remain the lodestone of the profession of arms. Membership in
its faculty should be considered an accolade by the entire military profession.
Both a new Army Chief of Staff and an Army War College commandant have re-
cently assumed their duties. They now jointly bear the prime responsibility and
enjoy the opportunity to preserve and improve the already excellent senior offi-
cer education system for the benefit of the nation and future members of the
armed forces.
NOTE S
1. Donald F. Bletz, “The ‘Modern Major Gen-
eral’ (Vintage 1980),” Parameters 4, no. 3
(1974).
2. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 30.
3. Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A
History of the U.S. Army War College, rev. ed.
(Carlisle Barracks, Penna.: Alumni Associa-
tion of the U.S. Army War College, 1994),
pp. 501ff.
4. U.S. Army War College curriculum pam-
phlet, 2003.
5. The development of the Army War College
curriculum over the past century is beyond
the scope of this article, but it has not been
without difficulties. Focus is always a prob-
lem as Army Chiefs of Staff and Comman-
dants come and go, sometimes in rapid
succession and with quite different ideas. For a
summary of this process, see Ball, pp. 491–99.
6. A master of strategic studies degree has been
conferred on graduating students since the
class of 2000. Full accreditation is expected in
2003. The Army War College emphasizes that
this is a professional degree, not a degree in
either the arts or sciences. This is philosophi-
cally consistent with the nature of the college
as a professional institution.
7. The directive that prescribes the academic re-
port, AR 623-1, “Academic Evaluation Re-
porting System,” describes (chap. 4) senior
service college evaluations only in broad out-
line. The regulation perpetuates a system of
doubtful value. As president of a senior ser-
vice college selection board in the late 1980s, I
found these reports, as prepared, the least
useful of all tools available for evaluation. I
doubt that assignment officers seriously con-
sult them today.
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A LARGER MEANING, A LARGER PURPOSE
Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, U.S. Navy
We must always be thinking about the next war, about the twenty-first cen-tury. The only thing that we can say with certainty is that things will
change. They will change dramatically, and we will be surprised.
Twenty-nine years ago, when I matriculated at the Naval War College in Au-
gust 1974, the world was also undergoing a time of great change and surprise.
President Richard Nixon resigned, and Gerald Ford became president. Con-
gressman Carl Albert was the speaker of the House. Mike Mansfield was the ma-
jority leader. The year I graduated, 1975, was a very difficult one for me and for
the nation. The Vietnam experience was coming to a conclusion when on 30
April we evacuated Saigon, which became Ho Chi Minh City. I remember the
College’s military-media conference of that year, and its uneasy tension. That
year saw the beginning of the end of the old system in Congress: that year the
Democratic Congress came back; Congressman F. Edward Hebert from Louisi-
ana was replaced as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee by
Melvin Price; and John Stennis became the Chairman of the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee. Retention in the Navy was 15 percent on a good day. The com-
bat readiness of our forces was abysmal. We were plagued by drug abuse and
racial tension.
Not all was bad and disheartening. There were good things happening in the
armed forces. The draft had ended in 1973, and we were just beginning to evolve
into the all-volunteer force that today serves our nation so well. The
twenty-eight years since then is 25 percent of the life of the Naval War College.
Since its establishment in 1884, the College has formed the professional soul of
over twenty-five thousand officers and senior government officials from fifty
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nations around the world and has produced some of the nations’ most influen-
tial leaders across all walks of public service—the best and brightest of our na-
tion’s services, departments, and agencies, as well as those of other nations.
Graduates of this fine institution have walked on the moon and have become
service chiefs, ambassadors, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and even
heads of state—for instance, the president of Lebanon, President Emile Lahud.
The academic year that I spent here determined my fate. That was
twenty-nine years ago, which means one of two things—that I am very old now
(perhaps true) or that I was very young when I attended the College (also true).
When I arrived as a student, I had been in the Navy five years. I had been a lieu-
tenant for all of two years, and I was raring to learn something. I had heard that
lieutenants were wanted at the Naval War College. I had just finished my first sea
tour and was an A-7 Crusader instructor pilot at Cecil Field near Jacksonville,
Florida. There, as one of perhaps fifty lieutenants, I was unhappy about the lead-
ership—all that mattered was logging flight hours and carrier landings. Our na-
tion did not, I thought, spend the money it did for aircraft carriers, the aircraft on
them, the support they required, and our training simply so that we could fill up
our logbooks; there had to be some larger meaning, some larger purpose. I could
not quite figure it out myself, and none of my leaders could explain it to me.
So I asked the officer assignment branch in Washington to send me to New-
port. The detailer advised me to inform my commanding officer, which I did.
That was a naive thing to do, because I did not expect his response. My CO threw
me out of his office; he did not want anyone in “his Navy,”he said, who would give
up a seat in a cockpit to go to the Naval War College. That was how I came to this
great institution with a fitness report from my former command that the Bureau
of Personnel might use as an example of how to write a damning evaluation.
I was disgruntled. It was a hard time for our military. I had effectively been
kicked out of naval aviation, and I did not know if I was going to stay in the Navy.
But Newport embraced me, and I embraced it. I felt that I was in the presence of
greatness; it started to change my attitude, my worldview. My seminar mates in-
cluded two lieutenant commanders eight years senior to me; both of them (Lieu-
tenant Commanders Ted Lockhart and Len Oden; they both later became
distinguished flag officers) were wonderful role models for me. My professors—
Bing West in Strategy and Policy, and Rich Lloyd in National Security Decision
Making—showed remarkable patience with this immature, precocious lieuten-
ant. It made a difference. They began to teach me what critical thinking was
really about. I remember a case study about close air support. Of course, being
an A-7 pilot, I had strong opinions and gave my two cents’ worth about how
the Air Force never really wanted to do close air support and therefore never
really wanted to buy the A-7. An Air Force major, fresh from supplying close air
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support to the Army in Vietnam, let me have it right between the eyes. I will
never forget that; when he was done with me, I thought to myself, perhaps I don’t
know everything.
I began to think about the business that I was in. I was no longer just a pilot
trying to fill up my logbook; I was a member of the national security profession,
and national security was, in my view, the nation’s highest calling. As my eyes
opened, I began to realize that though I was very proud to be a pilot, flying was
simply a means to an end, not an end in itself. So many of my commanding offi-
cers had thought it was the end of the world when their command tours ended
and they went to desk jobs. That, I thought, cannot be right. So it was that my wife
Joy and I had one of those kitchen-table conversations and made the decision that
I would stay in the Navy. My Naval War College study was to serve me well.
As the institution’s founder, Commodore Stephen B. Luce, declared, the Na-
val War College was established as a place to study the art and science of war. The
aim is simply to invite officers to meet together to discuss questions pertaining
to the higher branches of their profession and to enable each one, according to
his or her inclination, to prepare for the highest and most responsible duties that
can devolve upon a naval officer. That is exactly what this institution did for me.
It extended my horizons to the higher branches of this profession, and I will ever
be in its debt.
On 3 October 1889, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain—a distinguished Civil
War soldier who, like me, was modestly proud of being from Maine—declared at
the dedication of the Maine monuments of the Gettysburg battlefield, “In great
deeds something abides.” The founding of this institution was a great deed. The
spirit and legacy of inquisitive and critical study of the higher branches of the
military profession will abide in each of its students as they lead our Navy, our
armed forces, and our nation in the twenty-first century.
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THE CASUALTY-AVERSION MYTH
Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., U.S. Army
It’s easy to see. . . . [P]eople go off to war and the bands play and the
flags fly. And it’s not quite so easy when the flag is draped over a coffin
coming back through Dover, Delaware.
SENATOR JOHN GLENN, 1997
What is the nature of the American public’s sensitivity to U.S. military ca-sualties? How does casualty sensitivity affect the pursuit of American
national security objectives?1 The first question is easy to answer: There is no in-
trinsic, uncritical casualty aversion among the American public that limits the
use of U.S. armed forces. There is a wide range of policy objectives on behalf of
which the public is prepared to accept American casualties as a cost of success.
Squeamishness about even a few casualties for all but the most important na-
tional causes is a myth. Nonetheless, it is a myth that persists as widely accepted
conventional wisdom.
The second question is more difficult to answer. Avoidance of casualties is an
unassailably desirable objective. It is precisely the natural nobility of the argu-
ment that makes it susceptible to misuse in the policy-making process, poten-
tially leading to ineffective or inefficient choices. The persistence of the myth
also causes adversaries to misjudge the likely reactions of the United States. In
both of these ways, the myth of deep-seated casualty aversion among the Ameri-
can public hinders the pursuit of American national objectives.
The evidence indicates that the public response to casualties is a function of
leadership and consensus among national policy elites, who have wide latitude
in this area. They should not allow concern about casualties to replace thorough
consideration of the larger context of costs and benefits. National leaders
must not let unsubstantiated assertions of American casualty aversion dis-
tort the national security policy-making process or compromise professional
military ethics.
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This article briefly describes the nature of American casualty sensitivity,
identifies some prominent negative effects of widespread acceptance of the ca-
sualty myth, and offers recommendations that may produce a more accurate un-
derstanding of the American public’s casualty sensitivity.
AMERICAN CASUALTY SENSITIVITY
Are the American people in fact reluctant to risk lives? In a superficial and un-
helpful sense, the American public is always reluctant to risk lives, particularly if
there is some other reasonable way to accomplish objectives. No one wants
casualties.
Myth and Conventional Wisdom
We had 500 casualties a week when we [the Nixon administration] came into
office. America now is not willing to take any casualties. Vietnam produced a
whole new attitude.
HENRY KISSINGER, 1999
It’s obvious that there’s a political agenda to have low casualties. . . . If my Achilles’
heel is the low tolerance of the American people for casualties, then I have to recog-
nize that my success or failure in this mission [in Bosnia] is directly affected by that.
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM L. NASH, 1996
[America is] a nation intolerant of casualties.
EDWARD LUTTWAK, 1995
And the hearts that beat so loudly and enthusiastically to do something, to intervene
in areas where there is not an immediate threat to our vital interests, when those
hearts that had beaten so loudly see the coffins, then they switch, and they say: “What
are we doing there?”
SENATOR WILLIAM COHEN (LATER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)
These are just some of the many similar expressions of the conventional wis-
dom of American public casualty aversion.2 The conventional wisdom is strong
among civilian, military, and media elites. Steven Kull and I. M. Destler have re-
corded many interviews—with members of Congress and their staffs, the media,
the executive branch, and leaders of nongovernmental organizations—that sup-
port this view.3 Other interviews with members of the media and military lead-
ers also confirm a widespread belief that the American public is unwilling to
accept casualties.4
The wellspring of this conventional wisdom is generally understood to be the
Vietnam War, as reinforced by experiences in Lebanon (1983) and Somalia
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(1993). The tremendous efforts by civilian and military leaders to minimize ca-
sualties in other operations—the Persian Gulf War (1991), Haiti (1994), Bosnia
(1995), and Kosovo (1999)—can be read as a reaction to the public’s purported
low tolerance for casualties. Rising casualties in Iraq following the end of “major
combat operations” have also been portrayed as an important factor affecting
the public’s willingness to support the mission. The abandonment of military
intervention in several instances in which it was seriously considered has also
been attributed to casualty aversion. Examples include the Balkans (before
1995), Rwanda (1994), and Zaire/Congo (1995).
Manifestations of this conventional wisdom are many and widespread—
the “Vietnam syndrome,” the “Dover test,” the “CNN effect,” part of the
Weinberger/Powell doctrine, the concept of “post-heroic warfare,” and a social
equity effect attributed to the absence of American civilian elites and their chil-
dren from military service.
The “Vietnam syndrome” is commonly understood as a general reticence
among Americans to use military force abroad as a result of negative lessons of
the Vietnam experience. It is “that revulsion at the use of military power that af-
flicted our national psyche for decades after our defeat.”5 It is a comprehensive
generalization about the American public’s unwillingness to continue to sup-
port U.S. foreign military efforts, particularly as casualties rise. This aspect of
the Vietnam syndrome relates casualty aversion to the idea that public support
for military operations in Vietnam declined because of the human costs of the
war.6 A variant attributing the decline in popular support to media portrayals of
events in Vietnam has fed negative attitudes toward the media, particularly
among many members of the military.
Senator John Glenn’s “Dover test” (alluded to in the first epigraph, above) re-
fers to the American public’s assumed response to American service people
returning to the United States in flag-draped coffins. This oft-repeated image
symbolizes the cost in casualties of American military operations. In an interest-
ing response to its presumed visceral effect, the Department of Defense has pro-
hibited media coverage of such events since 1989: “There will be no arrival
ceremonies for, or media coverage of, deceased military personnel returning to
or departing from Dover AFB [Air Force Base] or Ramstein AFB [in Germany],
to include interim stops.”7 In a sense, this provides an official endorsement of the
presumption that casualties have a powerful effect on the public.
The “CNN effect” refers broadly to the purported impact of certain types of
visual images, to include American casualties, when broadcast on the news. Like
the Dover test, it suggests that visual images of casualties will elicit an immediate
response from the public. Its various formulations convey the idea that the pub-
lic can respond precipitately to gut-wrenching depictions of human suffering,
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not only military casualties but starving children and other civilian victims of
war.8 This dynamic is also assumed to induce a similar visceral response to such
dramatic pictures as those of the body of an American soldier being dragged
through the streets of Mogadishu in 1993.9
The Weinberger/Powell doctrine is a set of six tests, drawn in part from the
Vietnam War experience, that, its advocates believe, should govern the use of
American military power.10 One test is the presence or absence of the support of
the American public and its elected representatives. In policy debates consider-
ing the use of force, it is in the framework of this test that assertions about the
willingness of the public to handle casualties enter decision making.11
“Post-heroic warfare” is the idea that the scope of casualties resulting from
the clash of armies at close quarters is no longer tolerable to the American pub-
lic. Edward Luttwak asserts that America is “a nation intolerant of casualties”;12
he relates this to the decreasing size of American families in the post–World War
II era. Luttwak believes that there exists a powerful unwillingness among Ameri-
cans to permit military operations that might endanger their children.
Finally, sociologist Charles Moskos posits that the American public’s sensi-
tivity is a function of inequitable social relations created by the absence of elite
members of society or their children in the ranks of the military. “Only when the
privileged classes perform military service does the country define the cause as
worth young people’s blood. Only when elite youth are on the firing line do war
losses become more acceptable.”13
THE NUANCED REALITY
Nonetheless, there are many interests and national objectives for which Ameri-
cans have readily found the risk of casualties an acceptable cost. There is in fact
no evidence that the public is intrinsically casualty averse. Several studies based
on polling data demonstrate that the American public is willing to accept casual-
ties when the need and the likely consequences are explained to them by national
leaders. This readiness is not restricted to issues of vital national interests or
self-defense. The public takes its lead from how national leaders characterize
and justify the mission. Leadership plays a crucial role in influencing how the
public responds to casualties.
One of the best studies on this topic is Eric V. Larson’s Casualties and Consen-
sus.14 In this detailed study, Larson explores the relationship between public sup-
port for military operations and the level of casualties for World War II, Korea,
Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Panama, the 1991–92 Gulf war,
and Somalia. The findings are very instructive.
Majorities of the public have historically considered the potential and actual casual-
ties in U.S. wars and military operations to be an important factor in their support,
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and there is nothing new in this. But the current attention to the public’s unwilling-
ness to tolerate casualties misses the larger context in which the issue has become
salient: The simplest explanation consistent with the data is that support for U.S.
military operations and the willingness to tolerate casualties are based upon a sensi-
ble weighing of benefits and costs that is influenced heavily by consensus (or its
absence) among political leaders.15
Further, casualties do not trigger an immediate public desire for withdrawal
from an operation. Both in Vietnam and in Somalia, for example, the public was
willing to accept casualties even as the political leaders signaled that the United
States would extract itself. The public supported orderly, not precipitous, with-
drawal. In both cases, Larson’s analysis suggests that an important consideration
was the public’s support for continued engagement until prisoner or hostage is-
sues were resolved.16
In a study that differentiated between the mass public, civilian elites, and mil-
itary elites, Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi found the mass public more will-
ing than policy elites to accept casualties in hypothetical national missions
ranging from conventional war to peacekeeping and humanitarian interven-
tion. They also found civilian elites more ready than military leaders to accept
casualties in intervention missions short of conventional war.17
Polling data indicates that though the American public’s willingness to accept
casualties is related to the strength of U.S. interests involved, a wide range of jus-
tifications is acceptable. The public does not require a direct threat to U.S. or al-
lied security or other such vital interests to endorse the use of armed force.
Instead, it supports broader American efforts on behalf of democratization, hu-
manitarian assistance, and cultivation of a favorable international environment
for the United States and other nations, including for the United Nations and
UN peacekeeping.18 Polling related to operations in Afghanistan as well as with
respect to military operations against Iraq also demonstrates robust public sup-
port for military operations, even with expectations of casualties.19 Polling data,
then, reinforces what many analyses have noted over the years—Americans are
motivated by considerations of both realistic national interests and idealistic in-
ternational aspirations.20
NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE CASUALTY-AVERSION ASSERTION
If the response to the supposed casualty aversion is simply the use of alternative
means to accomplish the same objective, there is no problem. Unfortunately,
perceptions of casualty aversion can have more negative effects. Misplaced con-
cern on this point can significantly impede the pursuit of national objectives, in
four main ways.
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Inefficient or Ineffective Execution
Belief that the public cannot withstand casualties can skew choices concerning
the use of force in ways that cause operations to be conducted inefficiently or in-
effectively. Recent combat operations in Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2001–
present) illustrate this point. Another aspect of this negative effect is the manner
in which American armed forces, overly concerned about casualties, pursue
force protection and “zero defects” to such an extent that mission effectiveness is
hindered.
In 1999 in Yugoslavia, NATO found itself in a dilemma partly, if not wholly,
based on the priority given to avoiding friendly casualties. On the first night of
the war, President William Clinton announced that he did not intend to use
ground forces in Kosovo. This knowledge made it possible for the Serbs to hide
weapons and troops—forces that otherwise would have been tactically deployed
and therefore more easily detectable—from the NATO air campaign. Further-
more, the difficulties in accurately targeting from the mandated fifteen-
thousand-foot altitude made accidental civilian deaths and injuries (“collateral
damage”) more likely. Meanwhile, the Serbian forces (regular, police, and irreg-
ular), free to operate near civilian targets that NATO was taking care to avoid,
were able to accelerate their efforts to force Kosovar Albanians to leave.
Ultimately, in terms of lost U.S. lives, the Kosovo operation was a resounding
success, if not a rapid one. In terms, however, of one of the operation’s principal
objectives—support for the Kosovar Albanians and an end to ethnic cleansing
and atrocities—the effect was less gratifying. Did an unwillingness to threaten,
much less use, ground forces or to deliver lower-level and more accurate aerial
attacks exacerbate and extend the suffering of the people we intended to help? A
counterfactual but plausible argument suggests that military tactics that would
have posed greater risks to friendly forces would also have ended the conflict
more swiftly and, quite possibly, with much smaller loss of life overall.
Casualty aversion hindered operational effectiveness in Kosovo in other ways
as well. For instance, Task Force HAWK, which combined Apache attack helicop-
ters and the Army Tactical Missile System, was not given permission to attack in-
side Kosovo because, among other things, Serbian targets, having been
dispersed, were no longer appropriate targets for the Apaches, which had been
designed to attack massed armored formations. The modest rewards expected
from flushing out dispersed Serb units was outweighed in the minds of many
Americans involved by the high risk of casualties.21 An Air Force officer assigned
to one of the key NATO intelligence centers said, “If he [Slobodan Milosevic]
kills one U.S. pilot, he wins. . . . [H]e knows that, and we know that.”22 This view
had much to do with keeping Task Force HAWK sidelined.
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The negative effect of excessive casualty aversion was evident in the war in
Afghanistan, despite the clear, self-defense justification for the operation and its
overwhelming public support.
Addressing the nation when the bombs began to fall on 7 October, Bush said the
troops might have to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. Despite such warn-
ings, there is some evidence that U.S. officials have questioned whether Americans
would accept significant casualties, in spite of polls indicating that they would. An
adviser to senior Pentagon officials said concerns about high American casualties led
the Bush administration to craft a strategy that relied on air power and small num-
bers of commandos, as opposed to tens of thousands of American ground troops.
“They are risk-averse about casualties,” said the adviser, who requested anonymity.
“They didn’t know what we were facing.”23
An important cost of this approach was the failure to capture or destroy large
numbers of al-Qa‘ida and Taliban forces—and possibly Osama Bin Laden him-
self—during the Tora Bora fight of December 2001.
It was widely acknowledged that the attacks on al-Qa‘ida and its Taliban hosts
had been forced upon Americans as a matter of self-defense. As after Pearl
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MASS VERSUS ELITE OPINION
The poll upon which analysts Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi based their
assertion of the relative willingness of the mass public to countenance casual-
ties was conducted between September 1998 and June 1999. It addressed
hypothetical missions to “stabilize a democratic government in Congo,”
“prevent Iraq from obtaining weapons of mass destruction,” and “defend
Taiwan against invasion by China.” In each case the public identified a higher
level of acceptable casualties than did samples of elite military leaders and ci-
vilian elite leaders. Significantly, in each case the number of acceptable casu-
alties to the public was in the thousands. The question even included a
description of how many casualties the U.S. had actually suffered in Somalia
(forty-three), the Gulf War (383), Korea (approximately fifty-four thousand),
Vietnam (approximately fifty-eight thousand) and World War II (approxi-
mately four hundred thousand). Results:
Polling sample: 623 military officers, 683 nonveteran civilian elites, 1,001
adults from the general public. In addition to Feaver and Gelpi’s Washington
Post article (note 17), see Triangle Institute for Security Studies, “Project on
the Gap between the Military and Civilian Society: Digest of Findings and
Studies,” Conference on the Military and Civilian Society, Cantigny Confer-
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Harbor, Americans were strongly committed to fighting the perpetrators of
mass murder and their accomplices. Polls conducted in the months after 11 Sep-
tember 2001 demonstrated willingness to accept the risks of significant ground
force operations, even high casualties.24
The initial U.S. military forces on the ground included small contingents of
special operations forces coordinating the support by American aerial attacks of
the operations of Afghan allies. The strategy worked brilliantly in the first phase,
unseating the Taliban government and seizing major population centers. How-
ever, even when the enemy was pushed into the mountainous hinterlands, the
same American strategy continued—a low-level commitment of U.S. ground and
air power, in favor of heavy reliance on local coalition partners. In retrospect, it
appears that as a result large numbers of enemy soldiers and leaders were able in
December 2001 to escape into neighboring Pakistan or remote areas of Afghani-
stan.25 Having interests different from those of the American forces, local Afghan
coalition members appear to have made deals that permitted these escapes.
[An Afghan] commander, Hajji Zaher, said in an interview in Jalalabad that he had
pleaded with Special Forces officers to block the trails to Pakistan. “The Americans
would not listen,” said Mr. Zaher, 38. “Their attitude was, ‘We must kill the enemy,
but we must remain absolutely safe.’ This is crazy. If they had been willing to take ca-
sualties to capture Osama then, perhaps they’d have to take fewer casualties now.”26
A more substantial American ground force might have crippled al-Qa‘ida—
that is, would have better achieved the national objective at Tora Bora. A stron-
ger American effort could have rendered ineffective enemy fighters intent on
continuing attacks against American or allied forces in Afghanistan, maybe even
disrupted or destroyed cells dedicated to further terrorist attacks on the United
States itself. The additional risks would have been easy to justify. If casualty aver-
sion among military leaders was a significant factor in this misjudgment, the im-
plication is that the military, for institutionally dysfunctional reasons, may be
unwilling to accept prudent risks in the pursuit of national interests—even
when public support is unequivocal.
This unhealthy state of affairs is a factor not only at the upper levels of mili-
tary and civilian leadership. As emphasis on risk avoidance filters down the
chain of command, junior commanders and their soldiers become aware that
low-risk behavior is expected and act accordingly. As Brigadier General Daniel
Kaufman, dean of academics at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, has said,
What it [priority on force protection] says is officers no longer have the right to use
their judgment, to make decisions based on the situation on the ground and act deci-
sively in accordance with what they believe to be the requirements of carrying out
their mission. You do not deploy somewhere to protect yourself. If you want to do
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that you stay in Kansas. You deploy somewhere to accomplish a mission. And, oh, by
the way, an ancillary part of that is you never put your soldiers in harm’s way reck-
lessly, but you understand that in operations that’s the nature of war.27
Concerned about the effects of any casualties, then, commanders and small-
unit leaders become hesitant to act, fearing that even small events at the tactical
level could have important strategic effects.28
Recent studies have revealed the existence in the services of a degree of safety
consciousness and focus on risk assessment that reinforces risk aversion in gen-
eral.29 To prevent the automatic investigations and presumptions of error that
attend any death—in peace or war—commanders make tremendous efforts to
avoid such an event and, in some cases, to shield themselves from blame if a fa-
tality does occur. Such efforts, however well intentioned or understandable in
themselves, are inappropriate and even professionally unethical if they override
mission accomplishment. “Force protectionism” as an end in itself can corrupt
professional standards of service to society, as represented by the assignment of
the mission in the first place.30 It places the interests of the members of the
armed forces and of the institutions themselves first, and the mission second.
Emboldening Adversaries
Another negative effect of embracing the unsupported conventional wisdom on
casualty aversion is that it needlessly encourages American adversaries. With re-
spect to the 1999 war in Kosovo, the NATO commander, General Wesley Clark,
observed,
There was continuous commentary on the fear of NATO to accept military casual-
ties. This, unfortunately, is unlikely to be unique to this operation. Of course, using
friendly personnel on the ground risks friendly casualties. Neither political nor mili-
tary leaders will want to take these risks. But our adversaries will exploit our reluc-
tance by facing us with the dilemma of either inflicting accidental injuries to civilians
or risking our own people on their territory.31
There are numerous examples of the perception by foreigners that the United
States is unwilling to risk casualties.32 This perception has been a factor in the
considerations of the nation’s enemies. Saddam Hussein before the 1991 Gulf
War, Slobodan Milosevic before the Kosovo War in 1999, and Osama Bin Laden
and al-Qa‘ida generally in 2001 all appear to have had great confidence that the
United States lacked the moral courage to face a deadly military confrontation.
This assurance made them less susceptible to diplomatic maneuvers or military
threats. They seem to have considered the prospect of U.S. military action, par-
ticularly the use of ground troops, a bluff.
During the first Gulf war, it appears that the central element of Saddam’s
strategy was to keep his forces in place during the air war and wait for the ground
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attack, when, he believed, they would be able to inflict massive casualties and
therefore cause the United States to give up. “Saddam Hussein clearly believed
that his greatest chance of success lay in inflicting the maximum number of ca-
sualties on coalition forces through close combat.”33 In the 2003 war, the appar-
ent Iraqi plan to draw the coalition into an urban battle in Baghdad seemed to
have presumed that the Iraqi army would cause unacceptable U.S. casualties.
The guerrilla-style war that (at this writing) still continues in Iraq, whether rep-
resenting the organized resistance of remnants of the former regime or external
terrorist groups, also seems based on the premise that simply inflicting casual-
ties on American forces will break the will of the American public and thereby
lead to withdrawal.
The supposed American glass jaw with respect to casualties is often con-
nected to the battle in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, in 1993. In another in-
cident that seemed to reinforce this point, Haitian thugs prevented the USS
Harlan County (LST 1196) docking and offloading troops in Port-au-Prince just
a week after the battle in Mogadishu.34 Osama Bin Laden was to cite Somalia as a
reason to expect to be able to force the United States to withdraw from the Mid-
dle East. In his 1996 declaration of war on the United States, Osama Bin Laden
dismissed the idea that the United States would be able to sustain support for a
military response if it suffered casualties.
Your most disgraceful case was in Somalia, where after vigorous propaganda about
the power of the USA and its post cold war leadership of the new world order you
moved tens of thousands of international force, including twenty eight thousand
American soldiers into Somalia. However, when tens of your soldiers were killed in
minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you
left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you.
Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge,
but these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. You have been disgraced
by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became
very clear.35
To Bin Laden, the fact that the bombings in 1998 of two U.S. embassies in Af-
rica elicited only cruise missile attacks in retaliation was further confirmation of
this weakness.36 Ultimately, the planners of the suicide attacks launched against
the USS Cole and then the World Trade Center and Pentagon appear to have re-
lied heavily on the presumption of acute casualty sensitivity by Americans.37 In
an October 2001 al-Qa‘ida videotape (released just as the U.S. attacks on Af-
ghanistan commenced), Osama Bin Laden’s lieutenant, Ayman Zawahri, ex-
pressed a conviction that the American will to fight would weaken quickly after a
few casualties. The United States would retreat, just as it had “fled in panic from
Lebanon and Somalia.”38
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Casualty/Technology Trade-offs, Force Structure, and Weapon Programs
The American way of war has long been characterized by a search for ways to
substitute firepower for manpower.39 In its most recent manifestation, this laud-
able quest has emphasized the utility of airpower, applied at stand-off range, to
accomplish coercive aims. Airpower has been a valuable force multiplier for the
United States and is regularly advocated in terms not only of effectiveness but of
the higher casualties that ground operations would likely produce. Stating the
argument directly, Edward Luttwak has suggested that the United States focus
more on the development of long-range attack forces, particularly aviation, as
an alternative to ground forces, which he asserts are less usable in practice be-
cause of casualty aversion on the part of the American public.40
Casualty-aversion arguments also provide convenient support for a variety of
particular weapons programs. A typical example is the Crusader artillery pro-
gram. Informed that the system was under consideration for cancellation, Army
officials attempted to defend the system by lobbying members of Congress that
its termination would put soldiers’ lives “at risk.”41 This argument, however, was
more sensitive than the Army knew and seems to have had much to do with the
rather nasty and public manner in which the issue was finally resolved: the cancel-
lation occurred more swiftly than originally envisioned, the Army was flailed in
public, and the person responsible for drafting the “talking points” lost his job.42
Another example was opposition to STREETFIGHTER, a prospective naval
weapon system, on the premise that it posed a casualty risk. The concept was to
complement the small number of high-cost large warships that currently domi-
nate the Navy force structure with more numerous, smaller ships. Like the PT
boats of World War II, these boats would provide flexibility and a capability to
attack close to shore. Larger numbers and smaller crews make individual
STREETFIGHTER ships less indispensable to the overall force. Unlike the PT boats
of World War II, however, they would not be expendable—because of the poten-
tial effect of the loss of even their small crews.43
Exaggerated concern about casualties can inhibit the selection and develop-
ment of new systems that can add important capabilities and improve the
effectiveness of the armed forces. It may also impede the progress of
transformational tactics and approaches—swarming, dispersed operations,
network-centric warfare—that by their nature would not provide the degree of
force protection afforded by large platforms and massed formations.
Self-Constraint in the Use of Armed Forces
Another negative effect is the failure or reluctance to use the U.S. armed forces at
all, due to mistaken beliefs about the public’s likely response. To the degree that
policy makers believe that the American public cannot endure casualties, leaders
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may well decide that the risk of casualties is disproportionate to the value of an
objective and refrain from taking action in situations. This effect was apparent
in debate over use of force in Bosnia (1992–94) and in Rwanda (1994).44 Failure
to intervene probably saved U.S. lives, but counterfactual (yet plausible) scenar-
ios in both cases suggest that hundreds of thousands of lives could have been
saved by intervention, and peace and stability reestablished much earlier.
Assertions of casualty aversion may simply reflect the normative preference
of individuals for what the public ought to find acceptable or not. Speaking of
the pursuit of Serb war criminals under the Dayton accords, the former com-
mander of the Implementation Force in Bosnia, Admiral Leighton Smith, gives
an example:
What’s it going to take and what’s it going to cost? Then I’ve got to feed that back to
the politicians. . . . “All right, you want me to do this, this is the price.” Remember
what I said about the war criminals [whom the military might be asked to arrest]?
“You want me to do that, it’s going to cost you lives. We’re going to get people killed
doing this. I might have to go to Kansas and tell Johnny’s mama that he got his head
blown off trying to arrest [Ratko] Mladic [a Bosnian Serb military leader and in-
dicted war criminal] in a coffee shop somewhere. Or better, in a bunker.”45
In this formulation, it is not a matter of whether the public is willing to accept
casualties but this officer’s opinion that the public ought not to accept casualties
for this mission. In this way the public’s supposed casualty aversion may become
a screen for other objections to a particular mission. It may be easier and more
morally persuasive to invoke casualty concerns than to pursue a complex or sen-
sitive argument.
POLICY APPLICATIONS
The concept of the American public’s casualty aversion is a myth—an inappro-
priate oversimplification of an important issue. The fundamental policy need is
to reject this oversimplification—leaders must understand the more complex
reality of the public’s reaction to casualties, a reality that in fact affords wide lati-
tude. With a better grasp of this issue, national leaders can avoid errors that dis-
tort the policy-making process and corrupt professional military ethics.
Latitude for Leadership
The likely response of the American public to casualties is primarily an issue of
leadership. As many studies have noted, even when support for a military opera-
tion wanes over time there is no compelling evidence that the public expects ei-
ther immediate withdrawal or escalation simply in response to casualties. The
American public weighs the costs and benefits of the use of force, and the inter-
ests involved. In general the public takes a permissive view, one that allows
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national leaders tremendous discretion to launch military operations and to
persevere in them even as casualties mount. It’s about leadership.
Elected civilian leaders play a critical role in shaping the public’s response to
casualties and in characterizing the missions for which they may be incurred.
The dynamic is somewhat circular—the extent of public willingness to abide ca-
sualties is a function of the degree of consensus among policy leaders, whereas
public reaction to cost has much to do with how elites present the situation.
Congressional leaders and their agreement with the administration, or lack of it,
have an important effect on the public’s sensitivity to casualties. Average citizens
perceive policy elites—privy to classified material and detailed analysis, sub-
jected to innumerable inputs from interest and advocacy groups, and served by
extensive staffs—as better placed than themselves to weigh costs and benefits.
Unsurprisingly, opinion on such major issues as the use of force reflects a “fol-
lower effect,” whereby individuals take their cues from the nation’s civilian and
military leaders. There is also evidence that members of political parties tend to
favor the positions and policies supported by their parties’ leaders—particularly
when those leaders include the president.46
This understanding also reveals a certain circularity in the Weinberger/
Powell rules—that is, though it is undeniably desirable to have American public
support for any military operation, the public takes its cue from the political
leadership as a whole. Broad agreement among national leaders tends to give the
public confidence that the costs of action, including casualties, are being in-
curred in support of important national interests. If the country’s leaders are
unsure, the public is unlikely to accept the price willingly.
The public’s tolerance for a particular level of casualties in a specific case is
not predictable. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that casualties exceed-
ing original expectations may generate greater scrutiny over military operations
in question, without changing the commitment to the objectives sought. In fact,
it is common for such sacrifices to cement more firmly the commitment of those
who favored force in the first place. Casualties already suffered, far from being
dismissed as “sunk costs,” are often perceived as requiring redemption, increas-
ing the value of the original purpose.
Not only are the dynamics of casualties difficult to anticipate, there is a natu-
ral tendency in the midst of war for casualties to trigger passions that can over-
whelm reasoned consideration of government policy. It is valuable to recall
Clausewitz’s metaphor of the “remarkable trinity” of passion, creativity, and
reason:
As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trin-
ity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded
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as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the cre-
ative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of
policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.47
Policy makers are responsible for managing the application of reason in the
realm of war. This responsibility extends to a clear-headed understanding of the
costs and benefits of military operations and the manner in which their results
are likely to shape the public attitude.
The Cost-Benefit Policy Equation
A nuanced understanding of the public’s willingness to accept casualties should
frame the policy process. Leaders should be careful not to let overemphasis on
casualty avoidance lead to risk-averse behavior that jeopardizes American policy
interests. A misperception of the public’s willingness to accept casualties distorts
the cost-benefit calculations of civilian and military leaders as they consider
when to use military force and how. As General Edward Meyer, former Chief of Staff
of the Army, has warned, “No commander likes to lose soldiers, but if he starts
out with [no casualties] as his goal, nobody is going to accomplish anything.”48
The public’s understanding of casualties is neither capricious nor fickle. The
emotional commitment of liberal societies to the dignity and worth of individu-
als is part of the foundation of those societies. Human costs weigh heavily—but
not too heavily. The public understands and accepts that risks to individuals are
sometimes required by the larger interests of society. The public wants to mini-
mize casualties—not just among members of the American military but also in-
nocent civilians and sometimes even enemy combatants. However, as numerous
studies have shown, the public understands in essence Clausewitz’s dictum that
“war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”49 Military force is
used as a means to a policy end; it is difficult to consider the costs (of which casu-
alties are but one) in isolation from the benefits sought. This is true both in the
midst of conflicts (for example, Korea and Vietnam) and in the consideration of
future military operations. It is extremely difficult to articulate succinctly and in
advance all possible ends of policy against which casualties might be measured.
Moreover, the value of each new casualty is of uncertain subjective weight that
varies tremendously from one citizen to the next.
Evocations of the casualty-aversion assertion by national leaders can, as we
have seen, cause serious problems. They can embolden adversaries and cause
them to overestimate the strategic value of inflicting casualties. They can under-
mine the deterrent effect of American threats that otherwise might have averted
the use of force. Casualty aversion can also give the impression that the United
States is trying to shift to allies casualty risks that it is unwilling to accept itself.
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Technology has significant drawbacks here; the technology/casualty trade-off
debate has been a long one. Again, it is perfectly laudable to pursue methods that
minimize casualties; arguing the converse would be ludicrous. More important,
however, are the strategic effectiveness and opportunity costs that accrue from
the use of various military instruments in singular, sequential or synchronized
ways. The casualty-aversion issue can become a surrogate for decades-old
interservice arguments between airpower and ground-power advocates. Such
often-misdirected disputes focus on the special interests and constituencies of
particular means at the expense of national strategic ends. That an option is os-
tensibly cheaper should not relieve it from the ultimate tests of military effec-
tiveness in achieving national ends. The conviction that technology can or must
substitute for risk to human life has a pernicious tendency to distort the consid-
eration of risks and rewards. Cheaper, less risky means may also make more
likely the use of force in situations of marginal importance—in which the pres-
tige and effectiveness of the United States and its allies may require escalation to
achieve success.50
The Professional Military Ethic
How the American public is likely to react to casualties in a particular case is not
within the scope of military judgment; officers must stick to their own profes-
sional expertise and ethics when rendering advice on the use of armed forces.
One reason that concern about casualties has been allowed to cross over into
military planning is the Weinberger/Powell doctrine. In particular, its fifth
test—which requires “reasonable assurance we will have the support of the
American people”—seems to require judgment by national security planners
about American public opinion.51
Predicting the likelihood and magnitude of casualties in a particular mission is
in itself an appropriate professional judgment, firmly grounded in expert knowl-
edge and military experience. Assessments of the impact of casualties on military
effectiveness are similarly appropriate; for example, a planner would properly rec-
ommend against a course of action in which casualties were likely to render the
force unable to complete the mission. However, judgments of the “social weight”
of casualties or their effect on public opinion are matters for civilian leaders.
Of course, urging civilian leaders to consider that factor in their decisions to
use armed force is appropriate. It is a very weighty matter, touching on impor-
tant values; military leaders should be confident that civilian leaders have care-
fully addressed it. However, suggesting in advance what level of casualties, if any,
the American public would accept, as an element of considered military judg-
ment, is inappropriate. It represents a corruption of the professional military
ethic. Military leaders should recognize the issue of casualty sensitivity for what
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it is—a question of how potential costs will be valued in terms of policy aims. “If
a military officer expresses preferences among policy goals while acting in an of-
ficial capacity, that officer may come to be seen as more a political figure than a
military expert.”52 Such a reputation would undermine the professional credi-
bility of the officer on other issues.53 There is no objective, a priori standard for
predicting the American public’s toleration of casualties on behalf of national
interests—vital, important, routine, or otherwise.
There is no doubt that military leaders have a profound responsibility to their
subordinates and to society more broadly to minimize casualties and take all
prudent and reasonable measures to protect the precious human resources en-
trusted to their care. As servants of society, senior officers are obliged to provide
the best possible professional assessment of military alternatives and their likely
costs. Advice on military capacity to achieve objectives is appropriate; opinions
as to whether the costs or risks are acceptable exceed the professional responsi-
bility of officers.
This is a significant civil-military relations issue. Assessment of the mili-
tary costs and risks of a given operation in support of national policy is an
appropriate element of professional military judgment and the management
of violence, what Clausewitz called the “grammar of war.”54 To decide whether
the costs and risks are worth it is to judge the policy itself. That is a decision
reserved for civilian leaders.
Public casualty aversion is a myth. There is no evidence that the American public
has an intrinsic, uncritical aversion to U.S. military casualties. There is strong
evidence that the American public seriously considers the costs and benefits of
particular missions and that it judges the acceptability of casualties against the
value of objectives. Historically, the relationship between public support for
military operations vis-à-vis the level of casualties has been a function of na-
tional leadership.
The myth’s persistence as widespread conventional wisdom is harmful and
should be vigorously opposed. The myth impedes efforts to achieve national objec-
tives. National leaders—civilian and military—should work to dispel the presump-
tion that the American public will not endure military casualties; this would place
debates on national objectives on a firmer foundation. Dispelling the casualty-
aversion myth would allow more precise and appropriate consideration of when
to use military force, more effective and efficient political and military decisions,
and more accurately communicate American resolve to potential adversaries.
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CORBETT IN ORBIT
A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory
Lieutenant Commander John J. Klein, U.S. Navy
Despite its growing importance, no comprehensive theory of space
power has been formulated.
COLIN GRAY
Since the 1950s, there have been discussions concerning the need to develop aspace power theory.1 In their attempts to formulate such a theory, strategists
have noted the similarities of space operations to those of air and naval opera-
tions. Consequently, many have attempted to derive a clearly articulated, all-
encompassing space theory through analogy and comparison to either airpower
or sea-control models. These efforts, however, as observers like the contempo-
rary historian and strategist Colin Gray have noted, have not produced a theory
addressing space operations and associated national interests.2 Without such a
strategic framework for space, some analysts fear that national resources and
military force will be applied poorly or even counterproductively.
This article, accordingly, addresses the need to cod-
ify a space theory. Do space operations and national
interests in space have in fact useful parallels in either
air or naval operations? If air and naval models do not
fully match the essence of space operations, is there
one that does? Given a suitable historical model, what
are the principles for a space strategy? Would the re-
sulting space strategic model be borne out by contem-
porary observations?
We will argue that neither the air nor naval model
embraces the breadth of space operations and strategy.
However, by expanding naval theory to include broadly
maritime concerns, which incorporate the interaction
of land and sea, the scope of space operations can be
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adequately modeled. In fact, maritime theory already exists, in the work of Sir
Julian Corbett, on the basis of which maritime strategy can be defined and then
the principles of space theory developed. The resulting maritime-based space the-
ory largely meets the test of current observations and ideas while highlighting sig-
nificant areas that contemporary space literature has omitted.
The United States has developed space systems and doctrine quite well with-
out the benefit of space theory; why bother deriving one? The reason is the ad-
age, “You don’t know what you don’t know.” A theory attempts to make sense of
what would otherwise be inscrutable, to set forth “rules of the game” by which
actions become intelligible.3 According to the Prussian military strategist and
theorist Carl von Clausewitz, theory “gives the mind insight into the great mass
of phenomena and of their relationships, then leaves it free to rise into the
higher realms of action.”4
To achieve in connection with space the kind of insight of which Clausewitz
wrote, this article will compare past strategic theories and use the most suitable
model as a framework for a strategic space theory. Using historical theories as a
guide increases the likelihood of developing a meaningful space theory beyond
that which arbitrary choice, pure chance, or blind intuition would allow.5
CURRENT OPERATIONS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
The United States has become increasingly reliant upon space. Space-based
technology enters homes, businesses, schools, hospitals, and government offices
through applications related to transportation, health, the environment, telecom-
munications, education, commerce, agriculture, energy, and military operations.6
Although the range is indeed broad, the nation’s space activities can be di-
vided into four major sectors—civil, commercial, intelligence, and military.7
Civil space activities are those aimed at exploring space and advancing human
understanding; the missions performed by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration fall into this category. Commercial activities are performed by
private companies and industry for profit. The intelligence sector involves sur-
veillance and reconnaissance missions conducted by such government agencies
as the National Reconnaissance Office. Lastly, military activities are those pro-
moting national security through offensive or defensive operations in and
through space. Space-based systems may, consistently with international law,
perform essential functions facilitating military activities on land, in the air,
and on and under the sea.8 Because of the diverse and pervasive nature of the
space activities of the United States, its space operations have implications
spanning all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, economic, tech-
nological, or information.9
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NAVAL AND AIR MODELS
As Colin Gray has observed, space operations have more in common with the
sea and the air than is widely appreciated.10 For just as space operations utilize
ground facilities, up-and-down links to vehicles in orbit, and the satellites them-
selves, so naval and air operations have bases at home and facilities abroad, as
well as ships and planes. Like international airspace and waters, space is open to
all nations; it is free from claims of sovereignty and national appropriation.11 Be-
cause of these similarities, Gray declares, “the history of sea power and air power
offers true precedents for developing a space strategy.”12 For that reason, many el-
ements of current space power theory have been derived from various tenets of
airpower and sea control theories.13
The Air Model
There is no single airpower theory of the comprehensiveness and universality of
Clausewitz’s work on land power.14 Air Marshal Giulio Douhet of Italy is gener-
ally credited with developing the first of the theories of airpower that now exist.15
In his The Command of the Air he contended that aircraft are the solution to stra-
tegic and tactical stalemates, and that all future wars could be won from the air.16
He found the aircraft’s superiority in its offensive characteristics—freedom of
maneuver and speed—which accrue from operating in the air.17 Furthermore,
Douhet’s formula for victory includes gaining command of the air and then
neutralizing the enemy’s vital centers.18
In a supporting view after the First World War, Brigadier General William
“Billy” Mitchell declared, “As air covers the whole world, aircraft are able to go
anywhere on the planet . . . [and] have set aside all ideas of frontiers.”19 Mitchell
held that some air operations, such as strategic bombing, can achieve inde-
pendent results, thereby winning wars through destruction of the enemy’s
war-making capability and will to fight.20 The nation that wins the air war,
Mitchell was convinced, is practically certain to win the entire conflict.21
Early thinkers on space forces considered them simply “high-flying air
forces.”22 For example, U.S. Air Force space doctrine was first established merely
by replacing the word “air” with the coinage “aerospace” in the literature.23 Ac-
cording to aerospace integrationists, space power is no different from airpower,
because it delivers similar products to users.24 Consequently, in that view, no
separate space power theory or definition is warranted, since aerospace power
embraces space operations.25
Nevertheless, many critics have argued against combining air and space theo-
ries, pointing out that the respective propulsive, aerodynamic, and orbital-
mechanics conditions and requirements make air and space quite distinct
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media.26 These differences are manifested in the differing ability of aircraft and
space systems to maneuver and loiter.
If air and space are different media, however, they are made interrelated and
interdependent by shared activities and mutual boundaries. For example, no
space vehicle can ascend into orbit without traversing the air realm. The history
and development of aerospace power theory is, consequently, useful for the deri-
vation of strategic space theory, since it incorporates the interaction of media and
forces. The point is that space theory should be “holistic,” addressing the indirect
effects of space operations on national strategy and nonspace activities.
The Naval Model
Some strategists, pointing to the similarities between sea and space operations,
suggest that the best possible space theory would be achieved by simply substi-
tuting “space” for “sea” in naval strategy.27 Naval theory, however, deals with
ships, shipbuilding, war at sea, and military forces associated with navies.28
Moreover, naval theory is primarily concerned with the means and methods of
employing force at sea to achieve national goals while increasing national power
and prestige. This emphasis on naval operations and fleet actions results in a
“sea” and “navy”-centric perspective. Consequently, the applicability of the na-
val model to space is limited, since it does not adequately encompass the interac-
tion and interdependence of other environments or military forces.
Both air and naval models are relevant to space operations and activities, but
neither possesses the breadth needed for a strategic space theory. The air
model, in its aerospace variant, takes into account the interrelationships of
other forces and environments, but it has a primarily military focus. The naval
model includes national interests, such as prestige and power, but is focused on
naval engagements alone and tends to exclude other operations or forces. Yet
there is a theoretical model that incorporates other mediums and forces, as
aerospace power does, while including broad national interests, as the naval
model does.
A MARITIME MODEL
The term “maritime,” in contrast to “naval,” connotes the whole range of activi-
ties and interests regarding the seas and oceans of the world, and their interrela-
tionships: science, technology, cartography, industry, economics, trade, politics,
international affairs, imperial expansion, communications, migration, inter-
national law, social affairs, and leadership.29 Additionally, maritime theory
includes the interaction between sea and land. Since many national and local
economies have historically depended upon ports for trade and general
6 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
66
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 35
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/35
economic well-being, the need to protect maritime trade with fleets arose. Naval
theory, therefore, is but a subset of maritime theory.
The maritime model, then, appears to match more closely the various issues
of space operations than does either air or naval theory. But a number of major
theoreticians have worked in this field. If maritime theory is to be the framework
of a strategic framework for space, whose version should be used?
The work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, particularly The Influence of Sea Power
upon History 1660–1783, has been frequently employed in this connection.30
Mahan is credited with linking maritime and naval activities to national and in-
ternational issues, as well as with laying out principles for the formulation of na-
val strategy.31 His writings address national policy, sea power, sea control,
offensive versus defensive operations, speed and mobility, communications,
trade, concentration of force, and strategic position.32 Indeed, Mahan is exten-
sively quoted, especially in the United States, to promote a variety of ideas. In the
search for axioms on strategy, his ideas have been “used, misused, superseded,
broadened, and modified.”33 Mahan’s strategic theory, properly understood, in-
sists that the “proper sphere” of the fleet is offensive operations and gives little
attention to matters, such as interaction with land armies, outside the direct ac-
tion of navies and fleets. Consequently, Mahan’s theory does not incorporate ad-
equately for present purposes the interaction and interdependence of other
mediums and forces. If not Mahan, then who?
Perhaps the answer is Sir Julian Corbett, whose work many (though not all)
historians regard highly as a coherent and convincing exposition of maritime
principles.34 Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854–1922), acclaimed as Great Brit-
ain’s greatest maritime strategist, is particularly renowned for his 1911 work
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, a “fusion of history and strategy.”35 Corbett
took up many of the same issues as Mahan, but his writings are widely consid-
ered more accurate, more complete, and “more logically developed” than
Mahan’s.36 Additionally, many historians regard Corbett as the deepest and most
flexible thinker among either maritime or naval theorists.37 Therefore, it is
Corbett’s ideas and principles, from Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, that
we will use as a framework for deriving a strategic space theory.38
Corbett wrote of the implications for national power of maritime operations in
both peace and war. Like Carl von Clausewitz—whom he cites extensively—
Corbett recognized that both land and sea operations are influenced by national
politics and interests. The object of naval warfare being in his view to control
maritime communications, including commercial and economic aspects,
Corbett held that naval action can influence the balance of wealth and power
among nations.39
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Nonetheless, Corbett acknowledged that sea and land operations are interde-
pendent, that naval strategy and operations constitute only a subset of a nation’s
wartime operations. He repeatedly stated the necessity for the closest coopera-
tion of ground and sea forces. In fact, in a departure from the conventional
thought of his day, Corbett considered it of paramount importance that naval
strategy work within the overall national strategy, since it is almost impossible
for war to be decided by naval action alone (Some Principles, page 15). Therefore,
the purpose of maritime strategy is to determine the “mutual relations of your
army and navy in a plan of war” (page 16).40
Another theme of Corbett’s work is “command of the sea,” which he consid-
ers different from the occupation of territory by an army, for the high seas can-
not be subjected to political dominion or ownership. The inherent value of the
sea, in his view, is as a means of communication. Consequently, Corbett defines
command of the sea as the “control of maritime communications, whether for
commercial or military purposes” (94). He explicitly states, however, that to
command the sea is a relative advantage, not an absolute; it does not mean that
the enemy cannot act, only that it cannot seriously interfere with one’s actions.
The normal state of affairs, Corbett observes, is not a commanded sea but an un-
commanded one—that is, command of the sea is normally in dispute (91).
Maritime communications pertain to those routes by which the flow of “na-
tional life is maintained ashore”; therefore, they have a broader meaning than
land lines of communication and are not analogous to those traditionally used
by armies (93, 100).41 While maritime communications include supply and
trade, they also include lines of communication that are of a strategic nature and
are thus critical for a nation’s survival. The objective of controlling maritime
communications is protection of one’s own commerce and interference with the
enemy’s economic interests, ultimately the defeat of the adversary’s “power of
resistance” (102). Corbett argues that the primary object of the fleet, therefore, is
to secure sea lines of communication, putting the enemy’s fleet out of action if it
is in a position to render them unsafe (102).
For Corbett, offensive operations are called for when political objectives ne-
cessitate acquiring something from the enemy; as a more “effective” (his term)
form of war than the defensive, offensive operations should be the preference of
the stronger power (31). Notwithstanding the advantage of the offensive, how-
ever, even a superior naval force seeking a decisive victory will likely find the en-
emy in a position where he cannot easily be affected; throughout naval history
fleets have been able to thwart attempts to force decisive battle by retiring to the
safety of coasts and ports (158). Still, and despite this limitation, Corbett ex-
pressed concern that some naval professionals made a fetish of the offensive.
Corbett argued that defensive operations should not be shunned or avoided;
6 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
68
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 35
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/35
they are, he held, specifically called for when political objectives necessitate pre-
venting the enemy from gaining something (32). Moreover, defensive opera-
tions are the “stronger” form of war and, as a rule, should be resorted to by the
weaker navy until it is strong enough to assume the offensive (310–11).42
Like Clausewitz, Corbett classified wars according to whether the object is
limited or unlimited. Because of the nonescalatory nature of truly limited war-
fare, a nation initiating a limited war needs the “power of isolation” to defend it-
self against an unlimited counterstroke. Such “isolation” could be achieved by
commanding the sea to such a degree as to make it effectively an “insuperable
physical obstacle.” In such a case, “He that commands the sea is at great liberty
and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.”43
Corbett envisioned several actions that may be taken by lesser naval powers to
dispute command of the sea. A lesser naval force would be unlikely to win a deci-
sive major fleet engagement, yet it could achieve significant results. Through mi-
nor naval actions—such as attacks on sea lanes and coastal raids (261–62)—it
could contest a superior power’s command of the sea and thereby accomplish at
least limited political objectives. In such ways a lesser power could disturb en-
emy plans, regardless of its fleet’s size, while strengthening its own national
power and prestige (61).
A small navy could also effectively dispute command of the sea through the
“fleet in being” concept (166).44 A decisive defeat at the hands of a more capable
navy would make one’s fleet unavailable should the situation later develop in
one’s favor (211). Consequently, keeping its fleet actively “in being”—not
merely in existence but in active and vigorous life—constitutes a defensive strat-
egy for a relatively small maritime power (214).45
Corbett theorized that victory at sea is dependent upon the relative strength
of one’s force and the exploitation of one’s “positions”—naval bases, commer-
cial, and nearby focal areas where trade routes converge (106).46 If correctly ex-
ploited, strategic positions allow a naval force to restrict the size of any enemy
force, thus creating favorable conditions for battle (72). Corbett specifically con-
sidered it more effective to control ports and maritime choke points, thereby
threatening the enemy’s commerce and potentially luring his fleet into battle on
one’s own terms, than to seek out the enemy’s fleet for a decisive action (185).
Relatedly, Corbett envisioned blockades, of two types, “close” and “open.”
The former closes the enemy’s commercial ports. “By closing [the enemy’s]
commercial ports we exercise the highest power of injuring him which the com-
mand of the sea can give us”—the enemy must either submit to the close block-
ade or fight to release himself (185). In contrast, in an open blockade a fleet
occupies distant and common lines of communication—a means for a stronger
navy to force the enemy out of its harbors. “It is better to sit upon his homeward
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bound trade routes, thus costing him his trade, or making his fleet come for a de-
cisive battle,” than repeatedly attempt to seek out an enemy who habitually re-
tires to the safety of his ports (156–57).
The obverse of blocking maritime communications—in fact, the object of
naval warfare, in Corbett’s view—is protecting them. This was to be achieved by
the “cruiser,” a vessel of endurance and power sufficient for long, independent
deployments to deter and thwart enemy commerce raiding and protect sea lines
of communication. Corbett considered the importance even of the battleship
secondary to that of the cruiser (114). Because of the wide expanses of sea and
the numerous maritime routes and coastlines involved, cruisers had to be built
in significant numbers.
Finally, if cruisers were to be dispersed to distant operating areas, naval forces
had also to be able to concentrate rapidly and decisively when needed (132).
Such a strategic combination of concentration and dispersal in warfare, Corbett
argues, allows a fleet to engage the enemy’s central mass when needed but in the
meantime to preserve the flexibility necessary to control maritime communica-
tions and to meet minor attacks in several areas at once (133).
DERIVING A STRATEGIC SPACE THEORY
With this understanding of maritime theory as described by Sir Julian Corbett,
it is possible to extrapolate and define a theory for space operations. Maritime
operations are not the same as space operations; environmental, technological,
and physical factors are definitively different. Nevertheless, many of their strate-
gic aspects are similar, and therefore they may be presumed to share certain the-
oretical principles. We may attempt, therefore, to derive objectively a space
theory in strict keeping with Corbett’s original context and strategic intent, veri-
fying the applicability of its principles against contemporary literature.
National Power Implications. Space operations and activities utilizing
space-based assets have broad implications for national power in peace and war,
implications that include diplomatic, military, economic, technological, and in-
formation elements. Furthermore, military operations in space are extensively
interrelated with national and political interests, and any action in space, even
minor ones, can impact the balance of wealth and power among nations.
Interdependence with Other Operations. Operations in space are interdepen-
dent with those on land, at sea, and in the air. Space warfare is just a subset of
wartime strategy and operations; accordingly, space forces must operate in con-
cert with other military forces. Moreover, space strategy should work within the
overall national strategy, since it is next to impossible for space operations alone
to decide a war’s outcome.
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Command of Space. Command of space is the control of space communications
for civil, commercial, intelligence, and military purposes.47 The inherent value
of space is as a means of communications; therefore, space warfare must work
directly or indirectly toward either securing command of space or preventing
the enemy from securing it. Command of space does not mean that one’s adver-
sary cannot act, only that he cannot seriously interfere in one’s actions. Addi-
tionally, the command of space will normally be in dispute.
Space Communications. Space communications are those lines of communica-
tions by which the flow of national life is sustained in and through space. These
include strategic lines of communication, critical to a nation’s survival, that
serve the movement of trade, materiel, supplies, and information. By attack
upon space communications, a nation can adversely affect another’s civil, com-
mercial, intelligence, and military activities, thereby reducing that nation’s will
to resist. The primary purpose of space warfare is to secure space communica-
tions; enemy forces that are in a position to render them unsafe must be put out
of action.
Strategy of the Offense. Offensive operations in space are called for when politi-
cal objectives necessitate acquiring something from the adversary. Generally
speaking, offensive operations in space are reserved to the stronger space power.
However, an offensive force looking for a decisive victory will likely not find it,
since the enemy will usually fall back to a position of safety. Offensive opera-
tions must be decided upon with caution; space assets can be thrown away on
ill-considered attacks.48
Strategy of the Defense. Despite the advantage of offensive space operations, the
utility of defensive operations is substantial; offensive and defensive operations
are mutually complementary, and any campaign must have characteristics of
both. Defensive space operations are called for when political objectives necessi-
tate preventing the enemy from achieving or gaining something. Defensive op-
erations are inherently the stronger form of action and should be used
extensively by lesser space forces until the offensive can be assumed.
The Power of Isolation. A nation wishing to initiate limited war in or through
space requires a defensive capability adequate to protect itself against an unlim-
ited counterattack. The “power of isolation” is made possible by commanding
space and making it an insuperable physical obstacle, enabling one nation to at-
tack another for limited political purposes without fear of a devastating coun-
teroffensive. To paraphrase Corbett, “He that commands space is at great liberty
and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.”
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Actions by Lesser Space Forces. Although a less capable space force is unlikely to
win a decisive space engagement, it can still contest the command of space,
thereby achieving limited political objectives. To this end the weaker force may
seize local or temporary command in areas where the stronger force is not pres-
ent. Additionally, lesser space forces can disrupt commercial or economic inter-
ests or interfere in minor ways with space-based systems. Both types of action
are meant to disturb an enemy’s plans while increasing the lesser nation’s power.
Another effective method by which a lesser space force might dispute com-
mand is the “fleet in being” concept. It is important for relatively weak space
forces to avoid decisive engagements with stronger ones, but they can be kept
safe and active until the situation changes in their favor. Furthermore, while
avoiding large-scale engagements with a superior space force, a lesser one can con-
duct minor attacks against space communications or space-related activities, thus
preventing the stronger power from gaining general command of space.
Strategic Positions. Strategic positions include launch facilities, up-and-down
link systems, space bases or stations, and focal areas where operations and activi-
ties tend to converge. If correctly exploited, strategic positions allow a space
force to restrict the movement of the enemy forces or information, thus improv-
ing the conditions for military operations. Since it will prove difficult to force an
adversary into a decisive engagement, it is better to control strategic positions
and threaten commerce and operations, thereby forcing the enemy to action on
favorable terms. By exploiting strategic positions through occupation of the en-
emy’s space lanes of communication and closing points of distribution, we de-
stroy elements of the enemy’s “national life” in space.49
Blockades. Closely related to strategic positions are the methods of blockades,
whether close or open. The close blockade for space operations equates to pre-
venting the deployment of systems from launch facilities and to interfering with
communications in the vicinity of uplinks or downlinks, as well as impeding the
movement of vehicles near space-based hubs. Close blockade may be achieved
by physical systems or vehicles or interference measures. In Corbett’s model,
suppressing operations at these distribution points obliges the adversary either
to submit or fight. In contrast, a more capable space power can impose an open
blockade, occupying or interfering with the distant and common space lines of
communication, to force an adversary into action. Like the close blockade,
methods include both physical systems and interference.
Cruisers. The object of space warfare is to control space communications, and
therefore a means of establishing this control is required. Consequently “cruis-
ers” are needed in large numbers to defend the vast volumes occupied by space
lines of communication. One possible implementation of the “cruiser” concept
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would be inexpensive micro-satellites designed to defend high-value space as-
sets from attack or space-based interference. Space systems that perform purely
offensive operations with negligible influence on space lines of communication
are of secondary importance.
Dispersal of Forces. Space forces and systems should in general be dispersed to
cover the widest possible area yet retain the ability to concentrate decisive force
rapidly. Dispersal of forces will allow the protection of a nation’s space assets and
interests, thereby facilitating defensive operations or minor attacks wherever a
nation’s space interests are threatened. To defend against or neutralize a signifi-
cant threat, however, space forces should quickly concentrate firepower or other
destructive effects. This combination of dispersal and concentration preserves
the flexibility needed to control space communications but allows an adversary’s
“central mass” to be engaged when necessary.
MEASURING UTILITY
Since the principles of the above space theory were derived from a historical
framework, it is necessary to test them against current expert observations and
space literature to measure the theory’s potential utility. Two standards will be
used: a recent study regarding space operations, and U.S. joint military doctrine.50
Standards
The 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization, known as the Space Commission Report,
covers a broad range of issues pertaining to U.S. space activity. The report lists
current U.S. national interests pertaining to operations in space, including: pro-
moting the peaceful use of space; using the nation’s potential in space to support
its domestic, economic, diplomatic, and national security objectives; assured ac-
cess to space and on-orbit operations; space situational awareness; surveillance
from space; global command, control, and communications in space; defense in
space; homeland defense; and power projection in, from, and through space.51
With the exception of promoting the peaceful use of space, the listed national in-
terests are compatible with those of the diplomatic, military, economic, techno-
logical, and information national interests in the derived space theory model.
While the Space Commission Report does not explicitly state the need for of-
fensive capability and strategy in space, it does imply this view. The report notes,
“Weapons in space are inevitable,” and “we know from history that every me-
dium—air, land, and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be
no different.”52 Given this virtual certainty of future combat operations, the re-
port maintains, the United States must develop the means to “deter and to de-
fend” against hostile acts in and from space.53 Notwithstanding the use of the
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word deter, the method of achieving this is compatible with offensive strategy as
developed in the space theory.
Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, primarily deals
with establishing doctrine for space operations at the operational level of war-
fare; however, it does address some strategic security issues that can be com-
pared with the space theory model.54 Like the Space Commission Report, the
joint publication states the need to protect U.S. space assets while denying the
use of space assets by adversaries. This thought is comparable with the idea of
commanding space to protect one’s use of space communications. In fact, the
joint publication’s definition of “space control” is similar to ideas in the derived
strategic space theory. The publication states:
Space control operations provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while,
when directed, denying it to an adversary, and include the broad aspect of protection
of U.S. and allied space systems and negation of enemy adversary space systems.
Space control operations encompass all elements of the space defense mission and
include offensive and defensive operations by friendly forces to gain and maintain
space superiority and situational awareness if events impact space operations.55
Of note, the joint publication states that both offensive and defensive operations
are needed, which is consistent with the maritime-based space theory.
Divergences from the Standards
The Space Commission Report discusses topics not within the scope of maritime-
based space theory. These topics include reorganization and streamlining of dif-
ferent U.S. space-related agencies, and the need for the United States to invest its
resources—both people and monetary investment—to ensure that it remains
the world’s leading space-faring nation.56 Since the report is not attempting to
develop space theory, the inclusion of bureaucratic organization and streamlin-
ing issues is understandable; certainly, the need to invest in space operations is
implicit in space theory.
Differences between Joint Publication 3-14 and the space theory are primar-
ily matters of semantics or due to the operational focus of the publication. Such
differences include the use of “freedom of action,” “space superiority,” and “situ-
ational awareness,” not found in the maritime-based theory we have proposed.
The differences are, however, considered minor when comparing the strategic
context of each.
Nevertheless, three ideas from the developed space theory are neither explic-
itly nor implicitly mentioned in popular space literature. These ideas are the
“power of isolation” to prevent the escalation of limited wars, the use of “cruis-
ers” to ensure command of space, and the dispersal of force as a general practice.
These differences could mean one of two things: either that these points are
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baseless or that they are pertinent but not adequately addressed by contempo-
rary literature. Given the relevance of the majority of the principles of the mari-
time model, the remaining three ideas—which deal with securing space
communications—are likely relevant as well.
This is a significant result: a maritime-based strategic framework points to an
effective method of defending space assets and space lines of communications.
Through the use of space “cruisers”— to protect critical space communications
pertaining to the movement of trade, matériel, supplies, or information—a na-
tion can protect its various interests against a space-based offensive. The physi-
cal form the space “cruiser” takes is not important, but its function is.
Additionally, since the environment of space is vast but limitations on fiscal re-
sources necessitate balancing desired capabilities against number of systems
that can be procured, space “cruisers” should have a modest enough offensive
capability to allow production in quantity. By dispersing these space systems yet
maintaining the capability to concentrate firepower or other neutralizing ef-
fects, a threatening adversary can be decisively defeated while one’s own assets
and interests are protected.
“SO WHAT?”
A critic might well put that question. Using Corbett’s maritime model to de-
velop a strategic space model has merely substantiated ideas already known or
written about. Indeed, much of this strategic space theory is consistent with the
Space Commission Report and joint doctrine. Nonetheless, something of real
value has been added.
First, we have seen that a historically based theoretical model promises to
provide a useful framework for thinking about strategic issues in space. Second,
a maritime model matches more closely than air or naval theory the essence of
space operations. Third, the strategic space theory derived from a maritime
model is congruent with current space-specific theory and observation. The
maritime-based model, then, should be usable for predicting new concerns and
developing new ideas—such as methods of dispersal and concentration.
Perhaps the thinking of maritime theorists other than Corbett is also perti-
nent for space theory. For example, the work of Charles E. Callwell, Wolfgang
Wegener, Raoul Castex, and James Cable merits revisiting for this purpose.57 In
this way, space strategy and theory will have mined hundreds of years of mari-
time experience for insight into future operations in and through space.
Colin Gray once asked, “Where is the theory of space power? Where is the
Mahan for the final frontier?”58 The answer is that we have always had him—the
maritime theorist Sir Julian Corbett.
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CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER AMBITIONS
Seeking Truth from Rumors
Ian Storey and You Ji
For more than a decade there have been persistent reports that the People’sRepublic of China (PRC) intends to acquire an aircraft carrier force as part of
its ambition to achieve “blue-water” (high seas) naval capability. Some reports
suggest that China plans to refit one or more aircraft carriers from the former
Soviet Union or other countries. Others claim that China has investigated the
possibility of buying a light aircraft carrier from a European shipbuilder. Other
reports suggest China has already made the decision to build two or three indig-
enous carriers and has even allocated funding for the program. However, none
of these reports has ever been confirmed, and no firm evidence exists that China
really does intend to refurbish, build, or buy an aircraft carrier. Thus the pros-
pect of a Chinese carrier remains subject to a great deal of rumor and
speculation.
However, the issue is an important one, for a number of reasons. Were China
to begin operating aircraft carrier battle groups, the strategic equations in the
Taiwan Strait and South China Sea would be altered. Moreover, the appearance
of Chinese aircraft carriers would inevitably set alarm bells ringing throughout
East Asia, especially in Japan and Southeast Asian capitals. It would also have
implications for U.S. naval policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
This article examines the issue of Chinese aircraft carrier capability from sev-
eral angles. First, it reviews the “development” of China’s aircraft carrier pro-
gram to date and the various media reports that have appeared over the years.
Second, it traces the progress of China’s blue-water ambitions and the debate
within the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as to the necessity of acquir-
ing such vessels. Third, it assesses China’s ability to initiate a carrier-building
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program, and the financial, technological, and geopolitical problems involved in
such a venture.
CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAM TO DATE
The father of China’s aircraft carrier research and development (R&D) program
was Admiral Liu Huaqing. From 1954 to 1958 Liu studied under the great Soviet
naval strategist Admiral Sergei Gorshkov at the Voroshilov Naval Academy in
Leningrad. Gorshkov was the driving force behind the Soviet navy’s oceangoing
offensive strategy, an ambition that came to fruition during the 1980s.
Gorshkov’s maritime strategy greatly influenced Liu’s ideas on how the People’s
Liberation Army Navy should evolve. Like its Soviet counterpart, the PLAN had
traditionally been subordinate to the army, with a primary role of coastal de-
fense. Liu argued that China’s maritime doctrine should evolve through two
stages. The first should be a “green-water active defense” that would enable the
PLAN to protect China’s territorial waters and enforce its sovereignty claims in
the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The second phase would be to develop a
blue-water navy capable of projecting power into the western Pacific. Liu was
able to put these ideas into practice during his tenure as commander in chief of
the PLAN (1982–88) and then as vice chairman of the powerful Central Military
Commission (1989–97).
Liu believed that in order to fulfill a blue-water capability, the PLAN had to
obtain aircraft carriers. In 1997, just before his retirement, Liu penned an article
in Zhongguo Haiyang Bao (China’s Maritime Paper) in which he argued it was
“extremely necessary” for China to possess aircraft carriers. According to Liu,
aircraft carriers were needed to protect China’s sovereignty and maritime re-
sources, especially with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea; guard China’s
sea lanes of communications as the country industrialized and increasingly be-
came a major trading power; enable China to keep up with regional powers such
as India and Japan; and give the PLAN a decisive edge in future naval warfare.1
On becoming commander in chief of the Chinese navy in 1982, Liu initiated
at the navy’s Shanghai Research Institute a feasibility study on the design and
construction of an aircraft carrier. Models were constructed and tested in the in-
stitute’s six-hundred-meter (656-yard) pool and at Tai Lake in Jiangsu Prov-
ince.2 In 1985 Liu ordered the establishment at the Guangzhou Naval Academy
of a training course for aircraft carrier commanders.3 (Following the American
tradition, aircraft carrier commanding officers would be selected from among
pilots rather than captains of surface warships.) The importance of the course
was underlined by the academy’s president, Admiral Yao:
Since the Second World War, aircraft carriers as the symbols of a country’s important
deterrent power have been accorded more attention. For some historical reasons,
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China has not yet built aircraft carriers. But the Academy must look forward and
train experts needed for the carriers. As the building process is long we simply cannot
afford to dig wells after becoming thirsty.4
In 1992, students in the course began active training on board China’s most ad-
vanced guided-missile destroyers.5
Carrier design and pilot training received a major boost in 1985 when a Chi-
nese ship breaker purchased the fifteen-thousand-ton Majestic-class aircraft
carrier HMAS Melbourne from Australia. At that time the Australian govern-
ment did not oppose the sale, because China was seen as an important strategic
counterweight to perceived Soviet expansionism in Asia. The purchase helped
the PLAN’s R&D program in two ways. First, as the carrier was being dismantled
for scrap, Chinese naval architects and engineers were able to see at first hand
how it had been designed and built; using this information naval architects were
able to prepare drawings for a light carrier. Second, the flight deck of the Mel-
bourne was kept intact and used for pilot training in carrier takeoffs and land-
ings (though a static flight deck would, of course, have been of limited utility,
since it could not replicate the pitch and roll of an aircraft carrier at sea). China’s
carrier R&D program remained top secret. In 1987 Colonel General Xu Xing
denied that China wanted to acquire an aircraft carrier capability, citing the
country’s “defensive” military doctrine.6
During much of the 1980s the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) focused on the
land threat posed by the USSR in the Soviet Far East and did not see an aircraft
carrier as a strategic priority. However, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 allowed
China to turn its attention to strategic priorities in the south and southeast—
namely, the South China Sea dispute and Taiwan. Both of these areas of potential
conflict required increased naval power. As a result, China’s aircraft carrier R&D
program was accelerated.
In the first half of the 1990s reports appeared and persisted that China was in-
terested in purchasing an aircraft carrier from another country as a stopgap
measure while it built its own. In 1992 the Chinese government reportedly ap-
proached the Ukrainian government with a view to buying the unfinished Soviet
Kuznetsov-class carrier Varyag. However, nothing came of these talks; the Ukrai-
nian government in fact denied that any discussions had taken place.7 In Decem-
ber 1992 Russian president Boris Yeltsin visited Beijing, where Chinese officials
reportedly expressed to him an interest in buying one of the Russian navy’s
forty-thousand-ton Kiev-class carriers.8 Although nothing came of these talks
either, Chinese companies were later able, as will be discussed later, to purchase
two Kiev-class carriers (the Kiev and Minsk) and the still-incomplete Varyag.
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In 1995–96 two European countries approached China with aircraft carrier
technology. In February 1995 it was reported that the Spanish shipbuilder
Empresa Nacional Bazan had offered to build China a low-cost, lightweight
conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) carrier. Bazan placed before China
two designs: the twenty-three-thousand-ton SAC-200 (overall length 728 feet,
or 221.8 meters); and the twenty-five-thousand-ton SAC-220 (overall length
787 feet, or 240 meters).9 The cost of the vessels
would be $350–400 million. The SAC-220
would accommodate up to twenty-one CTOL
fighters, such as the MiG-29K. According to
Bazan, the first carrier could be delivered within
five years, with the second three and a half years
later. At the time, Bazan was constructing the
11,500-ton carrier Chakri Naruebet for the
Royal Thai Navy and was eager to secure further
orders in Asia. China expressed an interest in the
proposal, and initial talks between the Chinese
and Bazan were held in January 1996. However,
according to a representative of Bazan who
spoke with the authors, the Chinese side seemed
more interested in obtaining the blueprints of
the carrier than in ordering the actual vessel.10
At the end of 1995 it was reported that France
had offered to give China, gratis, the 32,700-ton
carrier Clemenceau.11 In return it was expected
that French companies would be awarded lucra-
tive contacts to upgrade the vessel’s radar and
communication systems. Again, nothing came
of the proposal. However, even if the Spanish or French proposals had pro-
gressed farther, delivering an aircraft carrier to China would have been politi-
cally difficult, especially with the European Union’s 1989 post–Tiananmen
Square arms embargo on Beijing still in place.
Beginning in 1997, a series of newspaper articles suggested that China had
decided to build its own fleet of aircraft carriers rather than either upgrading
secondhand vessels from abroad or buying new ones. In November 1997 the Far
Eastern Economic Review reported that the Chinese government had shelved
plans to build fixed-wing carriers in favor of smaller helicopter carriers.12 In
1999 Singapore’s Straits Times reported that the Chinese Communist Party Cen-
tral Committee and the State Council had earmarked 250 million yuan for the
design and construction of two aircraft carriers, to be completed by 2009.13 In
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2000 the respected Hong Kong Chinese-language newspaper Ming Pao reported
that construction of China’s first carrier would begin later that year and would
be completed by 2003.14 According to Ming Pao the Chinese carrier would dis-
place forty-eight thousand tons and carry twenty-four fighters, probably
Su-27Ks (Su-33s) from Russia. The cost of each vessel would be 4.8 billion yuan
($580 million).
However, to date there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that any aircraft
carriers are under construction in the PRC.
EX-SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND CHINA’S R&D PROGRAM
As mentioned earlier, during the early 1990s China repeatedly sought to buy air-
craft carriers from the former Soviet Union. By 2000 it had managed to acquire
three: Minsk, Kiev, and Varyag. How these vessels were acquired and the pur-
poses to which they have been put make interesting reading.
In 1975 the USSR commissioned the Kiev, the first of a new class of forty-
thousand-ton carriers designed to provide organic fighter cover for the Soviet
navy. Between 1978 and 1984 three more Kiev-class carriers were commissioned:
Minsk (1978), Novorossiysk (1982), and Admiral Gorshkov (1984). Kiev-class
carriers (referred to by the Russians as “heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers”) were
conventionally powered and capable of carrying twelve Yak-38 Forger vertical/
short-takeoff-and-landing (VSTOL) fighters and twenty helicopters. Following
the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the subsequent emasculation of the Rus-
sian navy, all four carriers were decommissioned.
In 1995 the Minsk and Novorossiysk were sold to South Korea for scrapping.
However, in June 1998 the Minsk was purchased for five million dollars by a Chi-
nese firm, the Minsk Aircraft Carrier Industry Company.15 Before the sale went
through, however, the South Korean firm stripped the warship of its armaments,
engines, and communication systems and exacted a guarantee that the new ves-
sel would not be used for military purposes.16 The Minsk was towed to
Guangdong Province, where a four-million-dollar conversion transformed the
carrier into a floating museum. The vessel was moved to Shenzhen in September
2000 to form the centerpiece of the “Minsk World” theme park. For an entrance
fee of eight dollars, visitors can now board the former flagship of the Soviet Pa-
cific Fleet and see MiG fighters on the flight deck, models of antiship missiles
and other weapons systems, and exhibitions on the history of the Russian navy
and the Soviet space program. Visitors can also watch displays of Russian danc-
ing in the hangar, eat at a Russian-themed restaurant, and ride on a tank on
parkland in front of the vessel. According to the pro-Beijing Hong Kong news-
paper Wen Wei Po, Minsk World is aimed at “popularising science as well as
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national defense education.”17 Minsk World has proved a hit with both locals
and tourists alike.
In May 2000 the Kiev was purchased by the Tianma Shipbreaking Company
in Tianjin for $8.4 million.18 The contract with the Russian Defense Ministry
stipulated that the vessel had to be scrapped. However, local authorities in
Tianjin had other ideas for the Kiev. In July 2000 the Tianjin Municipal Standing
Committee established a project investment corporation with the aim of turn-
ing the aircraft carrier into a tourist attraction. In November 2000 the original
contract with Moscow was renegotiated to allow the Kiev to be used for tourism
purposes. According to the developer, the Kiev will form part of the Beiyang Rec-
reation Harbor project, which will include “military recreation activities, muse-
ums, exhibitions, fun parks, recreational grounds, [and] education sites.”19
Planned amenities on the Kiev include a conference center, TV studio, night-
clubs, restaurants, and swimming pool.
The most intriguing purchase to date has been that of the Varyag. The second
of the 67,500-ton Kuznetsov class, the Varyag was laid down in 1985 at the
Nikolayev shipyards in the Ukraine, then part of the USSR. Kuznetsov-class car-
riers are conventionally powered but unlike the Kiev class are capable of accom-
modating fixed-wing aircraft,
such as Su-27Ks and MiG-
29Ks. This class of carrier does
not utilize a steam catapult for
launching fighters but is
equipped instead with a ski
jump at the bow to allow short
takeoffs. Work on the Varyag
was abandoned at the begin-
ning of 1992 following the
breakup of the Soviet Union.
The USSR’s successor state,
Russia, could not afford to pay
Ukraine to complete construc-
tion. The vessel was 70 percent complete but was without engines, rudders, or
armament. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese government expressed an interest
in buying the Varyag in 1992, but the sale did not go through at that time.
In March 1998 the Varyag was bought by the Chong Lot Tourist and Amuse-
ment Agency for twenty million dollars.20 Chong Lot was based in the then
Portuguese colony of Macau, although the company had no offices there;21
Chong Lot was in fact a subsidiary of a Hong Kong company, Chin Luck Hold-
ings. In November 1998 Chong Lot unveiled plans to turn the Varyag into a
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floating casino and entertainment complex anchored in Macau harbor.22 Two
aspects of this plan were unusual. First, the Macanese authorities did not (and
have yet to) receive an application to operate a casino on an aircraft carrier in the
enclave. Second, the waters around Macau are too shallow to accommodate such
a large vessel.23
When news of the sale was announced, the Russian media claimed that
Chong Lot and Chin Luck were acting on behalf of the Chinese government. The
Chinese embassy in Moscow was quick to dismiss these reports.24 However, in-
vestigations by the Hong Kong media revealed that the two companies involved
in the purchase of the Varyag had close connections with the PRC. Two of Chong
Lot’s directors were former PLAN officers.25 In August 1999, Hong Kong–based
Goldspot Investments became a majority shareholder in Chong Lot. One of the
directors of Goldspot has an address inside a military compound in Beijing. The
majority shareholder of Goldspot is China Securities International Ltd., which in
turn is a subsidiary of China Securities, a large, state-owned brokerage house.26
The plan to tow the Varyag to Macau was held up for fifteen months because the
Turkish authorities refused to allow the vessel to pass through the Bosporus Strait,
alleging a danger to shipping.27 In September 2001 Turkey finally gave permission
for the passage. After an eventful journey through the Mediterranean and
around the Cape of Good Hope, the Varyag arrived in March 2002 at the north-
eastern Chinese port of Dalian.28 The owners continue to assert that the vessel
will be turned into a casino.
The purchase of these carriers raises two important questions. First, is it mere
coincidence that three of the former Soviet navy’s aircraft carriers have ended up
in the PRC? Second, if it is not coincidence, how valuable are these vessels to
China’s research and development program?
It stretches belief that the acquisition of three ex-Soviet carriers by Chinese
companies is mere happenstance. Chinese authorities actively tried to purchase
directly one or more Kiev-class carriers and the Varyag in 1992–93 but failed.
Beijing has now been able to accomplish this goal through China-based compa-
nies. In the case of the Varyag, as noted, the companies involved had links to the
central authorities and the Chinese military. For some reason Beijing was partic-
ularly keen to acquire the Varyag. Its price, twenty million dollars, was about
three times its scrap value. Moreover, it was the direct intervention of Chinese
deputy foreign minister, Yang Wenchang, who visited Ankara in September
2001, that finally won clearance to tow the ship through the Bosporus. Yang re-
portedly offered a $360 million economic aid and tourism package to induce the
Turkish government to let the Varyag go.29
If the Chinese government was behind the purchases, to what purpose could
it put these vessels? Many analysts have contended that Chinese naval architects
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and engineers could learn a great deal about the design and construction of air-
craft carriers by inspecting the vessels. Presumably PLAN experts have already
inspected the three carriers. In May 2002 the Hong Kong media reported that se-
curity around the Kiev in Tianjin was very tight, leading to speculation that na-
val architects and engineers were examining the vessel.30 However, the value of
these inspections has probably been overstated. The technology employed was a
generation behind that of Western navies; China would simply be learning ob-
solete technology. Should the Chinese employ this technology in an indigenous
carrier, it would be obsolete when begun, let alone after the time it would take to
construct and commission it.
CHINA’S MARITIME DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Since the early 1980s, and especially during the 1990s, there was much talk of
China’s blue-water ambitions. Military analysts generally believed that by the
year 2000 or shortly thereafter, the PLAN would have achieved green-water (i.e.,
coastal zone) status and would be capable of limited power projection into the
western Pacific. By 2010 the transition to a blue-water navy would be complete.
As of 2003, however, although the Chinese navy has increased its basic war readi-
ness over the past decade, its overall progress is stagnant. It cannot even exercise
sea control in its own coastal waters.
China’s blue-water ambitions have remained unfulfilled for three reasons.
First, despite impressive economic growth and industrialization since 1978, the
PRC still lacks the financial resources and technological know-how to effect
rapid and effective naval modernization. Second, as will be examined later, the
Taiwan issue has forced the Chinese leadership to focus on home waters. Third,
Soviet influence in terms of operational doctrine, campaign theory, and combat
tactics persists, hindering the PLAN’s transition to blue-water capability.31
In combat terms, the PLAN is restricted to offshore-water defense, mostly at
the campaign level. In other words, although the Chinese naval strategy envis-
ages, on paper, a global reach in the future, for the present it emphasizes the stra-
tegic or tactical deployment of naval power. This emphasis limits strategic
objectives, weapons acquisition, and battle planning. More importantly, the
PLAN’s maritime strategy is reflected in the combat models that actually guide
the navy’s modernization.
According to China’s maritime doctrine, there are two combat models: the
first is the independent employment of naval power, and the second is that of
joint operations with other services, particularly the army.32 According to the
first model, the navy’s role is to project power into areas far from home waters,
most likely in the form of strategic independent campaigns against the enemy’s
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fleets or land targets. Under the second model, the PLAN’s primary mission is
defensive—to engage enemy ships in coastal waters—but the navy also has an
offensive role, to assist the army and air force in amphibious operations. At
present, the PLAN is limited in scope to missions of the second model, and has
accordingly developed a light fleet. Ultimately, though, the goal is to fulfill the
first model.
The projection of naval power far from coastal waters (i.e., the first model) is
in fact a mission the PLAN already faces, though without the resources to ac-
complish it.33 The most likely scenario would be armed conflict in the South
China Sea, where the Chinese navy’s mission would be to occupy disputed is-
lands, ejecting the forces of other disputants. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait is a
unique case that cuts across the two models. Any action in the strait would be
geographically close to home. However, the conflict zone could expand into
deep oceans if the United States were to become involved militarily (as the ma-
jority of Chinese security analysts fully expect that it would).34 In this case, the
PLAN would have to engage enemy fleets relatively independently and in distant
waters while it was assisting the army in amphibious landings on the island.
Sea control and sea denial are two important concepts that sustain the
PLAN’s combat models. Admiral Liu set attaining sea control as the service’s
most important priority soon after he became commander in chief. The PLAN
proposes to exercise sea control
within an inner line of defense
that comprises China’s three off-
shore narrows: the Bohai Sea
Strait, the Taiwan Strait, and the
Qiongzhou Strait. Of these the Bohai is the most important, as it protects Beijing
and northern China. The Taiwan Strait is also vital, because it allows the PLAN
access to the western Pacific. Aside from these three straits, the South China Sea
is an area of major concern for the navy.
In exercising sea control, the PLAN would launch defensive campaigns
against enemy fleets in waters adjacent to major coastal cities, such as Shanghai,
Hong Kong, and Fuzhou. The Chinese navy would also try to obtain, by means
of an offensive campaign—such as an amphibious landing on islands occupied
by Taiwan, such as Jinmen—control of the sea around the invasion area and to
protect the People’s Liberation Army from the air and sea. As far as the PLAN is
concerned, sea control is to be achieved not across a large horizontal geographic
area but in a few vertically distributed lanes. It need not be comprehensive; par-
tial control for a limited time would be sufficient.
In contrast, the outer layer of China’s maritime defense is covered by the
sea-denial concept. According to senior Chinese naval analysts, the traditional
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U.S. ocean frontiers of containment against China involve two “island chains.”
The first stretches from Japan to the Liuqi Islands, then to Taiwan and the Phil-
ippines. The second island chain stretches from Japan’s Ogasawara-gunto Is-
lands to the Marianas. The PLAN’s second layer of defense and its sea-denial
capabilities are designed primarily to break a blockade of the first island chain.35
How is the PLAN’s aircraft carrier program linked to these two combat mod-
els? Actually the linkage is not very clear, and this is one of the reasons why the
project has been shelved. That said, the program has only been delayed, not can-
celed altogether. Research and development continues, demonstrating that air-
craft carriers are not considered irrelevant to China’s national defense and the
Chinese navy’s long-term modernization goals.
The continued relevance of an aircraft carrier capability for China lies in the
fact that sea control can be achieved only through air superiority. This reality
was the origin of China’s aircraft carrier ambitions. In the 1980s the PLAN per-
ceived a need to acquire aircraft carriers for possible action in the South China
Sea. If China was to dominate
the area, it needed air superi-
ority. Given the distances in-
volved from the Chinese
mainland (950 miles, or 1,500
kilometers) and the very short
reach of People’s Liberation
Army Air Force fighters, the
navy considered that air control
could be won only by carrier-
based aircraft. Admiral Liu
was not convinced that aerial
in-flight refueling was the
answer to the range limitations
of land-based air. In March 1990 Liu visited the air force base where in-flight refuel-
ing technology was being developed; he remained unconvinced that the tanker
aircraft could be protected except by fighters from aircraft carriers.36
As mentioned earlier, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat in 1991, the
Chinese military focused its attention on the South China Sea dispute and the
Taiwan problem. During the first half of the decade, priority was given to the
South China Sea dispute, which centered around the Spratly Islands, a group of
about two hundred small reefs and atolls. Sovereignty of the Spratlys is con-
tested by six parties; China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim ownership of all the is-
lands in the archipelago, and the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei claim certain
parts of the group. The area includes valuable fishing grounds and is believed to
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be rich in oil and gas deposits; additionally, the islands occupy an important
strategic position straddling vital sea lanes that link the Indian and Pacific
Oceans and carry much of the world’s trade. China bases its claims on grounds
of discovery and occupation stretching back thousands of years. In the early
1990s China began pursuing a more assertive policy in the area. In 1992 the Chi-
nese National People’s Congress passed the Territorial Law of the Sea, by which it
claimed sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea; in May 1992 Beijing
awarded the U.S. oil company Crestone a contract to search for oil in waters dis-
puted by Vietnam; and in July 1992 PLA forces occupied Vietnamese-claimed
Da Lac Reef. Most alarming of all, Chinese-built structures were discovered in
February 1995 on Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines.37 These structures
were upgraded into a permanent military fortress in November 1998.38 China’s
policy in the South China Sea has been one of “creeping assertiveness”—estab-
lishing an ever greater physical presence, but gradually and without military
confrontation.
Later in the 1990s China’s focus shifted to the Taiwan Strait, because of a dete-
rioration in cross-strait relations. During the decade Taiwan had democratized,
a strong Taiwanese identity had emerged, and the leadership in Taipei had begun
to pursue more self-confident and independent-minded policies.39 Manifesta-
tions of this newfound self-confidence included President Lee Teng-hui’s trip to
the United States in June 1995, the December 1995 legislative elections, and the
March 1996 presidential poll, the first ever held on the island. China was increas-
ingly exasperated by these developments and lashed out at what it saw as moves
toward Taiwanese independence. Cross-strait relations reached crisis point
between July 1995 and March 1996, when Beijing conducted a series of mili-
tary maneuvers and live missile tests near Taiwan in an effort to intimidate its
voters and to send Taipei an unmistakable and definite signal that it was seri-
ous about reunification at any cost. When President Lee announced his “two
states theory” in July 1999, Beijing mobilized the armed forces and con-
ducted amphibious landing exercises, again as a warning to Taiwan. The Tai-
wanese electorate was not intimidated and in March 2000 elected as president the
pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party candidate, Chen Shui-bian,
thus propelling cross-strait relations into a new and uncertain realm. The Chi-
nese government has since repeatedly warned Taiwan that it does not rule out
the use of force to achieve reunification.
As China’s primary security concern has shifted to the Taiwan theater, the ac-
quisition of aircraft carriers seems to have lost whatever urgency it had. Should
conflict erupt in the Taiwan Strait, operations are likely to be conducted within
three hundred kilometers (190 miles) of the mainland. The PLA is confident
that as modernization of the air force continues, land-based aviation can control
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the air over at least selected maritime areas at that range. In addition, China is
increasingly relying on its growing arsenal of medium and intermediate-range
Dongfeng ballistic missiles stationed in Fujian and Zhejian Provinces to achieve
victory in any attack on Taiwan.
If shifting priorities reduced the strategic impetus for aircraft carrier acquisi-
tion, the retirement in 1997 of Admiral Liu Huaqing removed the idea’s main
champion. At the same time, proponents of a “revolution in military affairs”
(RMA) were gaining influence within the Chinese armed forces. They argue that
aircraft carrier battle groups are becoming obsolete.40 Because of their high ra-
dar and electromagnetic visibility, proponents hold, carriers have become easy
targets for precision-guided missiles. Further, in their view, aircraft carriers are
vulnerable to submarines and mines. Third, the frequent need to resupply carri-
ers at sea makes them vulnerable to the destruction of logistical vessels. For all
these reasons, the RMA school believes that in modern warfare aircraft carriers
have become “floating coffins.”41
In any case, the RMA advocates believe, it is not in China’s interests to develop
a costly symmetrical fleet. Instead, China should exploit technological advances
and adopt asymmetrical strategies to defeat the larger and more powerful U.S.
Navy in a cross-strait conflict. Specifically, they argue, its carrier battle groups
can be defeated by disabling command and information systems and severing
access to supply, and by attack with such sophisticated weapons as shore-based
precision-guided missiles, stealthy surface vessels, and advanced submarines.42
In fact, the PLAN’s acquisition of Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class
destroyers from Russia is part of just such asymmetrical warfare strategy.43
TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL, AND GEOPOLITICAL HURDLES
The lack of urgent strategic need is not the only factor that has put the acquisi-
tion of a Chinese aircraft carrier on hold. Even if the central government decided
that the project was a strategic necessity, Chinese engineers would face formida-
ble problems in transforming their ambitions into reality. In addition, the astro-
nomical cost militates against the project for the time being. Moreover, the
Chinese leadership would also have to weigh the geopolitical consequences very
carefully.
Building an indigenous carrier or upgrading a secondhand vessel would
present a raft of technical and engineering problems. Although China has a
competent shipbuilding industry with much experience in constructing large,
oceangoing vessels, aircraft carriers require special technologies to which it has
had little exposure. These include steam catapults, arresting wires, and large ele-
vators. In addition, a carrier would also require highly advanced electronic war-
fare and radar systems—an area in which China has a patchy record and has
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relied, in the main, on foreign technology. As suggested earlier, the extent to
which Chinese engineers can make up for these deficiencies by examining ex-
Soviet carriers is doubtful.
Transforming the Minsk, Kiev, or Varyag into operational vessels would be
highly problematical. The Minsk and Kiev have both been stripped of their pro-
pulsion machinery, armament, and communications. Replacing these key ele-
ments would be difficult and costly. In addition, the vessels had been laid up for
over five years, resulting in significant deterioration by the time they arrived in
China (the incomplete Varyag is in even worse condition than the Minsk or Kiev).
Moreover, China possesses no VSTOL aircraft that could operate from the
carriers as they are now configured. The Russian navy was always disappointed
with the performance of its Yak-38s, and in any case these aircraft are no longer
in production. It is highly unlikely
that Britain, the United States, or
Spain would sell secondhand
Harrier “jump jets” to Beijing.
The Western arms embargo
placed on China following the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre is still in
force; in any case, these countries would not want to help equip the PLAN for
possible action in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. India, which also pos-
sesses Harriers, views China as a long-term rival.
China could use these vessels as helicopter carriers. Another option, however,
would be to modify the Minsk or Kiev to accommodate conventional or
short-takeoff fixed-wing aircraft. This is what India plans to do with the last of
the Kiev-class carriers, Admiral Gorshkov. In December 1998 India and Russia
agreed in principle on the transfer of the Admiral Gorshkov;44 the ship is to be
provided free, if India has the extensive refit and refurbishment work done in a
Russian shipyard. The weapons forward will be removed to make way for a “ski
jump.” The flight-deck elevators will be enlarged and arresting gear fitted. This
conversion will configure the carrier for short takeoff but arrested recovery
(STOBAR).
The Indian project, however, will cost an estimated two billion dollars—
$750–800 million for the refit and a further $1.2 billion for an air wing of fifty
MiG-29Ks and a number of Ka-28 and Ka-31 early-warning helicopters.45 For
China, this figure is prohibitive. Construction of a carrier or conversion of a sec-
ondhand vessel in a domestic yard would also be extremely costly, especially
since much of the technology would have to be purchased abroad, quite aside
from the new fighters, helicopters, early-warning aircraft, escort surface vessels,
and screening submarines required. Moreover, one carrier would not be suffi-
cient; full operational capability would require, nominally, three whole carrier
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groups—one deployed, one in refit, and one working up. Strategically located
naval bases capable of berthing the carriers would also have to be constructed,
adding to the already burdensome bill.
Presumably the technical and engineering difficulties could be resolved over
time, with the assistance of foreign companies. There is no reason to believe that
Moscow would not assist China in the construction of an aircraft carrier, as it
has done with India. Also, the money could be found if the Chinese government
deemed it a strategic necessity; the Chinese economy continues to register im-
pressive growth. After all, the Chinese were able to overcome both technical and
financial problems in the mid-1960s, the height of the chaotic Cultural Revolu-
tion, to develop nuclear weapons; the country’s scientific, industrial, and eco-
nomic bases have been strengthened considerably since then.
The geopolitical consequences, however, are a different matter. The Chinese
government could argue that aircraft carriers are defensive, but other countries
in East Asia would view the matter very differently. A Chinese aircraft carrier
battle group would be seen as a formidable power-projection tool. It would rein-
force fears that Beijing intended to resolve its territorial disputes (especially in
the South China Sea) by force and to become the dominant regional power. The
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly
those with competing territorial claims to the Spratly Islands, would undoubt-
edly strengthen their military links with the United States, ensuring a continued
U.S. naval presence in the region. Japan would almost certainly initiate its own
aircraft carrier program.
China has been interested in the concept of aircraft carriers since the early 1980s,
when Admiral Liu Huaqing advocated the acquisition of such vessels as part of
his blue-water navy aspirations. With the retirement of Liu in 1997, however, the
aircraft carrier lost its champion in the Chinese navy. At the same time, the need
to control the South China Sea as a strategic priority was downgraded as reunifi-
cation with Taiwan hurtled to the top of Beijing’s agenda. In that context, given
the relative closeness of Taiwan and improvements in the capabilities of the Chi-
nese air force and missile arsenal, aircraft carriers are not now considered vital.
Moreover, the costs associated with building and operating aircraft carriers, the
technical difficulties involved, and the likely adverse reaction of neighboring
countries all argue against a Chinese carrier battle group for the moment.
However, the PLAN has not abandoned the idea altogether—merely shelved
it. The Chinese navy is determined to fulfill its blue-water ambitions, even if it
takes a generation or more. Moreover, public support for the acquisition of an
aircraft carrier seems high. Following the accidental bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade by NATO warplanes on 8 May 1999, a campaign was
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initiated on Chinese Internet sites to raise funds to build a carrier. Provincial
newspapers across the country took up the cause; within a month eleven million
yuan had been collected.46 Aircraft carriers are perceived as potent symbols of
national power around the world, and China is no different. The memory of the
“Century of Humiliation” (1842–1949), when European countries, Russia, and
Japan forced a weakened China to grant territorial concessions and then divided
the country into competing spheres of influence, still has a deep resonance
among the Chinese people. The Chinese see a powerful navy, capable of project-
ing power into the world’s oceans, as an important tool to prevent China from
being “bullied” again by outside powers.
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DEBATE & RESPONSE
SMALL NAVIES DO HAVE A PLACE IN NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
Rear Admiral Patrick M. Stillman, U.S. Coast Guard
In “Small Navies and Network-Centric Warfare” (Naval War College Review,
Spring 2003, pp. 1–16), Paul T. Mitchell asked if there is a place for small navies
in the world of network-centric warfare. From my perspective as the program
executive officer for the U.S. Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System (IDS),
the answer is a resounding “Yes!” The price of admission, however, is a network-
centric system for C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), modern air and surface plat-
forms, and a well-established relationship with the U.S. Navy.
The U.S. Coast Guard’s experience in addressing
the urgent need to recapitalize its inventory of patrol
boats, cutters, aircraft, and supporting systems to
meet twenty-first-century operational requirements
is instructive.
Our situation today bears a striking resemblance to
conditions faced by many navies around the world.
With an average age of more than thirty years, the
Coast Guard’s fleet of high and medium-endurance
cutters is older than all but two of the thirty-nine
worldwide fleets of similar size and mission. This ag-
ing and increasingly obsolete inventory of aircraft,
cutters, and systems jeopardizes the service’s future
ability to perform its multiple missions in such areas
as maritime homeland security, national defense, the
marine environment, and maritime safety.
Rear Admiral Stillman became the first program execu-
tive officer of the Integrated Deepwater System in April
2001. He leads the largest recapitalization program in
the U.S. Coast Guard’s history. Prior to this assignment,
he served as the first assistant commandant of the Coast
Guard for governmental and public affairs.
Rear Admiral Stillman’s career includes numerous
afloat assignments. He served as operations officer and
executive officer of, and later commanded, the U.S.
Coast Guard Eagle, and he was the first commanding
officer of the 270-foot medium-endurance cutter For-
ward. Early in his career he also commanded the cutter
Cape Cross, served on the cutter Valiant as a deck
watch officer, and was an executive officer of the cutter
Vigorous. Rear Admiral Stillman graduated from the
U.S. Coast Guard Academy in 1972 with a B.A. in sci-
ence. He holds a master of arts degree from Wesleyan
University, as well as a master’s of public administra-
tion from George Washington University.
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At a time when mission demands are growing, our legacy assets (which are
approaching block obsolescence by the end of this decade) are less reliable, more
difficult to maintain and repair, and more expensive to operate. As Mitchell cor-
rectly emphasizes, the challenges of designing and acquiring a force structure suit-
able for today’s network-centric age involve formidable technical issues as well as
the policies and protocols governing joint and coalition operations with the U.S.
Navy. The Coast Guard is tackling these challenges with a two-pronged strategy.
Past Coast Guard acquisition programs—based largely on the one-for-one
replacement of hulls and airframes—have resulted in suboptimized
interoperability in critical command and control capabilities. Yet as recent com-
bat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate vividly, seamless C4ISR is
the sine qua non for success in the netted battle space of the twenty-first century.
The IDS, conceived several years before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, will re-
dress the Coast Guard’s current dilemma. When fully implemented, the
twenty-year, seventeen-billion-dollar (fiscal year 1998 dollars) Deepwater pro-
gram will consist of three classes of new cutters and their associated small boats,
a new and upgraded fixed-wing manned aircraft fleet, a combination of new and
upgraded helicopters, and both cutter-based and land-based unmanned aerial
vehicles.
Deepwater takes an integrated “system-of-systems” approach to upgrading
existing surface and air legacy assets while developing new and more capable
platforms—including highly improved systems C4ISR and advanced logistics
capabilities.
Deepwater’s C4ISR system warrants special mention. It will lead to more effec-
tive risk management and more productive force employment in all Coast Guard
mission areas. The Coast Guard’s reliance on a capabilities-based system design
was based on broad C4ISR requirements established for the IDS contract award.
• Surveillance, detection, and monitoring: Capable of determining what and
who resides, enters, and exits in the Deepwater area of operational
responsibility.
• Internal information exchange: Maintain simultaneous real-time voice,
video, and data communications between all Coast Guard assets.
• External information exchange: Maintain simultaneous real-time voice,
video, and data communications with the Department of Defense, other
federal agencies, state and local government, NATO, and similar coalitions.
• Situational awareness: Maintain awareness of the operating environment, to
include fusion of local tactical information with database information in
near-real time.
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C4ISR capability improvements—including improved sensors and systems
to collect and transmit data and information—will give operational command-
ers the tools they need to develop better situational awareness and a common
operating picture. This will lead, in turn, to higher levels of maritime domain
awareness (comprehensive information, intelligence, and knowledge of all rele-
vant entities within the U.S. maritime domain, and their respective activities,
that could affect U.S. security, safety, economy, or environment).
Under current plans, Deepwater will begin deploying the Coast Guard Com-
mon Command and Control (CG-C2) system in 2005. It will be integrated with
Deepwater’s sensors, communication systems, and legacy interfaces. A common
C4ISR architecture and software implementation across Deepwater’s surface
and aerial platforms will reduce operational costs and accommodate an imbed-
ded “technology refresh” capability to obviate obsolescence in the future.
Tactical data from Deepwater platforms will be integrated into a common
operating picture through CG-C2; timely and secure data exchange will be en-
sured by satellite communication data links available twenty-four hours, seven
days a week. Sensor integration will be achieved on all assets through correlation
of specific data and fusion into the common operating picture.
Deepwater’s network-centric C4ISR architecture will contribute to improved
maritime domain awareness through its provisions for disseminating shared
tracks and real-time data streams, online intelligence, robust and seamless
connectivity with continuous coordination, stand-alone capabilities, a combina-
tion of active and passive sensors, expanded surveillance and detection areas, and
improved communications with all federal agencies and merchant shipping.
The IDS combination of upgraded and new surface and air platforms also
will be more technically capable and designed for increased endurance and
range, better sea-keeping, ease of maintenance, and smaller crews. These charac-
teristics translate into added operational capacity, more presence, and lower
life-cycle costs. Deepwater’s combination of both manned aircraft and UAVs, for
example, will deliver 80 percent more flight hours than today’s legacy inventory
of aging fixed-wing and rotary aircraft.
Turning from Deepwater’s technical considerations, the second thrust of our
acquisition strategy entails strong partnerships within the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, industry, and state and local
agencies. New levels of public and private cooperation with Deepwater’s systems
integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (a joint venture between Lockheed
Martin and Northrop Grumman), allow us to draw on its vast experience in de-
signing and developing market-edge systems that strike an appropriate balance
between capability and affordability.
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As one of the five branches of the U.S. armed forces, the Coast Guard strategy for
Deepwater also is guided by its historically close relationship with the U.S. Navy.
The National Fleet Policy Statement, originally signed in September 1998,
codifies this relationship. In July 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Vern Clark, and the Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Thomas H. Collins, re-
affirmed and updated the agreement to ensure that both services work together
to synchronize our multimission platforms, infrastructure, and personnel to
provide the highest level of naval and maritime capability for the nation’s invest-
ment. This partnership—a model, possibly, for similar arrangements between
the Coast Guard and some of the other twenty-one agencies in the Department
of Homeland Security—allows an effective two-way flow of capability to meet
both expeditionary and domestic-security imperatives.
One provision of this policy stipulates “all ships, boats, aircraft, and shore
command-and-control nodes of the National Fleet will be interoperable to pro-
vide force depth for peacetime missions, homeland security, crisis response, and
wartime tasks.”
Mindful of this guidance, my counterpart in the Department of the Navy, the
Program Executive Officer Ships, Rear Admiral Charles Hamilton II, and I
signed a memorandum of understanding in 2002 and formed a working group
to specify common technologies, systems, and processes critical to both the
Navy’s future Littoral Combat Ship and the design and development of Deep-
water’s Offshore Patrol Cutter. This team holds regular meetings and exchanges
at multiple staff levels to ensure that we will derive mutual benefits through a co-
operative technical approach in areas of common interest.
The renewed cooperation exhibited between the Navy and Coast Guard re-
flects our awareness that there are necessary and unavoidable transformational
intersections where each of our service’s operational requirements overlap.
Tomorrow’s Navy’s network-centric capability will reside in FORCEnet and
systems like cooperative engagement capability. They offer the Navy the means to
transition to a twenty-first-century force that can share digital tactical information
and sensor data seamlessly between ground, air, space, surface, and submerged
platforms despite broad geographic separation across an operational theater.
The Coast Guard faces a similar requirement, and it is this network-centric
vision that motivates the design and development of a Deepwater C4ISR system
that will allow Coast Guard surface platforms to serve as nodes for shared infor-
mation and operational knowledge with command centers ashore—a potent
force multiplier that will contribute directly to the development of a common
operating picture and maritime domain awareness.
Deepwater’s incremental C4ISR approach to improve Coast Guard maritime
domain awareness will complement the Navy’s FORCEnet initiative. Just as
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FORCEnet will transform the Navy’s operational capabilities by enabling more
rapid decision making and massed war-fighting effects, Deepwater’s inter-
operable C4ISR system will provide the means to communicate information
and data quickly and securely between Coast Guard assets, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Navy, and other federal, state, and local agencies.
What of the U.S. Coast Guard’s many friends around the world? Faced with a
widening gap in technical capabilities, they cannot dismiss out of hand the con-
cern (voiced by one commentator cited by Mitchell) that the nature of the U.S.
Navy’s network-centric capabilities may ultimately result in more unilateral U.S.
operations. Recent history, however, suggests that there are powerful incentives
for the United States and its allies to develop compatible navies and to reach
agreement on the means to share sensitive information in a networked coalition
force of ships and aircraft.
The United States and its partners in NATO have a long history of such coop-
eration and common purpose. More recently, during Operation Iraqi Freedom,
sixty-five ships from coalition nations joined 175 U.S. Navy ships and U.S. Coast
Guard cutters assigned to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. This operation was patterned on
similar cooperation demonstrated during combat operations in Afghanistan in
2001 and 2002.
For its part, the U.S. Coast Guard encourages foreign partnering opportuni-
ties through its Deepwater International Office, my program’s arm for interna-
tional engagement and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). This office serves as an
important link between the overall U.S. Coast Guard acquisition effort and the
overseas community. The ultimate goals are to achieve heightened cooperation
and interoperability with U.S. allies, increased efficiency of acquisition, and
worldwide visibility of the technological superiority in maritime domain aware-
ness that the Deepwater Program will bring to the twenty-first century.
During the past year, the Deepwater International Office has provided infor-
mation to educate prospective international customers and the security assis-
tance community. The Deepwater staff continuously studies potential foreign
markets for Deepwater system and subsystem applicability. To this end, the staff
works closely with defense attachés, embassy personnel, and security assistance
officers.
In addition to promoting the Deepwater System’s platforms and systems
through foreign military sales, the IDS International Office focuses on building
partnerships throughout the security assistance community. The Deepwater Of-
fice is presently working, for example, with the Director of Security Assistance
and Arms Transfers in the Department of State. In the Department of Defense,
the office works directly with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the
U. S. Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO).
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Deepwater International effectively leverages a memorandum of under-
standing between Navy IPO and the International Affairs Office (G-GI) at U.S.
Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C., to pursue security assistance
opportunities worldwide. G-CI is the nexus for international affairs policy guid-
ance at Coast Guard Headquarters, and it provides Deepwater with superb sup-
port. When briefing security assistance officers at annual meetings hosted by the
unified U.S. combatant commands, for example, the International Affairs Office
and Deepwater staff follow a team approach to derive mutual benefits.
Deepwater staff officers maintain close ties with the Navy IPO for the explicit
purpose of advocating the international market potential of the Coast Guard’s
IDS system of systems. As the lead implementing agency for maritime security
assistance and associated support, Navy IPO functions as Deepwater’s propo-
nent in pursuit of foreign military sales opportunities. Interested nations route
all international queries, informal “Requests for Information/Proposal,” and
formal “Letters of Request” directly to Navy IPO.
After appropriate review of the request for releasability and technology trans-
fer issues, Navy IPO tasks the IDS International Office to provide information,
pricing, and availability data and/or technical input to the U.S. Government Let-
ter of Offer and Acceptance that will formally offer the requested Deepwater sys-
tems, subsystem, or asset to the requesting government. This relationship with
Navy IPO provides the U.S. Coast Guard with the appropriate Department of
Defense conduit for successful execution of FMS functions that will eventually
help to reduce overall costs in the Deepwater acquisition through increased pro-
duction runs and economies of scale.
The Department of Commerce and the Deepwater International Office have
signed an agreement with the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), under
which BIS promotes Deepwater platforms to maritime forces around the world.
BIS, in cooperation with the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, is exploring
unique avenues to develop country and region-specific business plans.
The Department of Commerce and the Deepwater International Office also
are working in tandem with the U.S. Export-Import Bank. Due to the Coast
Guard’s unique role as a multimission military service and law-enforcement
agency, we see a real potential for many of the Deepwater platforms and sub-
system components to be acquired by our allies through nondefense related
loans guaranteed by the U.S. Export-Import Bank.
Clearly, as Mitchell indicates quite eloquently, many challenges exist if
smaller navies around the world are to reverse their shortfalls in recapitaliza-
tion by making suitable investments in network-centric systems. A failure to
transform their forces in ways comparable to the U.S. Navy and its smaller
partner, the U.S. Coast Guard, however, is not a feasible alternative. Antiquated
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platform-centric navies—large or small—will be relegated to operational
irrelevance.
The U.S. Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System provides smaller navies
a model for recapitalization that will meet the demands of today’s network-
centric operations at an affordable cost. Is there a place for smaller navies in
network-centric warfare? Absolutely.
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STILL WORTH FIGHTING OVER? A JOINT RESPONSE
P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel
Readers may recall that in the Autumn 2002 issue of the Naval War College Review,
Professor James F. Miskel, of the National Security Decision Making Department,
argued that the U.S. government often defines national interests in such general
terms that its specific goals are not clearly communicated to the American public
and to other governments.1 In the Spring 2003 issue, Professor P. H. Liotta, also of
the National Security Decision Making Department, responded with a counter-
essay arguing that while distinguishing core strategic interests—those for which
Americans would be willing to die—from significant interests is almost never
easy, it is also essential. Liotta disagreed with Miskel that U.S. national interests are
“vague platitudes” used by policy makers and argued that they are in fact long-
term, enduring, abstract principles that are embedded in the U.S. Constitution.
He disagreed as well with Miskel’s argument that national security strategies are
simple expressions of national interests.2 Rather, Liotta argues, national security
strategies are presidential declarations of strategic interests and policy objectives,
as well as explanations of the means offered to achieve these ends.
In the end, we agree that when there is a need to
articulate national interests, when it is necessary to
do so (and we both are convinced that there are times
when this must happen), it is no time to be half-
hearted or vague.
After further consideration of each other’s views, we
agreed to disagree on key issues that involve defining and
declaring interests and the fundamental purpose of
publishing a formal national security strategy (and we
have promised to continue to argue with each other).
There are areas, nonetheless, where our views are less
contradictory than our respective essays might suggest.
We thought it would be worth clarifying these areas of
agreement because, in light of the latest National Secu-
rity Strategy of the United States, there are issues where
we have mutual concerns about how, when, and where
the concept of national interests is used and abused.
To begin, we agree that national interests should ex-
press the goals of the nation. While there are, often,
Dr. Liotta is the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Ge-
ography and National Security at the Naval War Col-
lege. A former Fulbright scholar, he has received a
Pulitzer Prize nomination, a National Endowment for
the Arts literature fellowship, the International Quar-
terly Crossing Boundaries Award, and the Robert H.
Winner Award from the Poetry Society of America.
His recent work includes The Uncertain Certainty:
Human Security, Environmental Change, and the
Future Euro-Mediterranean (2003).
Dr. Miskel is the Associate Dean of Academics at the
Naval War College and a former professor in the Col-
lege’s National Security Decision Making Department.
Earning his doctorate at the State University of New York
at Binghamton in 1977, he served in the Department of
Health and Human Services before joining the Federal
Emergency Management Agency in 1984. He was the di-
rector for defense policy on the National Security Council
staff in 1987–89, thereafter returning to FEMA as assis-
tant associate director. He is the author of Buying Trouble?
National Security and Reliance on Foreign Industry
(1993) and of articles in numerous journals.
© 2003 by P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel
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occasions when it pays to be ambiguous in terms of articulating exactly what
those goals are, there are also specific times and events where ambiguity is inad-
visable. Miskel argues that ambiguity about the national interests is most often
the inadvertent product of the domestic political process rather than a deliber-
ate choice made by statesmen. In his view, ambiguity is usually the path of least
resistance for policy makers and their spokespersons, not the result of a con-
scious judgment that ambiguity best serves the goals of the nation. Liotta ac-
knowledges that interests are occasionally defined in ambiguous terms but
argues that the ambiguity is more often deliberate than Miskel maintains. There
are times, he suggests, when policy makers really have to rely on interests and ob-
jectives that build in latitude for action—in other words, “wiggle room”—for
specific policy circumstances.
We also agree that ambiguity, even inadvertent ambiguity, is often “good
enough.” It is not, however, good enough when the issues require long-term,
persistent commitment of national resources. The current post-9/11 security
environment may be one of those times.
Miskel argues that some security issues that the nation faces today (the war on
terrorism, or nation building in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, and elsewhere)
cannot be resolved without years of concerted effort. Further, this effort cannot
be maintained without a clear understanding of national interests on the part of the
American public. Liotta counters that despite the evident truth of such an argument,
there are at least two problems. First, it is not clear that such goals can be elevated to
sustained and long-term, high-level commitments that the public would support,
except in rare circumstances—such as the Cold War. Second, it is not clear that the
American public has the kind of stomach for imperial involvement on a global scale
not known since the United States occupied Germany and Japan.
Perhaps, intriguingly, administrations will end up committing themselves to
such interests in the absence of public support or understanding. Notably, for-
mer secretary of state Dean Acheson is said to have remarked to Edmund Muskie
during his failed bid for the Democratic presidential nomination, regarding for-
eign policy decisions and national interests, “Why should we care about the
American public?”3 Miskel suggests that Acheson’s reputed advice is particularly
ill suited to long-term projects like the war on terrorism or security building in
states and regions.
The Bush administration’s early disavowal of nation building, particularly in
the Balkans, is a good example for exploring the differences between the per-
spectives of Professors Miskel and Liotta. Liotta notes with dismay that the cur-
rent president has reduced U.S. commitment to stability-building measures in
the Balkans and that this is a result of what he believes is the administration’s
misperception of the national interests at stake in southeastern Europe—among
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other regions. Miskel argues that the problem is not misperception but rather a
predictable consequence of the failure of previous administration(s) to engage
the public in a serious dialogue about the national interests in Balkan stability.
Liotta agrees that statesmen may sometimes choose not to engage in such dia-
logues for sound strategic reasons but holds that avoidance of public discussion
and debate cannot last forever. In the case of the Balkans, the previous adminis-
tration simply refused to consider the Balkans as an issue in the national inter-
ests of the United States—or the NATO alliance—until 250,000 people had died
and two million refugees had fled the wars of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.
Even as the various versions of the Clinton administration’s national security
strategy of Enlargement and Engagement to 1995 claimed, as matters of the na-
tional interest, the significance of the advancement of human rights and the pro-
motion of democracy, these issues involved neither vital national survival
interests nor economic interests and were largely ignored. In November 1995,
however, following the Dayton Accords, President Clinton suddenly declared that
Bosnia was indeed in the “vital” interest of the United States—although nothing
on the ground had essentially changed. Yet the United States, not Europe, acted,
rightly or wrongly, to preserve “the vital interest” of the North Atlantic alliance as
a credible, meaningful alliance in a time of crisis. Today, we are faced with even
more challenges in more places. We can win the war but cannot win the peace
alone. We cannot ignore (but likely will, according to Miskel) all the necessary as-
pects of nation building—or, more appropriately, “security building,” or whatever
term one chooses to consider for sustaining communities and regions that cannot
sustain themselves by themselves. If we ignore that and fail to admit it in our open
declarations, what we face in the future is decades and decades of military engage-
ment and political frustration, with little accomplished.
The problem remains that since the end of the Cold War, we have enforced
national interests primarily through the military arm and practiced far less com-
mitment to sustaining security in unstable regions through other means. To be
blunt, we are able to “kick in the door in” quickly in hot spots but have trouble
putting the door back on and instead tend never to close the door (whether in
Korea, the Sinai, the Balkans, or the Greater Near East) but just leave. There are
ways to change this practice and actually save precious resources over the long
term. But to do so requires radically different thinking that begins with radically
different rethinking of national interests.
Confusion or lack of clarity about national interests is not just the by-product
of the post-9/11 environment. In truth, the environment we entered after the
Cold War—which was, and was not, a large international war in the traditional
sense—is radically different from any other experienced in our history. In terms
of military power, the United States remains preeminent; in terms of economic
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and political power, however, it is strategically dependent on any number of in-
stitutions, regions, and realities. Thus, while the Asia-Pacific may offer future
economic opportunity (and military threat), the United States remains bound
by alliance relationships in Europe and committed to engagements in Central
and South Asia (where it would seem to have no vital interests at all). Equally, the
slow but certain emergence of the Western Hemisphere leaves unanswered
whether or not U.S. strategic priorities will shift from an exclusive East-West ori-
entation to a North-South dynamic as well. Until 11 September 2001, most in
the United States largely believed that we were nestled in a period of uncertainty
that we uncomfortably and most often referred to as the “post–Cold War era.”
(The ironies, of course, persist: the United States and much of Europe remain
driven by post–Cold War uncertainties while still having to address the demands
of the so-called War on Terrorism.) We are still in the “post–Cold War era,” just
as we are locked into the “post-9/11” environment. But—aside from telling us
what phases of history we are not in—such “post” phrases do not at all help us
define the exact time and issues we face. One could think of these phrases as code
for the reasons why it is seemingly so preferable to fail to define national inter-
ests precisely, to fail to distinguish convincingly between what Liotta calls “core
strategic” and “significant” national interests.
Both of us acknowledge that the formulation of national interests cannot be
divorced completely from the political process. Miskel goes farther in arguing
that they should not be divorced at all when the issues require long-term invest-
ment of national resources. He also maintains that by ambiguously defining na-
tional interests, strategists and statesmen may actually be attempting to effect
the divorce indirectly.
We agree that there is a difference between interests and objectives—interests
being the end states that the nation hopes to achieve over the short and long
terms, and objectives being the steps or milestones on the way to those end
states. Interests are long-term and abstract (yet fundamental to strategy); objec-
tives should always be clear and precise for the execution of policy. That, sadly, al-
most never proves to be the case. Thus, interest and objectives become confused,
muddled, and perhaps inadvertently ambiguous as well.
We further agree that policy makers do not always recognize the difference, or
that if they do recognize the difference, they do not invest enough time and en-
ergy in explaining the difference to Congress and the public.
Although the two terms may overlap, there is also a difference between inter-
ests and values. A value is not an end state or a goal; it is either a characteristic or
attribute of the end state/goal or a principle that may or may not guide the ac-
tions that are taken in pursuit of the end state/goal. As an idealized example, the
Clinton administration envisioned a world in which democracy was the norm.
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Thus it defined as a national interest an “enlarged” family of democratic nations.
Democracy was the value to which nations were encouraged to adhere, and
strategy was the game plan for actually increasing the size of the family.
Of course, not just the Clinton administration but all administrations from
the end of World War II until today have come to recognize the value of an en-
hanced family of democratic states as a national interest, one (in the words of
John Ikenberry) that suggests that the promotion of democracy “reflects a prag-
matic, evolving, and sophisticated understanding of how to create a stable and
relatively peaceful world order.”4 Indeed, as Ikenberry and others have noted, the
great Wilsonian of our age—the champion of a free world, of democracy, of self-
determination—is not William Clinton but rather Ronald Reagan. As hopelessly
idealistic as it seems, there are many—including many in the current adminis-
tration—who believe that we secure our interests by spreading our values.
Liotta and Miskel agree that interests and values are occasionally conflated in
official documents like national security strategy reports. To Miskel the confla-
tion results from the fact that the documents maintain such a high level of gen-
erality that the distinctions between interests and values remain obscure. Liotta
agrees but rejects Miskel’s judgment that the political nature of such documents
virtually guarantees their too-general tenor.
Interests, of course, are subjective, based on judgments that come from differ-
ent perceptions of reality. Policy makers should carefully weigh those perspectives
and consider alternative criteria before leaping to the declaration of vital interests.
Despite our differing views about the value of recent national security strat-
egy reports in terms of their specificity on national interests, we agree in principle
that National Security Strategy reports can serve a highly useful purpose. That
useful purpose is informing the public and Congress about the nation’s main
goals or end states (as perceived by the executive branch) and the major policy
initiatives and courses of action that the president intends to pursue in further-
ance of those goals. In his article Miskel maintains that recent security strategy
reports have, in their ambiguity about national interests, largely forfeited the op-
portunity to inform the public or engage it in a dialogue about the grand pur-
poses of foreign and security policy. Liotta counters that the national security
strategies of the 1990s were remarkably consistent in their statement and be-
came increasingly clear in their relevance to specific regions, priorities, and is-
sues of strategic interest over time.
We also share mutual concerns about the latest National Security Strategy of
the United States (September 2002, available online at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss.html). Specifically, while the strategy itself is grand in purpose and expansive
in its lofty and ambitious goals, it sometimes distinctly conflates interests and
objectives, often sees interests and values as the same thing, and offers few
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specific details as to what are the most pressing priorities—other than the obvi-
ous goals of protecting American citizenry and territory from attack—versus
those that are merely important to embrace. Indeed, the conflation of these is-
sues appears intentional. In the introductory passage of the strategy, for exam-
ple, we see the declaration, “The U.S. national security strategy [is] based on a
distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and
our national interests. . . . Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political
and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for hu-
man dignity” (page 1). But these goals are in some ways in conflict with each
other even in their immediate declaration and are not specific in their emphasis.
Even subsequent declarations of interests do not help clarify these goals. No-
where in the document is there a clear, definitive distinction made between
“core values” and “strategic priorities.”
It seems significant, then, that the Bush strategy does not precisely define na-
tional interests in its introductory session, “Overview of America’s National
Strategy.” Indeed, not until pages 10–11 of the document, in a description of
problems in Africa, is there a distinction made between values and interests; spe-
cifically, the document refers to “preserving human dignity” as a core value while
“combating terrorism”is a strategic priority. Does this distinction recognize a core
value as a national interest or only suggest that a strategic priority is one? It never
becomes clear in the document itself; by the time some distinction is attempted in
the national strategy, the differences between interests and objectives, between in-
terests and values, and between the need sometimes to be ambiguous and some-
times deadly precise may have already been lost on most readers.
In sum, we agree that national security strategies should be published—and
revised—but perhaps only when they reflect a definite “rudder shift” for the na-
tion rather than to meet the chronology of congressional mandates. The re-
quirement to state, define, and defend national interests in a public national
strategy should remain. According to Liotta, for the United States, stating, defin-
ing, and defending interests in the national security strategy both demonstrates
a commitment to democratic process and explains how America see its role in
the world. According to Miskel, many forms of public debate can (but rarely ever
do) generate the necessary clarity about interests that long-term national com-
mitment requires. For both Liotta and Miskel, the important point is that the
debate takes place. The national security strategy document would then be
revised or rewritten to reflect the results of the debate. National security strate-
gies that do not follow such a debate will be often steeped in ambiguity about na-
tional interests or will fail to address adequately the needs of a nation to declare
its goals, its purpose, and its place in the world.
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NOTE S
1. James F. Miskel, “National Interests: Grand
Purposes or Catch Phrases?” Naval War College
Review 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 96–104.
2. P. H. Liotta, “Still Worth Dying for: National
Interests and the Nature of Strategy,” Naval
War College Review 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003),
pp. 123–38.
3. In defense of Acheson, nonetheless, it does
seem that the American public is not always
well informed or interested in issues of na-
tional security and foreign policy, especially
over the long term. Even as American opin-
ion increasingly came to favor intervention in
Iraq, for example, regardless of whether or
not the United Nations approved interven-
tion or allies objected, a survey poll taken by
Fox News on 13 March 2003 that asked,
“What is your assessment of Prime Minister
Tony Blair, French President Jacques Chirac,
and Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder?” re-
vealed some interesting results. Seventeen
percent of those surveyed did not know who
Tony Blair is, 24 percent did not know
Jacques Chirac, and 46 percent could not
identify Gerhardt Schroeder.
4. John Ikenberry, “Why Export Democracy?”
Wilson Quarterly (Spring 1999), p. 56.
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COMMENTARY
NATIONAL SECURITY BOOK LIST
Congressman Ike Skelton
[On 9 June 2003 Congressman Ike Skelton (Democrat-Missouri) released his
“National Security Book List,” a compilation of books that he recommends as
required reading to all officers of the armed forces, to members of Congress, and
all others interested in national security issues. In a press release Congressman
Skelton explained,
Professional Military Education is a particular interest of mine. I consider myself
lucky that my longtime hobby as a military history enthusiast has complemented my
work in Congress as a member of the House Armed Services Committee. Through
the years, I have benefitted enormously by seeking out books recommended by oth-
ers who share my interest in history and military affairs. The fifty books I have cho-
sen cover the topics of leadership, character, and military art. The subject matter
ranges from ancient to modern warfare, although a large number of my recommen-
dations focus on the Civil War and World War II. By necessity, some excellent works
were omitted—such as Churchill’s outstanding six volume history of World War
II—but the list is comprehensive and covers each branch of the U.S. military. If one
undertakes to read the entire list, I expect it would be about a ten-year project. How-
ever, familiarity with this material should be invaluable to any officer preparing to at-
tend a war college.
Congressman Skelton, the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC), was chairman of the HASC’s Panel on Professional Mili-
tary Education in 1987–88. He is currently the ranking Democrat on the HASC’s
Panel on Professional Military Education, which was reconstituted during the
108th Congress.]
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REVIEW ESSAYS
A REFLECTION OF SADDAM’S BIOGRAPHY
Brenda L. Connors
Post, Jerrold M., and Amatzia Baram. Saddam Is Iraq: Iraq Is
Saddam. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 2002.
69pp. (no price given)
This book is a psychological assessment of the style of decision making, motives,
and perceptions of the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. Its focus is on the
deterrence of Saddam’s use of weapons of mass destruction before Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM.
The first author is Jerry Post, a psychiatrist, former CIA analyst, and current
director of George Washington University’s Political Psychology Program, and
the other, Amatzia Baram, is a professor of Middle Eastern history.
The book’s title captures the psychological theme
of Saddam’s grandiose self-concept that renders him
and Iraq indistinguishable. Yet the authors show that
beneath such grandiosity lies devastating psychologi-
cal trauma for which grandiosity is only partially an
effective compensation. Post and Baram relate the
story of Saddam’s early life in great detail to construct
a picture of his fundamental psychology. Deep isola-
tion, abuse, and resultant rage during Saddam’s first
twenty years created in him a messianic ambition and
an insatiable pursuit of power and control that made
him well adapted to revolutionary Ba’athism and the
fragmentation of Iraqi politics. Post and Baram argue
that in this context, and that of the Middle East more
generally, Saddam cannot be considered “mad” but
Brenda Connors is senior fellow in the Strategic Re-
search Department, Naval War College. The Director of
Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense since
1996, has supported her investigations into nonverbal
communication research and its application to interna-
tional and military affairs. Her research assesses the
human body and its signals to infer propositions regard-
ing leadership style, performance, cognition, emotion,
and credibility. Her most recent publications include
“Saddam’s Telling Movement Signature,” published in
the Providence Sunday Journal, 27 July 2003. A
primer titled Body Leads: A New Approach to Under-
standing Leadership and Performance Style, with
accompanying CD-ROM produced in 2002, is forth-
coming from the Naval War College Press. Brenda
Connors, a former Department of State officer, holds a
B.A. and M.A. in political science from Tufts University
and is a certified movement analyst.
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rather a judicious “political calculator, dangerous to the extreme.” Though
Saddam is “paranoid” and suffers from “malignant narcissism,” in their view he
is nonetheless a “rational actor.” They build their argument convincingly and of-
fer insights by intimately connecting Saddam’s “psychological architecture” to
domestic and foreign policies that proved quite successful. For example, the
book contains documented analyses that argue how Saddam’s psychological
view of himself and the world enabled him to exploit skillfully the United States
and the Soviet Union, and later the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
The book concludes with the statement that Saddam would not accept exile
because his main goal was “survival in power.” A life not in power would be
death for the dictator. The exile conclusion proved correct, but the notion that a
life not in power would kill Saddam reveals the limitations of this analysis. For
Saddam, one could argue the struggle to survive at any cost, in or out of power,
lies at the basis of his psyche.
This book demonstrates the power and pertinence of such psychological
studies, but it also provides examples of the difficulties that can attend such an
approach to leadership assessment. For example, studying someone from afar
involves collecting enough “reliable” data, which is often difficult, if not impos-
sible, and there are many levels of interpretation that separate actual events from
the account of an adversary. A key issue is how meaningful it can be to describe
someone as clinically paranoid and suffering from malignant narcissism, while
at the same time asserting that he is a judicious political calculator and a rational
actor. The authors cannot have it both ways. Either Saddam must be psychologi-
cally and politically out of touch with reality, at least to some extent, or there is
little point in using this approach.
In fact, it can be argued that both Saddam’s psychology and his political ac-
tions stem from one and the same source. Analysis of an adversary requires that
we appreciate him from “his” perspective.
Each of us has experienced the ability to identify someone because of the fa-
miliar way they hold themselves, gesture, or walk. We also, impressionistically,
use those same sorts of physical cues to help evaluate an individual’s intentions.
Nonverbal communication researchers (of whom this reviewer is one) system-
atically examine these kinds of commonsensical observations. Moreover, a for-
mal, rigorous study of identity can be derived from recurrent patterns of
physical movement and expressions that underpin personality characteristics,
motivations, and decision-making style.
The field of movement analysis has made notable progress, especially
through the use of modern technology to permit close study of so-called
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microexpressions related to emotions, cognition, and performance that are gen-
erally not under the conscious control of the subject under observation.
A great strength of this direct observation approach is that it eliminates the
data problem so often acute in more traditional methods of investigation. The
observer has direct contact through video with the subject’s visible physical
movements. Therefore, the primary repository of intelligence about Saddam
and his perspective is himself, and that information is detectable through direct
analysis of his physical behavior, which underlies his thought and action in all
contexts. The personality issues described by Post and Baram are represented on
the deepest level in Saddam’s body—his biography is reflected in his patterned
expression.
Not surprisingly, Saddam has long been the subject of movement analysis.
Most noticeable in him is a disconnection between the movement of his arms
and his torso. While observing
him making speeches and
public appearances, he dis-
plays his arms to especially
emphasize his status and
power. In a sense, Saddam’s
arms are his power. They are as
visceral and personal to him as
his next breath, unconsciously
integral to his identity. This is
reflected in his quintessential
wave to the crowds—a sym-
bolic gesture to “relate,” but
the appendage is so controlled
that the arm is energetically
detached from the torso.
As a form of self-compensation, Saddam relates to his “military arms” as
powerful appendages to compensate for his fractured self (and the torso/arm
connection). The authors link Saddam’s psychological architecture directly to
the Mother of All Battles mosque, which has four minarets shaped like Scud
missiles and four others shaped like assault rifles. Behaviorally, however,
Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction are one and the same, virtual ap-
pendages of the man, which, as this profile rightly suggests, made exile or relin-
quishment out of the question—the equivalent of further dismemberment.
Saddam’s effective routing of the international community in its attempt to
expose fully his weapons and inventories powerfully fed his need to prevent this
R E V I E W E S S A Y S 1 1 5
The Umm al-Maarek (Mother of All Battles) mosque, built as a tribute to the 1991 Gulf War, was com-
pleted on Saddam’s birthday in 2002. It is a vast edifice of gleaming white limestone and blue mosaic.
The inner four minarets, each forty-three meters high (for forty-three days of aggression) are in the form
of Scud missiles. The outer four minarets, each twenty-eight meters high, were built to resemble the bar-
rel of a Kalashnikov rifle, pointing skyward. Saddam’s actual birth date (28 April 1937) is embedded into
the mosque’s very design.
(New York Times photo by Tyler Hicks, 13 December 2002)
119
War College: Winter 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
dismemberment. It is likely that he enjoyed considerable pleasure at his success.
These observations are consistent with the essentially impoverished self that is
Saddam, as described in the book. The psychophysical data enables us to under-
stand more clearly what those weapons mean to Saddam psychologically, and
therefore the poor prognosis of any policy designed to cut off his access to them.
It also makes sense of his self-destructive decisions over the weapons inspec-
tions to defy the United States directly, when, as so many have observed, if he had
negotiated a little here, or withdrew a little there, the American position would
have been seriously undermined. Certainly many U.S. planners expressed con-
cern in 1990 that Saddam, at the last minute, would partially withdraw from Ku-
wait while retaining its northern oil fields. From a psychological viewpoint, for
Saddam, that strategically wise move was very unlikely.
A similar example of disunity of expression occurred during Saddam’s Feb-
ruary 2003 interview when he told an astonished Dan Rather that he had won
the 1991 Gulf war. While we can presume his statement reflects to a degree cal-
culated defiance against the United States to garner Arab support, direct analysis
of his expression reveals a high degree of segmentation in his gesticulation. This
is a reflection of the sort of compartmented cognition that suggests both that he
believed what he was saying and that he is assuredly not psychologically in touch
with reality.
In a last example, Saddam’s physical body attitude communicates his passive
detachment, symptomatic of how he was organized to survive early in his diffi-
cult childhood. It also provides him with a patterned sense of “timelessness,”
which offers another explanation for his being “out of touch” and his tendency
to ignore ultimatums and deadlines, so that he can continue to exude the belief
that he remains powerful. While today deposed, Saddam surely tells himself that
he is here to stay, and his notion of permanence is abetted by the seemingly delu-
sional belief in his weapons, again pointing to the intimate connection between
them and Saddam’s psyche.
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THE KOREAN WAR REMEMBERED
Donald Chisholm
Stueck, William. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplo-
matic and Strategic History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press, 2002. 285pp. $29.95
Mills, Randy K., and Roxanne Mills. Unexpected Journey: A
Marine Corps Reserve Company in the Korean War. Annapolis,
Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2000. 271pp. $32.95
Millett, Allan R. Their War for Korea: American, Asian, and
European Combatants and Civilians, 1945–53. Washington,
D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002. 311pp. $25.95
Taken together these three volumes indicate the variety of published works on
the Korean War to appear during the past several years, coinciding with the fifti-
eth anniversary of that once-forgotten conflict.
Only one of these books, however, Stueck’s Rethinking the Korean War, fol-
lows the format of a conventional academic disquisition. Stueck, a distinguished
professor of history at the University of Georgia, published his similar but much
longer The Korean War: An International History (Princeton University Press) in
1995; that edition relied heavily on primary sources made available in the wake
of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the slight but promising opening of China. He
argued reasonably enough that, when viewed in the sweep of history and in the
context of the new world order assembling itself from the ravages of World War
II, the Korean War constituted a less bloody substitute for what might otherwise
have been World War III. Well researched and largely persuasive, the book effec-
tively and clearly demonstrates the vast complexity and uncertainties that char-
acterize the international system, the strangeness of those internal
decision-making processes of states that produce foreign policy decisions, the
attendant opaqueness of motivations underlying the behaviors of states, and the
often bizarre foundations of coalitions and alliances.
As an empirically grounded historical work it was
marred, however, by two recurring indulgences that
Stueck apparently could not resist: his evaluations of
the morality of American motivations and behav-
iors, based, evidently, on the author’s own unstated
ethical code and related “counter-factuals”—those
seductive but ultimately empty conjectures that
Donald Chisholm is professor of Joint Military Opera-
tions at the Naval War College. He is the author of
Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: Origins and Develop-
ment of the U.S. Navy’s Officer Personnel System,
1793–1941, which received the Rear Admiral Samuel
Eliot Morison Award in 2001.
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frequently bemoan that if such and such had happened the world would be a
better place.
Stueck’s Rethinking the Korean War represents a distillation and updating of
its predecessor, reflecting both the author’s further reflection on the subject and
additional information provided by recently declassified archival material from
both sides of the Iron Curtain. In a very real sense, it constitutes the book that
Stueck would have liked to have originally written. As its title suggests, it directs
its attention to the broader canvas of international politics on which the conflict
was played out. The book is most persuasive in its analysis of the disparate chain
of events that began in various places across the planet and that came together to
produce the Korean War: the ideological rigidity, stunning parochialism, insu-
larity, and centuries-old geopolitical concerns of the Soviet and Chinese leader-
ships; the naiveté of the United States and its confusion about the extent of its
global interests and new responsibilities; fear of a monolithic international com-
munism; Kim Il Sung’s unabashed drive to unite and dominate the recently di-
vided country from the north and Syngman Rhee’s equally intense push to do
the same from the south—provided all the variables needed to cause the war.
Stueck’s narrative of China’s decision to intervene actively in the war is espe-
cially well done. He concludes that while operationally and tactically brilliant,
the success of the Inchon landing and MacArthur’s subsequent efforts across the
thirty-eighth parallel, by rapidly and dramatically reversing the tide of the war,
so alarmed the Chinese that their direct involvement on the ground was virtu-
ally assured, consequently concluding one war and commencing another.1
For this reader, the zenith of Stueck’s efforts is in his analysis of why the con-
flict did not expand beyond the Korean Peninsula. He argues that the most im-
portant limiting factor was that both sides reassessed their political aims in light
of changing military conditions on the ground and in the larger context of pres-
sures from their respective allies. The Chinese and North Koreans consistently
sought more active participation from the Soviets, particularly direct air sup-
port from their ground troops (the lack of which had proven their undoing in
their autumn 1950 operations). Notwithstanding, the Soviets confined their air
operations to a narrow area in the far north of Korea, affording them what more
recently would become known as plausible deniability.
For its part, the United States was not anxious to see greater Soviet involve-
ment, and in 1950, at least, America kept very quiet about its use of depth
charges on unknown submarine contacts and the shooting down of a Soviet re-
connaissance aircraft immediately prior to the Inchon operation. Chinese na-
tionalists actively pursued a larger war, recognizing that this would afford them
their only opportunity to retake mainland China. In the early stages of the war,
the United States sent its Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, as much to keep
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Chiang Kai-Shek in Taiwan as to deter the communists from mounting a cross-
strait invasion. The Chinese nationalists also unsuccessfully tried to gain U.S.
approval (General Douglas MacArthur at least entertained the idea) to place
their own forces in the Korean ground war. Rhee saw this as his best chance to re-
unify Korea under his control.
Unfortunately, Stueck falls into the same pattern in this book as he did in his
first—he succumbs to the temptation to engage in several what-ifs. Even so,
Stueck has written a very good book that deserves to be carefully read, particu-
larly for his lessons on the necessity to grasp the complexities of international re-
lations at multiple levels of analysis in order to understand the origins and
courses of important historical events.
Unexpected Journey is at opposite ends of the earth when compared to Stueck.
Following the adventures and travails of the members of C Company, the 16th
Infantry Battalion corps reserve unit from Evansville, Indiana, from its mobili-
zation through combat, as part of the 1st Marine Division in late September
1950 to its return to the United States in 1951, the book is clearly a labor of love.
Rather than a history of operations, the authors provide a collective memoir of
the war from the vantage point of reserve Marine riflemen, based on interviews,
letters, diaries, and personal recollections. In so doing, they complement well
those earlier memoirs of Marines who served in the war.2
The story of how a drastically drawn-down Marine Corps managed hurriedly
to scrape together, first a provisional brigade with air group, then a reinforced
1st Division with air wing, to hurl into the fight in Korea is by now well known. It
withdrew troops from the 2d Division, leaving only a skeleton crew, pulled in
personnel from miscellaneous duties, stopped retirements, called up the re-
serves, and folded in a battalion landing team afloat in the Mediterranean. The
effort proved decisive for holding the Pusan perimeter, the Inchon and Wonsan
landings, and the fighting withdrawal from Chosin. It also ensured that a Marine
Corps much buffeted in the post–World War II defense unification fights would
no longer have to worry about its survival.
This account shows that beneath the positive reports to the public from senior
Marine officers, all was not copacetic.3 Despite the high percentage of reservists—
especially noncommissioned officers and company-grade commissioned
officers—with at least some World War II experience, a significant number
had little or no training at all. The protagonists were mostly among those who
were in high school or recent graduates who had joined the reserves for all the
usual reasons.
Company C did not go to Korea as a unit but rather as a cadre to fill in existing
units. Its first battle was the operation to take Seoul. Some of its members re-
mained there as late as December 1951, after participating in the spring
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counteroffensive and the static hilltop war in central Korea that followed. Their
words reveal how quickly they had matured into Marine infantrymen, recogniz-
ing the sublime value of hot water in the front lines, their initial disdain for their
opponents that changed into grudging respect, and understanding the “law of
averages” and “no more volunteering.”
Overall, this is a worthwhile read. Unexpected Journey balances the overly san-
guine official Marine reports and reconstructions by senior officers of the mobi-
lization and deployment process. It shows clearly how even in democracies the
interests of individuals are inevitably subordinated to national needs, the danger
of counting paper units as effective combat forces, and the historical tension be-
tween regular service members and the reserves. However, mostly this book il-
lustrates the extraordinary capacity of the individual American to rise to the
occasion.
Their War for Korea presents a puzzle. The author, Allan Millett, is a distin-
guished professor at Ohio State University who is well known in military history
circles and has contributed significantly to the published research on the Korean
War. He writes that his aim for the book is to “find the meaning of the Korean
War through the experience of individuals and small groups of people caught
within the third bloodiest conflict of the twentieth century.” However, it reads
like nothing so much as a visit to the bits and pieces of interview notes reposing
in the author’s research archives. Having gleaned the substance from those notes
for previous works, the author apparently believed that what remained would
make a good read.
Alas. Although Millett attempts to give structure to his “war stories” by
grouping them into “The Koreans,” “The Allies,” and “The Americans,” the au-
thor offers no rationale for the collection, and this reader, at least, could discern
no pattern and no criteria for inclusion, other than that the stories constitute the
universe of people with whom the author had occasion to speak over the years
about the war—even though some stories are obviously assembled only from
documents and secondary sources. Thus one finds a retired Australian army ma-
jor general cheek by jowl with several Belgian officers and the People’s Republic
of China’s Renmin Zhiyuanjun. Apparently, those on land experienced the war
but those at sea hardly at all. If a book promises to provide a close-up and per-
sonal view of war, then unexpurgated oral histories rather than casual third-
person narratives are much to be preferred.4
To his credit, Millett provides an introductory overview of the war that pro-
vides even the uninitiated reader with historical context for what follows, and an
appendix offers a categorized list of selected reading. However, the value of what
is published here will most likely accrue only to those well versed in the war’s
history and who have a rich context into which to place the stories.
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NOTE S
1. For more information on the Chinese decision
to enter the war and the role of the Soviet
Union, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon:
China’s Undeclared War against the U.S. in
Korea, 1950–1951 (New York: Newmarket,
1988); Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis,
and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao,
and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
Univ. Press, 1993); and Patrick C. Roe, The
Dragon Strikes, China and the Korean War:
June–December 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio,
2000).
2. See Joseph R. Owen, Colder than Hell: A Ma-
rine Rifle Company at Chosin Reservoir
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996);
and James Brady, The Coldest War: A Memoir
of Korea (New York: Orion Books, 1990).
3. See “Lemuel C. Shepherd Oral History, 27
July to 4 August 1966” (Washington, D.C.:
Marine Corps Historical Center); Victor H.
Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the
U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 1984); Lynn Montross and
Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations
in Korea, 1950–1953, based on research by
K. Jack Bauer, The Inchon-Seoul Operation,
vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch,
G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
1955); and Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Victory at
High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Phil-
adelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968).
4. Published oral histories of the Korean War
include Donald Knox, The Korean War: An
Oral History—Pusan to Chosin (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1985); and Rudy Tomedi, No
Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Ko-
rean War (New York: John Wiley, 1993). His-
torical archives of the several services contain
substantial unpublished oral histories from
officers both senior and junior.
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WHAT THE BENEFITS OF ENLARGING NATO AGAIN MIGHT BE
Joyce P. Kaufman
Ramet, Sabrina P., and Christine Ingebritsen, eds. Coming in
from the Cold War: Changes in U.S.-European Interactions since
1980. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. 256pp. $80
Szayna, Thomas S. NATO Enlargement 2000–2015: Determi-
nants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001. 165pp. $15
Valasek, Tomas, and Theresa Hitchens, eds. Growing Pains:
The Debate on the Next Round of NATO Enlargement. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2002. 126pp.
(no price given)
Each book reviewed here offers a different perspective on the relationships be-
tween the United States and Europe, between the West and Russia, and among
NATO allies. This topic has become especially important to students of interna-
tional security in light of the issues surrounding the decision to go to war with
Iraq and the divisions that this decision caused between the United States and its
NATO allies in Europe. In spite of the different approaches taken by each book,
certain common themes emerge. Where they vary is
how each one makes its case and arrives at its conclu-
sion. It is important to note that all three books were
published prior to the war with Iraq, which could have
changed some of the authors’ points.
Sabrina Ramet and Christine Ingebritsen’s work is
by far the most academic of the three. Of the two ed-
ited volumes reviewed here, Coming in from the Cold
War allows the reader to know it is the result of con-
sultation and interaction between the authors, virtu-
ally all of whom are associated with an academic
institution. As a result, it is more cohesive and
broader than the other edited work.
Rather than focus on the issue of NATO enlarge-
ment and what that means for the alliance, Coming in
from the Cold War offers a general introduction to and
discussion of relations between the United States and
Europe. The chapters range from Ramet’s general
Joyce P. Kaufman is currently professor of political sci-
ence and director of the Whittier Scholars Program at
Whittier College. She is the author of NATO and the
Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict and the Atlantic
Alliance, published by Rowman & Littlefield in 2002.
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from the United States Institute of Peace, the National
Science Foundation, the Fund for the Improvement
of Post-secondary Education, and the Parsons
Foundation.
Prior to coming to Whittier College in 1985, from 1977
to 1979 she served as a foreign affairs specialist in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna-
tional Security Affairs. She spent the next four years
working in Washington, D.C., for defense contractors
on policy-related issues.
She received her Ph.D. in 1978 from the University of
Maryland in the areas of international relations and
comparative politics, and her B.A. and M.A. in political
science from New York University.
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introduction that establishes the context, to such specifics as relations between
the United States and Britain, France, and Germany. While discussion of this
topic is expected in a volume such as this, the book also includes less-explored
relationships, such as those between the United States and Poland, and the
United States and Spain, both of which have emerged as important in light of
issues surrounding the war with Iraq.
Of all the chapters, Christopher Coker’s “NATO as a Postmodern Alliance” is
especially prescient, particularly in his comment that “the most likely theater of
peacekeeping in the future lies not in Europe itself but in its hinterland: in the
Middle East. . . . These theaters are the origin of international crime.” As the situ-
ations in both Iraq and Afghanistan continue to unfold, it will be interesting to
see the ways in which the allies play a role, especially in the peacekeeping func-
tion that NATO has been moving toward.
The other two books offer insights of “practitioners,” rather than academic
perspectives. Growing Pains deals specifically with the debate surrounding the
next round of NATO enlargement, with each chapter centering on a different as-
pect of the issue. Beyond the common theme, however, I found that there is little
that ties it all together. It would have been helpful if the editors had given the
reader an idea of when each chapter was written and if it was written specifically
for this book or for a conference. Although the chapters are thematically related,
I found them to be of uneven quality, more so than the Ramet-Ingebritsen book.
For example, I found the chapter by Tomas Valasek well written and thoughtful
(perhaps because I agree with him for the most part); however, I did not have the
same reaction to some of the other chapters, which I found laden with sweeping
generalizations that could not be substantiated and that undermined some of
the important and interesting ideas. In short, this book offers the reader an in-
troduction to many issues surrounding NATO enlargement, as seen through the
eyes of a range of experts in the field, although not necessarily all academics.
Given the caveats noted, anyone interested in this particular topic will find at
least parts of the book to be of interest.
NATO Enlargement 2000–2015 was written by Thomas Szayna and published
by RAND specifically for decision makers. It “develops and applies an analytical
framework to evaluate potential members’ relative readiness for and likelihood
of admission to NATO.” While documenting approaches to enlargement, Szayna
also notes, “The pace of enlargement would change . . . if the security environ-
ment deteriorated rapidly and a military threat arose. Under such circumstances
military, rather than political, imperatives would become the important drivers
of the process.” This is an important point, not only after 9/11 but also because
of the war in Iraq and the pressure it has placed on the alliance. Because of the
book’s publication date, it is unfortunate that the implications of the war,
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especially in light of the above statement, could not be explored further. Szayna,
however, does offer a number of guidelines to help us draw our own conclusions
about NATO subsequent to recent events, such as Iraq. This is not an academic
piece, nor does it purport to be. Nonetheless, this small book offers an interest-
ing and well documented approach to understanding NATO enlargement and
what the next round might mean for the alliance.
Despite the apparent differences between these books, they all arrive at some
common conclusions, such as the importance of politics—both domestic and
international—and how it influenced the first round of NATO enlargement and
will no doubt affect the next round. They also suggest (either explicitly or im-
plicitly) that only academics or researchers who study the topic have given much
thought to questions about what an enlarged NATO will mean. John Newhouse
raises the question in his essay in Growing Pains, asking “what the benefits of
enlarging NATO again might be.” Another point made in all three books is that
there is no single “European position”—or any single Europe, for that matter.
The United States in particular must be reminded that Europe is made up of
many different countries and cultures and that each looks differently at the
broad questions regarding their relationship with the United States and with
one another. Another common theme deals with the relationship between the
countries of the West and Russia, especially under President Vladimir Putin.
While Russia’s grudging acceptance of Round One of NATO enlargement has
been well documented, its reaction to the next round and its relations with the
United States are far less certain.
In the wake of the war with Iraq and the attendant issues surrounding the de-
cision to go to war, I have found most interesting how many of the assumptions
made by the United States about security and defense have changed since 9/11
and the subsequent war on terror. Each book reviewed here offers different ways
to look at these important concepts as they pertain to relations between the
United States and Europe.
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IN MY VIEW
IRAQ: THE MONTHS AFTER
Madame:
Dr. Phebe Marr’s “Iraq ‘the Day After’” (Winter 2003, pp. 12–29) was presum-
ably written before the Bush administration’s much promoted, rationalized, and
precipitously made-inevitable “preemptive” war of Iraqi freedom. Yet at this
writing in late June 2003—some nine weeks into the actual “day after”—it is
clear that the paper had correctly predicted: “Replacing Saddam’s regime . . . may
prove costly, and it may require a long-term American presence,” and that there
will be “the policy dilemma” of working with problematically complex dynam-
ics among three main ethnic and sectarian “communities” and the associated
“inside [and] outside options” for potential leadership replacement.
It is interesting to note that Marr’s paper is premised on the precept of
Saddam Husayn [sic] being “unseated” by whatever “means” it may take, and
moreover on “regime replacement” to be undertaken by the “U.S. administration”—
though “[it] will be one of the most difficult decisions facing the . . . administra-
tion.” Ironically, this precept has turned out—and still is as the debate rages on
“hyped” and/or “failed” intelligence—to be in fact the Bush administration’s
“most difficult decision.”
One would expect studies by those with direct knowledge of Iraq, like Dr.
Marr, to be beneficially exploited in preparing America’s political infrastructure,
armed services mission objectives, and societal psyche and support for going to
war. It would be useful indeed to examine all possible means of effecting the re-
gime change in Iraq. Such an academic—that is, unemotional and rigorous—
exercise might help to understand better the precise natures of issues and diffi-
culties that the United States and the world face in so determined a regime
change; more importantly, it might help in shaping astute strategies and pos-
tures for dealing individually with all nations of the world—well beyond the
Iraqi war, in confrontations with other emerging threats to the civilized world.
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But it seems obvious that no such pragmatic, let alone in-depth, deliberation was
made “before” or on the “day after” by the hard-core handful of war-policy makers
of the administration, the president and Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and
Vice President Cheney—“the Bush people,” as they have been referred to by Sir
Jeremy Richards, Britain’s ambassador to the UN (on PBS’s Charlie Rose, 18 June
2003). The Bush people chose a simpler approach of justifying the war on weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) as the “clear and present danger” to homeland Amer-
ica. More serious is their “conviction” that every “non-Saddam” Iraqi would wel-
come the American “liberators” with open arms. The current daily reports of
serious attacks on U.S. and “coalition” troops by Iraqi militants shouting “Ameri-
cans, go home,” in more than isolated sectors, prove that this conviction was unin-
formed and ill conceived. Is it really fear of the (June 2003) yet-to-be-taken-out
Saddam that is driving this fierce opposition? Do the “Iraqis,” with their multi-
ethnic, multireligious, and multipolitical background—Shi’ah and Sunnis, Kurds
and Arabs—have a common base for classic nationalism against foreign occupy-
ing forces? The often referred to post–World War II unopposed occupation of
Germany and Japan—each a unicultural society—may not be a viable model. Curi-
ously, both theaters in that war had begun in historical-benchmark “preemptive”
attacks that—proving the attacking nation’s miscalculation of the enemy’s will to
resist—resulted in all-out wars and the defeat of the preemptors.
A unilateral, and sure to be judged imprudent, employment of the de facto
superpower should have been weighed carefully against the potential loss—in a
proverbial “quagmire”—of critical credibility and prestige. An extra-astute di-
plomacy is needed in a world that regards U.S. actions and postures from many
varied perspectives, from nationalism-centric resentment to legitimate dis-
agreement. The administration’s doctrine of “preemptive” defense against ter-
rorism—some have called it the “militarization of foreign policy,” others even a
“flawed” policy—has unnecessarily caused strained global and cross-cultural
public sentiments, if not total divisiveness in international relationships.
The military and economic superpower status of the United States presents an
unprecedented opportunity to lead the world toward universal democracy. But that
task will take an ever more intellectually disciplined leadership in Washington.
THOMAS S. MOMIYAMA
U.S. Senior Executive Service (Ret.), associate fellow, and Public Policy Committee
member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, formerly director
of the Aircraft Research and Technology Division, Naval Air Systems Command
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True to the Naval War College’s “rational decision making” teachings, Professors
Dombrowski and Ross (“Transforming the Navy: Punching a Feather Bed?”
Summer 2003, pp. 107–31) assess fairly and candidly the Navy’s progress with
transformation. Their determination to call it as they see it is laudable and
needed, as PowerPoint concepts and plans require as many checks and balances
as the law. One hopes their audience is broad and attentive. Their observations,
challenges, and conclusions, however, are useful to the Army and the Air Force as
well as the Navy.
In the late 1990s, the backbone of Army digitization was the “trans-
formational” Army Battle Command System (ABCS). Field elements would
communicate information of all kinds to a network of ABCS processors, each
tailored to a specific functional area but sufficiently cross-linked via common
message formats and protocols to work in digital and operational harmony with
all the others. Each system had been developed separately within its own func-
tional stovepipe. Bringing the systems together after the fact proved remarkably
difficult, expensive, and frustrating. After five years of tweaks and major digital
surgeries, further ABCS development has been effectively terminated. Bringing
together sensors, processors, and users in a common digital environment, hori-
zontally and vertically, remains no easier today. Our ability to describe what we
want far exceeds our practical ability to implement what we envision. We set the
bar too high, spend a small fortune struggling to reach it, and then spend an-
other small fortune to accomplish individually achievable things that an itera-
tive approach would have had us do anyway.
The list of accomplishments in the transformational arena is manifold, but it
contains nothing revolutionary or remarkable outside the realm of the iterative,
evolutionary application of technology to military problems and systems. We
harness improving technologies and miniaturization as best we can to improve
information transfer and knowledge. It is one thing to set the bar higher, but one
must actually clear the bar as one goes. History says we do that iteratively, one
design at a time, regardless of complexity. Engineers cannot remain perma-
nently in the concept-development and preliminary-design modes if they are to
deliver anything.
Technology applications that make a difference today, and will tomorrow,
tend to be applied to specific problem sets having manageable numbers of vari-
ables. Only then are we able to decide, program, implement, and judge their use-
fulness effectively. In applying the Global Positioning System to “dumb” bombs,
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for example, we make a clear and present difference. We do not do nearly so well
with higher-order concepts, like network-centric operations and the Global In-
formation Grid. We know what we want in general terms. We are inundated with
visions and proclamations of knowledge-based this and that, horizontal infor-
mation flow, and optimized sensor-shooter combinations in near real time.
Where we consistently go astray is in believing we can have it all now, or within a
few years, without taking the time to design and engineer practical, realizable so-
lutions that must apply today’s technologies with only a limited eye on tomor-
row’s. We aim instead at the elusive “revolution,” rarely allowing time to deal
with the devils in the details—the organization’s ability to employ the proposed
changes, and the tough technical issues of exponentially growing bandwidth,
memory, processing speed. Schedules are too tight and wishful, assuming that
some technological “big bang” will make the concepts real—but as Dombrowski
and Ross remind us, the big bang never occurs.
Compounding the problem of transformation is the breadth and diversity of
customers. Our typical “integrated process team” style forms committees on top
of subcommittees on top of working groups on top of focus groups to ensure
that everyone’s requirements are identified and their interests covered. Transfor-
mation, then, is as much affected by turf as by technology. Perhaps the Navy of
the 1950s had a better way; while many today would reject the autocratic meth-
ods of Admiral Hyman Rickover, one wonders how transformation is to be
achieved without a czar who knows systems engineering.
I agree that though we are not achieving transformations of the magnitude
advertised, we are doing great work, selectively applying modern technologies to
improve what we have and what we are. Certainly our organizational responses
lag, but they will catch up. There is a strong argument for better balance, for ca-
pabilities, organizations, and doctrines that are more complementary than they
now are. There is no magic here; we will be best served if the resources spent on
transformational glitz are applied to commonsense, iterative progress. At the
end of the day, our process will turn out to have been iterative anyway, because
engineering is simply that way. And we will all, somehow, still be relevant.
ALLEN BOYD
Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.)
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NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Madame:
Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack’s article “The United States, North Korea, and the End of
the Agreed Framework” (Summer 2003) was well researched and well written.
The author has obviously studied his material and understands his subject. Yet
the entire article read as little more than a long apology for the actions of the
North Korean government in seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, something
that it had supposedly forsworn in 1985 through the signing of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and more specifically through the adoption of the 1992
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
I will leave it to persons more familiar with the problem than I am to defend
the actions of the Bush administration in reacting to the revelations that North
Korea had begun the enrichment of uranium in light of the 1994 Agreed Frame-
work. My sole purpose is to use that uranium enrichment program as an exam-
ple of the incomplete consideration of an issue leading to a questionable
conclusion of benign intentions on the part of North Korea. Dr. Pollack seeks to
explain away the uranium enrichment program as having “an entirely legitimate
civilian purpose—[enrichment facilities] provide the means for fabricating the
low-enriched uranium . . . to power light-water reactors.” Dr. Pollack then goes
on to analyze in considerable detail whether the uranium enrichment capability
was sufficient to produce one or a number of uranium-fueled weapons and con-
cludes that it was unlikely to do so. Dr. Pollack mentions, but seems to attach no
importance to, the fact that the Pakistani nuclear weapons program tested a
uranium-fueled weapon and that Pakistan may have provided assistance to the
North Korean program.
Despite the considerable doubt cast by Dr. Pollack on the capability of North
Korea’s enrichment program to produce fuel for a weapon, there is no analysis
whatsoever of whether the North Korean uranium enrichment program would
ever produce light-water reactor fuel in meaningful quantities. A more complete
consideration would have contained such an analysis, and I do not know what
conclusions it would have reached. One thing is certain. In light of the incredibly
low prices of enriched uranium on the world market, developing a capacity to
enrich uranium for electricity production makes all the economic sense of a ca-
pacity to produce seawater. The U.S. Department of Energy would probably
agree to give North Korea light water reactor fuel, since it is presently “blending
down” highly enriched uranium from the Russian weapons stockpile to make
such fuel.
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The article’s overall tone is one of moral equivalence between the United
States and North Korea. For example, in what sense can North Korea be said to
have “reacted” to U.S. intelligence findings about its program? As if the North
Korean leadership didn’t know what it was doing before U.S. officials told them?
A more accurate approach might phrase it as a North Korean reaction to having
been caught doing what it sought to keep secret.
The situation with North Korea reflects a serious dilemma for policy makers,
but one that the article leaves unexplored, in light of its clear endorsement of the
1994 Agreed Framework. The United States seeks to prevent North Korea from
developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. North Korea wants to acquire nuclear
weapons, probably for purposes of blackmail, but possibly for sale to terrorist
groups. Negotiations are undertaken and an agreement reached in which North
Korea appears to have agreed not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and is
compensated for not doing so. North Korea then begins secret activities proba-
bly intended to develop nuclear weapons. What should the appropriate U.S. re-
sponse be? Dr. Pollack’s response, as best I can divine it, is to engage in further
negotiations and (presumably) further compensate North Korea to forgo activi-
ties that the United States believed North Korea had already agreed not to un-
dertake. Yet Dr. Pollack notes that one of North Korea’s objectives is to be treated
as an “equal” of the United States, something it certainly achieved in the context
of his article. Since equality in negotiations is one of North Korea’s objectives, it
has every incentive to breach existing agreements so that it can provoke further
negotiations demonstrating its equality with the United States. It is not terribly
difficult to predict how this process will end. North Korea will have its “feeling”
of equality with the United States, nuclear weapons, and compensation
throughout the process. The only conceivable gain in such an arrangement is de-
lay, and it is not clear whether delay favors the United States or North Korea.
Many commentators on the difference between Anglo-American and Asian
business practices and legal systems remark that the different cultures view con-
tracts in a different light. The Anglo-American view is that they are relatively fi-
nal arrangements, meant to be respected and referred to in governing the
subsequent conduct of the parties. The Asian view is that they are simply way
stations in an ongoing relationship and subject to wide interpretation and rene-
gotiation when the situation changes, even if the change is the desire of one
party not to adhere to the agreement. If that is the case, the entire notion of the
United States reaching agreements meant to be respected with North Korea is
probably fundamentally flawed. Making North Korea a regional issue (which I
believe to be the present policy of the Bush administration) is probably the
better option. It denies the North Koreans their objective of equality with the
United States in negotiations. It places the problem in the hands of regional
1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
134
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 35
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/35
actors (South Korea, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia), who
will be threatened sooner by North Korean nuclear weapons than will the
United States. It will involve negotiations and agreements between cultures that
share a similar attitude toward their obligations. Finally, it will demonstrate to
that portion of the world that cares that the United States does not seek to be the
final arbiter of all international relations. It does raise the specter that North Ko-
rea will develop nuclear weapons and seek to sell them to terrorists, or otherwise
threaten the United States directly. But U.S. intervention at that stage, to protect
itself from terrorist attack or other nuclear threat, however bloody and destruc-
tive, will be as a result of the failure of those states with the most influence over
North Korea and those states most directly impacted by war.
DENNIS B. WILSON
1995 graduate of the Naval War College,
College of Naval Command and Staff,
College of Continuing Education (Washington, D.C.)
PITY THE POOR PLA NAVY
Madame:
Justin Bernier and Stuart Gold’s article “China’s Closing Window” (Summer
2003) has it precisely right. China has been busy trying to develop a military that
can isolate Taiwan and, if necessary, hold the United States at bay. The problem
for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is that as fast as it is able to move
in modernizing its interdiction forces, U.S. military advancements, particularly
by the U.S. Navy, will negate any gains it may hope to achieve.
The PLAN’s one hope for success in a campaign against Taiwan is that it can
successfully blockade the island and limit or even negate a U.S. response by chal-
lenging the American naval presence in the waters to the east of Taiwan. The tar-
get of choice, naturally, is a U.S. aircraft carrier.
Attacking a U.S. aircraft carrier, particularly one steaming in harm’s way, is
one of the most difficult tasks that can confront any hostile power. The
Lexington Institute recently published a study on this subject. In Aircraft Carrier
(In)vulnerability, Dr. Loren Thompson concludes that U.S. aircraft carriers are
I N M Y V I E W 1 3 1
135
War College: Winter 2004 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004
extremely difficult to find and target, but that even were it possible for an adver-
sary to do so, the defensive firepower available in the carrier battle group and the
inherent resilience of the platform itself would make it highly unlikely that the
aircraft carrier could be attacked successfully.
The substantial defensive capability that the Navy enjoys with its current as-
sets will be further augmented by a number of programs currently under way.
The nearest-term advance in defensive capabilities will come with the deploy-
ment of the advanced E-2C Hawkeye based on the Radar Modernization Pro-
gram (RMP). Providing enhanced airborne command and control as well as an
expanded surveillance umbrella, the Hawkeye will act as an airborne node for
the Cooperative Engagement Capability, supporting complex air defense mis-
sions and leveraging the RMP’s electronically steered, ultra-high-frequency ra-
dar system. The Aegis weapon system currently aboard both Arleigh Burke
(DDG 51) destroyers and Ticonderoga-class (CG 47) cruisers can deal with most
air-breathing threats. In addition, the U.S. Navy and the Missile Defense Agency
are working hard to develop the Area Missile Defense System and the
Theaterwide Missile Defense System to counter ballistic missile threats at vari-
ous ranges. Finally, the extended-range active missile will be deployed on
Aegis-capable ships to address advanced cruise missile and aircraft threats.
On the offensive side, extended air defense will be enabled by the deployment
of the F/A-18 E/F and F-35 JSF. With its enhanced radar, large payload, increased
range, and networked data sharing, the F/A-18 E/F will allow the carrier battle
group to operate at a greater distance from the enemy while delivering a more
powerful punch. The addition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter at the end of the
decade will further enhance the ability of carrier-based aviation to conduct both
offensive and defensive missions.
An observer might pity the poor PLA Navy planners. They have focused their
attention almost solely on the aircraft carrier threat when an equally great danger
to their plans will be lurking below the surface. The United States is converting
four Trident ballistic missile submarines to carry up to 154 cruise missiles each.
These boats will be able to operate independently in otherwise denied waters and
to strike suddenly and with devastating effect. The first SSGN is scheduled to en-
ter the fleet in 2007.
Perhaps most significantly, the U.S. Navy is developing FORCEnet, an infor-
mation architecture that networks sensors, weapons, command and control,
databases, and platforms. Integrating ground, air, space, and sea-based capabili-
ties, FORCEnet will serve as the structure for acquiring, processing, and distrib-
uting a vast amount of information that will improve battle space awareness for
both offensive and defensive operations.
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The Chinese can buy ships and missiles, but no one is selling network-centric
capabilities. This alone is likely to tip the scales in favor of the U.S. Navy in terms
of overall combat capability in the region. As Bernier and Gold note, China’s
current intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities do not, as yet,
allow the PLAN even to see over the horizon. In the race to dominate the seas,
don’t bet on China. As fast as the PLAN tries to go, as much as it drives itself, the
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Barnett, Roger W. Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power. Brassey’s, 2003. 176pp. $39.95
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a
cacophony of voices arose (mostly from
the conservative wing of the Republican
Party) asserting that the United States was
in danger of being eclipsed by the Soviet
Union. In short, the argument was “the
sky is falling.” President Reagan used the
issue to great advantage during the
1980 presidential campaign, setting
the stage for a massive increase in de-
fense expenditures and the launching
of the ambitious “Star Wars” pro-
gram, the forerunner of the Clinton and
Bush administrations’ attempt to build
a national missile defense system. It
turned out that Soviet power had been
exaggerated and that our own political,
intellectual, and ideological predisposi-
tions had blinded us to signs of the im-
pending implosion of the Soviet system.
Interestingly, it could be argued that
however misguided the Reagan defense
buildup might have been vis-à-vis its
principal objective, programs launched
during that era set us on the path that
today has resulted in an unprecedented
global conventional military superiority
that we see manifested today in battle-
fields around the world.
Today, there are new arguments that
the sky is falling, that the global security
environment has undergone profound
and even revolutionary change, and
that the United States remains woefully
unprepared to deal with the threats
posed by a new caste of diabolical ad-
versaries boasting new and dangerous
capabilities. Roger Barnett’s Asymmetri-
cal Warfare could be regarded as a bible
for those interested in exploring the im-
plications of such a thesis. Like propo-
nents of arguments advanced in the
early 1980s, Barnett, professor emeritus
at the Naval War College, believes that
the United States has never been more
vulnerable and must take drastic steps
to avert an impending catastrophe. To-
day’s security environment, aptly and
eloquently described in the Bush ad-
ministration’s National Security Strat-
egy of the United States of America, is
characterized by undeterred rogue
states and transnational terrorist orga-
nizations with access to new weapons
that can inflict mass casualties on an
unprecedented scale. Barnett argues
that the new environment represents a
fundamental departure, or paradigm
shift, in that there are no longer any
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behavioral constraints on those seeking
to attack the United States. In short, the
international order stands at the preci-
pice, if it has not already descended into
the Hobbesian state of nature.
Barnett argues that a series of mutually
supporting, and damaging, constraints—
moral, political, organizational, legal,
and operational—developed over the
second half of the twentieth century
and are now conspiring to subvert the
ability of the United States to use force
as a tool to manage the new security en-
vironment. He argues that the United
States is fundamentally in a strategically
defensive posture, thereby ceding the
initiative to its adversaries and making
it vulnerable to the kinds of surprise at-
tacks that happened on 9/11. This
means that “the United States has,
without malice and forethought, backed
unwittingly into the situation where it
resembles the mighty Gulliver, cinched
down by Lilliputian strings.”
Barnett believes that these limitations
on using force have effectively created a
“breeding ground” for asymmetrical ac-
tions by adversaries under no moral or
political limits, who in fact perceive
these constraints as signs of weakness.
Throughout the history of warfare, par-
ticipants have always sought to exploit
an opponent’s weaknesses, but Barnett
posits that asymmetric warfare today
constitutes something new and differ-
ent—war and conflict without limits. In
other words, we are not talking about
adversaries advancing creative ideas on
asymmetric warfare like those devel-
oped during the 1930s by the Billy
Mitchells and Heinz Guderians of the
world, which eventually revolution-
ized conventional military warfare.
Today’s adversaries are bent on mass
destruction using any means at their
disposal—nuclear, chemical, biological,
and cyberspace.
Barnett’s description of the interna-
tional environment seems apt enough,
if a bit dire, and his discussion of the
various constraints is interesting and
contains some good and useful points.
He is right to point out that moral and
legal constraints have assumed great
importance in the conduct of military
operations. Such issues as collateral
damage, the idea of proportionality in
using force, and the perpetration of the
myth that the American people have an
aversion to taking casualties have all af-
fected the decision-making process on
when and if the country should use
force. As for the country’s decision
making on using force, Barnett rightly
criticizes the haphazard series of inter-
actions between various governmental
bureaucracies and the executive and
legislative branches as a discombobu-
lated process that can be manipulated
and exploited by sophisticated adver-
saries. He is also right to point out that
the United Nations has proven to be
only marginally successful in managing
new threats to security in the interna-
tional environment and that the succes-
sive surrendering of authority to the
international body under various trea-
ties has constrained some capabilities
that could conceivably be useful for de-
terrence and operational use. Barnett’s
prescription to address the problem is
useful, suggesting that the United States
undertake a systematic review of cir-
cumstances under which the nation will
use force and be prepared to declare
war, and make these circumstances
widely known to its adversaries.
However, like those who declared that
the sky was falling in the 1980s, one
cannot help feeling that Barnett has
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overdramatized the situation. While the
9/11 attacks created a cottage industry
of sorts describing a supposedly new
and dangerous security environment,
the toppling of the World Trade Center
towers needs to be seen in the context
of a pattern of increasingly bold attacks
on the United States that arguably
stretch back to the 1980s, when the first
hostages were taken in Lebanon. One of
the surprising things about the attacks
was that they were a surprise at all. Af-
ter all, Ramzi Youssef came closer than
is generally appreciated to bringing
down the towers in 1995; the Khobar
Towers attack in 1996 resulted in a dra-
matic change in U.S. security posture in
the Persian Gulf; and the United States
had already returned fire with al-Qa‘ida
following the August 1988 embassy at-
tacks. Over this twenty-odd-year period,
America adjusted and took a variety of
steps, mostly at the operational and or-
ganizational levels, that helped create
the special operations capabilities that
are now being deployed around the
world in the so-called global war on
terrorism. Homeland defense is now a
priority, seeing the creation of a new
cabinet secretary and department to co-
ordinate efforts at the federal, state, and
local levels.
While Barnett decries the irrelevance of
the United Nations in the new environ-
ment, the global war on terror is in fact
taking place within an internationally
sanctioned legal framework that re-
quires all states to take necessary steps
to combat terrorism, including the use
of force. While the United Nations has
proven less successful in addressing
threats posed by rogue states, UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1368 (passed
after 9/11) provides a useful and inter-
esting template that requires global
cooperation against the very threat
Barnett argues is a principal source of
evil in the international system. It is
hard to see that it is anything other
than a useful tool for marshaling a
global cooperative effort against
terrorism.
Moreover, while it is true that the
United States operates under a number
of constraints when using force, today’s
global military deployments around the
world simply belie Barnett’s contention
that the United States remains ham-
strung in using force as a tool to man-
age the international environment. If
anything, it would appear that efforts
over the last twenty years have posi-
tioned America quite well to go after its
adversaries in all four corners of the
globe, and that the attacks of 9/11 cre-
ated the political environment for deci-
sion makers to use force aggressively to
address perceived threats. While
Barnett asserts the necessity of a more
systematic and commonsensical process
for deciding when to use force, events
indicate that we are not doing too badly
on that front. As for a new declaratory
policy spelling out when the country
will use force, any adversary could read
the Bush administration’s national se-
curity strategy report and get a good
idea of the nation’s intolerance for di-
rectly threatening the United States.
On a stylistic note, Asymmetrical Warfare
at times reads like a legal brief, and it
gives the impression that the author sim-
ply searched for arguments supporting
his thesis and consciously ignored any
contradictory evidence or points of view.
Some parts of the text simply consist of a
series of long, strung-together quotes
by other authors, making for heavy
going. The extent to which the author
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repeats his arguments in successive
chapters is also somewhat irritating.
These criticisms notwithstanding, the
book provides an extremely interesting
and thought-provoking argument that is
cogently expressed in a well organized
work. Barnett has produced a useful
and positive contribution to the ongo-
ing revitalization of the field of strategy
and to the associated debate surround-
ing the use of force in the international
environment. Students and professors
interested in security strategy in the




Stanik, Joseph T. El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Un-
declared War with Qaddafi. Annapolis, Md.: Na-
val Institute Press, 2002. 360pp. $34.95
This well researched and clearly written
study of U.S. combat with Libya in the
1980s has important echoes for today’s
policy makers. It begins with a quick
look at America’s first war with a Mus-
lim state—in the nineteenth century,
when the U.S. Navy fought viciously
with the Barbary pirates off the coast of
North Africa. It then traces the rise of
one of the Barbary pirates’ direct
descendants—the well known late-
twentieth-century practitioner of state
terrorism Muammar Qaddafi of
Libya. Throughout the book Joseph
Stanik, professor of history and retired
naval officer, provides detailed accounts
of the 1980 key attacks and a well rea-
soned analysis of their political impact.
There is, of course, particularly well
documented material covering the
key air strike of 15 April 1986, which
was a devastating blow against
Qaddafi’s regime and changed his ap-
proach profoundly.
For those of us on active service in the
1980s, the battles with Libya seemed a
bit of a sideshow when compared to the
main dance of the Cold War. Yet this
relatively short, bitter conflict was actu-
ally a harbinger of things to come.
Much as today’s terrorists seek to influ-
ence global events through individual
attacks, Qaddafi sought to drive the
course of world activity through
bombings and state-sponsored terror-
ism. The Reagan administration at
first responded with rhetoric, but it
eventually became clear that more
forceful action would be needed.
It is interesting, in this time of “global
war on terrorism,” to look back to the
1980s and realize that this is a war that
began long before 9/11. President Reagan
was elected in no small measure in re-
sponse to the state-condoned terrorism
of Iran, where radical students had held
American diplomats hostage for 444
days before Reagan’s election, releasing
them just after his inauguration. Over
the next five years, a series of dramatic
terrorist incidents followed—bombings
and killings in Lebanon, including the
horrific truck-bomb attack on the U.S.
Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over
two hundred Marines in a single mo-
ment; the murder of Marine embassy
guards in El Salvador; the hijacking of
major airliners and the killing of hos-
tages, including a U.S. Navy SEAL,
Robert Stethem; airport killings in Rome
and Vienna; and the dramatic disco
bombing in Berlin. Clearly, the United
States had to respond, so in the spring
of 1986, Operation EL DORADO CANYON
sent a clear and dramatic message to
Muammar Qaddafi, with telling results.
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Beginning in the 1970s with territorial
claims that the Gulf of Sidra was actu-
ally within Libyan internal waters,
Qaddafi had plotted a collision course
with the United States. For over two de-
cades he attempted to use Libya’s oil
wealth to undermine moderate govern-
ments in the Middle East and Africa,
sought weapons of mass destruction,
and developed a national foreign policy
that incorporated the use of terrorism
to achieve his objectives.
This is a story painted on a global can-
vas, from the 1986 La Belle Disco
bombing in West Berlin, which killed
U.S. servicemen, to the ghastly destruc-
tion of a global war on terrorism.
El Dorado Canyon is a fine case study in
combating terrorism and deserves a
place on the shelf of anyone interested
in America’s current conflict, as well as
the history of U.S. Navy involvement
in combat.
JAMES STAVRIDIS
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Friedman, Norman. Seapower and Space: From
the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-centric Warfare.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
384pp. $36.95
This work examines the development of
space systems and its implications for
naval warfare in the twenty-first century
by focusing on the argument that “access
to space systems makes possible a new
style of warfare.” It addresses the “linked
revolution of long-range missiles and
their space-based supporting systems.”
Furthermore, Friedman seeks to under-
stand how the development of space-
based systems (notably rockets and
satellites) has radically influenced how
naval forces conduct navigation,
communication, reconnaissance, and
targeting. The reality is that modern
military forces depend almost entirely
on platforms in space to know where
they are and to communicate with
friendly forces, as well as to know the
location of enemy forces and use that
information to destroy them. This “rev-
olution in military affairs” is now hav-
ing an effect on a global scale.
None of these observations, however, is
particularly new, and in fact all have
been widely discussed within the de-
fense establishment since the Persian
Gulf War, when it became evident that
U.S. military forces depend to a unique
and unparalleled degree on constella-
tions of satellites. Such technologies as
the Global Positioning System (GPS)
became familiar in the public debate
about national security in the early 1990s
with reports that U.S. soldiers used com-
mercially purchased GPS receivers to
navigate across Iraq’s featureless desert.
In addition, the images broadcast glob-
ally of Scud missiles landing in Saudi
Arabia and Israel reinforced the reli-
ance on space-based systems to warn of
impending attacks. Nor have we for-
gotten the failure of coalition forces
during the Persian Gulf War to find
Iraqi Scud missiles in what were called
“Scud hunts.”
What is interesting and noteworthy
about Friedman’s work is its focus on
the fact that the development of these
space systems has profound implications
for the nature and conduct of maritime
operations. In 2004, naval forces can
know exactly where they are in the mid-
dle of vast oceans; communicate with
their counterparts anywhere on the
globe; scan entire oceans or land masses
for targets in relatively short order;
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and use precision-guided munitions,
such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, to
destroy them. Not surprisingly, the
combination of space-based systems
has significantly improved U.S. mari-
time as well as military capabilities.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of
Friedman’s work is the sheer volume of
data that it contains. The reader is led
through discussions of the development
of space launchers, including detailed
reviews of the U.S. and Soviet pro-
grams. Friedman is quite comfortable
discussing the development of these
technologies and thus easily examines
how the United States has integrated
space technologies into everyday mili-
tary operations. This descriptive mate-
rial is quite useful for those not familiar
with many of the technologies and ca-
pabilities that exist under the rubric of
space systems. The central value of
Seapower and Space is to help the reader
understand the technological and oper-
ational forces that have changed how
the U.S. defense establishment, most
notably its naval component, goes
about its business.
All told, Friedman’s work is useful be-
cause of its breadth and depth. Yet in
many chapters the analytic foundations
of the work are obscured by the excep-
tionally detailed discussions of the evo-
lution of, for example, rocket programs,
communications systems, satellite pro-
grams, and cruise missile programs, to
name a few. For readers who are more
interested in how space systems support
maritime operations, these details
prove somewhat distracting.
How, then, should we judge the value
of Friedman’s work? The overall quality
of the research and writing speaks for
itself. The chapters are tightly organized
and lucid, which reaffirms that the
author is knowledgeable about naval
matters. This is a useful work that by
contributing to the literature on the re-
lationship between space and naval op-
erations exposes the reader to a wide
range of systems and technologies that
are fundamental to the capabilities pos-
sessed by modern navies and military
forces. As a history of space and mari-
time systems, it contributes new and
useful particulars, background, and in-
sights into how space systems help the
naval commanders. My only wish is
that he could have focused less on pro-
grammatic details. That being said,
Friedman’s work represents an impor-
tant step toward analyzing how space
represents the next set of technologies




Lim, Robyn. The Geopolitics of East Asia: The
Search for Equilibrium. New York: Routledge
Curzon, 2003. 208pp. $90
Kane, Thomas M. Chinese Grand Strategy and
Maritime Power. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2002.
158pp. $55
One of the most intriguing questions
about the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) today is whether its communist
government does or does not have the
“ambition” to acquire a blue-water
navy. If building an oceangoing fleet
is among Beijing’s long-term goals,
then China may one day become a dan-
gerous peer competitor of the United
States. If so, a future Sino-U.S. mari-
time conflict is possible; if not, Wash-
ington’s primarily maritime power and
Beijing’s primarily continental power
need never meet in battle.
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The two books discussed here focus on
different aspects of China and so an-
swer this question in radically different
ways. Robyn Lim examines Far Eastern
geopolitics and history to address the
issue of Sino-U.S. conflict. Focusing on
the numerous twentieth-century wars
fought among the East Asian quadrilat-
eral—the United States, China, Japan,
and Russia—Lim concludes that a new
“great-power war” is “thinkable” and
that such a conflict would probably be
maritime in nature: “If China, a rising
continental power, is indeed seeking
domination over East Asia and its con-
tiguous waters, this pattern of conflict
is set to continue—because the United
States, with its own maritime security at
stake, is bound to stand in China’s way.”
The underlying reason for a possible fu-
ture Sino-U.S. conflict, says Lim, is Ja-
pan’s defeat in World War II, coupled
with the Soviet Union’s collapse in
1991. Not only has Russia’s precipitous
decline given China “strategic latitude
unprecedented in modern times,” but
the waning security threat along the
Sino-Russian border has allowed
Beijing to point “east and south strate-
gically, pressing on the vital straits that
connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans.”
In light of Russia’s decision to sell mas-
sive amounts of military equipment—
dominated by ships, planes, and naval
weaponry—to China, possible Sino-
U.S. flashpoints include a PRC invasion
or blockade of Taiwan, international
conflict on the Korean Peninsula, mari-
time tensions with Japan over the
Senkaku (in Chinese, Diaoyutai) Is-
lands, and Southeast Asian resistance to
China’s self-proclaimed sovereignty
over the South China Sea.
To offset such a conflict, Washington
must ally itself even more closely with
Tokyo, be prepared to stop a PRC at-
tack on Taiwan, dampen the rising
tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and
redirect future Chinese maritime ex-
pansion into more peaceful directions.
Lim cautions that too strident a policy
might push China into a corner, lead-
ing to irrational decisions on Beijing’s
part—much as Washington’s 1941 fail-
ure to deter Tokyo resulted in the mis-
calculated decision to attack Pearl
Harbor. However, Lim concludes that
in the coming years a certain degree of
great-power conflict will probably be
unavoidable, since “when China
started to demonstrate blue water
ambition, it was certain to collide with
America’s interest as the global ‘off-
shore balancer.’ ”
Thomas Kane examines the future of
China’s navy in Chinese Grand Strategy
and Maritime Power. Studying the his-
tory of Chinese grand strategy, which
has most recently included calls for
the creation of a “new order” among
the world’s great states, Kane con-
cludes that “if China wishes to claim a
leading role in international politics, it
must become a seapower,” which
means, in turn, that “maritime devel-
opment is one of the most prominent
and most challenging goals of the
PRC’s [grand] strategy.”
To support his point, Kane argues that
for thousands of years the Chinese were
among the world’s great practitioners
of seapower. From the sixteenth to the
mid-twentieth century, however,
China’s navy stagnated, only to be born
anew during the 1950s, when Mao
Zedong proclaimed that China should
develop a strong fleet. In 1979, Deng
Xiaoping helped to make Mao’s dream
a reality, redirecting an ever larger share
of the defense budget to the People’s
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Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Not
only was a strong navy necessary to ex-
ploit maritime resources in the sur-
rounding seas, including enormous
reserves of fish, oil, and natural gas, but
“until the Chinese have an oceangoing
navy, their freedom to trade will de-
pend upon the goodwill of others.
China’s leaders understand this fact,
and are determined to remedy it.”
During the twenty-first century, the
Chinese navy is bound to grow. It is no
match for the U.S. Navy, but Kane cau-
tions that just because “China’s navy
remains materially weak does not mean
that it is strategically useless.” In fact,
the PLAN is clearly “designed to serve a
purpose in war,” and if “one reflects
upon how China’s navy measures up to
the tasks Beijing is putting it to, and
combines those reflections with a con-
sideration of how the Chinese fleet may
develop over time, the PLAN begins to
seem more adequate.”
China’s primary strategic goals include
coastal defense, intimidation of Taiwan,
and the gradual expansion of Chinese
power southward into the South China
Sea. In recent years, the PLAN has begun
to acquire the naval equipment neces-
sary to achieve these limited goals. In
particular, Kane notes the rapid increase
in China’s mine warfare capability: “As
of the year 2000, almost 90 percent of
the major ships in China’s fleet could
carry mines as part of their standard ar-
mament.” In addition, all newly pur-
chased naval equipment from Russia,
including the Kilo-class submarines and
the Sovremenny-class destroyers, “have
integral minelaying capabilities.” Such
capabilities may soon grow beyond the
point where the U.S. Navy and its Asian
allies can easily counter them.
Although the Chinese navy still exhibits
serious vulnerabilities, especially in air
defenses, air forces, and electronic sys-
tems, concerted efforts are under way
to correct these problems. In addition,
should Beijing ever focus its land and
sea forces either on mainland Asia or
any of the thousand offshore islands,
the “PLA’s assault forces could also
prove overwhelming in battles for is-
lands in the South China Sea, and per-
haps for attacks on more distant islands
as well. China, in other words, is well
equipped to use land forces as part of a
joint maritime strategy.”
Lim and Kane have approached this
question from different angles—one
from the field of geopolitics and the
other from strategy—but they agree
that the PRC’s future ambitions most
likely include the construction of a
blue-water navy. Until that navy is
complete, China cannot hope to fight
and win a war at sea, especially against a
force as large and sophisticated as the
U.S. Navy. However, as Kane aptly sug-
gests, a naval victory may not be part of
China’s grand strategy, since Beijing
“has reason to hope that it has found
limits to Washington’s willingness to
intervene.” So long as China keeps its
strategic goals small, it may succeed in
making incremental gains unopposed.
It is perhaps because of this threat of
incremental gains that Lim warns, “The
need to establish a stable power equilib-
rium in East Asia is an imperative of in-
ternational security that the United
States cannot afford to ignore.”
BRUCE ELLEMAN
Naval War College
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Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam
in Central Asia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ.
Press, 2002. 281pp. $24
After the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem-
ber 2001, U.S. policy makers focused
heavily on Central Asian states as ven-
ues for basing troops and equipment
for the war on terrorism. Although that
war initially focused on Afghanistan,
the effects of militant Islam have also
affected various states in the Central
Asian region to the north. In this book,
Rashid provides the reader with a jour-
nalist’s account of what has led to the
rise of militant Islam in Central Asia.
This book had just gone into editing
when the attacks on the World Trade
Center towers and the Pentagon oc-
curred, and it underwent revision
shortly before publication.
Rashid served as the chief correspon-
dent for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Central Asia at the Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review and the Daily Telegraph
for several years. His books and articles
have made him one of the most re-
spected observers of events in the re-
gion. His previous book, Taliban, won
him worldwide acclaim and became a
best-seller after 9/11 for its explanation
of the rise of the Taliban.
Rashid begins by providing historical
background. He points out that due to
its geographic location, Central Asia has
historically been the setting of numer-
ous conquests, great-power struggles,
significant economic activity, literary
and artistic developments, and discus-
sions about Islamic philosophy. Some
of these themes still resonate today.
The struggle between Russia and Great
Britain in the late nineteenth century
saw major Central Asian khanates (ter-
ritories), such as Bukhara, Samarkand,
and Tashkent, fall under Russian influ-
ence. This influence continued into the
Soviet era despite attempts by Central
Asian territories to forge autonomy. By
appealing to Islam in various combina-
tions with nationalism, ethnic identity,
and ideology, Muslim intellectuals and
clerics in Central Asia initially tried to
find common ground with the Bol-
shevik government. Unfortunately, all
overt symbols of Islam were ultimately
suppressed, and the religion went un-
derground during Soviet times.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Is-
lam underwent a rebirth in Central
Asia, according to Rashid. However,
most of the region’s new leaders were
former Communist Party officials
turned nationalists who were mainly
concerned about maintaining order
and preventing the infiltration of mili-
tant Islamists. The civil war in Afghan-
istan, the rise of the Taliban, and the
presence of al-Qa‘ida fed these objec-
tives. Furthermore, the new Central
Asian rulers have been unable to im-
prove the economic condition of the
people. Rashid observes that among
other factors, a combination of abject
poverty, authoritarian rule, and the
skepticism of Central Asian leaders
about even peaceful manifestations of
Islam have led to the rise of militant
groups throughout the region.
The author uses three examples to illus-
trate his points: the Islamic Renaissance
Party in Tajikistan, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir
in several Central Asian states, and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Each
of these, although in itself unique, owes
its prominence to the reasons outlined
above. Rashid also discusses the situa-
tion of great-power rivalry among the
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United States, China, and Russia as it
relates to oil pipelines and regional sta-
bility. He also goes into detail regarding
neighboring states, such as Saudi Ara-
bia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, and
their respective agendas toward the re-
gion. These chapters round out a com-
plete picture of all the factors affecting
Central Asia’s stability.
The author ends with a chapter that
highlights the issues contributing to
Central Asia’s woeful situation and
offers some thoughts about forging sta-
bility there. This latter portion is disap-
pointingly short; Rashid devotes only
nine pages to discussing possible solu-
tions to alleviating Central Asia’s plight.
A more developed discussion would
have been beneficial.
Aside from this flaw, Jihad provides an
excellent overview of the reasons for the
rise of militant elements in Central Asia.
The book gives an understanding of the
stakes involved in Central Asia’s security
and how the region applies to U.S. inter-
ests. Central Asia has become significant
for U.S. interests not only because of the
prospects for oil but also for its potential
as a haven for terrorist bases.
AMER LATIF
Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Dahlgren, Virginia
Klare, Michael T. Resource Wars: The New Land-
scape of Global Conflict. New York: Henry Holt,
2002. 304pp. $15
Michael Klare argues that most wars of
the future, like many of those of the
past and present, will be caused by con-
flicts over natural resources, especially
oil and water. As a consequence, he
suggests that American national
security policy focus “on oil field pro-
tection, the defense of maritime trade
routes, and other aspects of resource
security.” This position represents a
reaffirmation of the industrial and eco-
nomic dimensions of U.S. national se-
curity. In effect, if Klare is right, we are
witnessing a resurgence of a materialist
strand of American strategic thought
that has been prominent at least since
Alfred Thayer Mahan. For strategists,
neither the clash of civilizations, the
tragedies of identity politics, nor the
long-buried animosities of religion or
ethnicity are sufficient motivations for
the major sources of conflict in the
modern world. Rather, conflicts and
national security policies are about the
struggle for natural resources.
Lest anyone think that this is a purely
American phenomenon, Klare suggests
that the “economization” of interna-
tional security affairs holds not just for
the United States but also for most
countries, including China, Japan, and
Russia. Insatiable consumption coupled
with finite, poorly distributed resources,
as well as with a propensity to use armed
force, leads to a conflict-ridden future.
Much of Klare’s argument reads as if it
were inspired by the tumultuous events
of the 1970s, specifically after the first
global oil shock helped to alert the
world to upcoming neo-Malthusian di-
lemmas. The 1973–74 oil crisis, among
other events, forced the United States
and the world to face the reality that pe-
troleum supplies are finite, poorly dis-
tributed across the globe, and vulnerable
to rogue states. Academics and policy
entrepreneurs then spent much of the
decade cataloguing the vast number of
critically important natural resources
that were in short supply or projected to
be, given consumption trends and
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demographic growth. Klare continues to
assume that resource shortages lie in
wait for humanity as a whole and for
specific societies in particular.
Unfortunately, Klare barely pauses to
consider the possibility that diplomatic,
economic, and political developments
might ease potential resource conflicts
before they escalate into armed con-
flicts. After all, countries fighting over
access to water or oil could simply ne-
gotiate arrangements or allow market
forces to dictate outcomes; the author
himself notes examples and cases where
diplomatic solutions have succeeded in
the past. In fact, the absence of eco-
nomic reasoning in this book is star-
tling. After all, economists from cranks
to countless mainstream professionals
have demonstrated how market forces
can help manage the worst aspects of
resource shortages. Thus energy short-
ages that lead to price increases in turn
encourage consumers to conserve; con-
sumption is reduced, as well as overall
dependence. Hence, despite tremen-
dous economic growth, Western Eu-
rope, Japan, and even the United States
have become much more energy effi-
cient since the oil shock of the 1970s.
Substitution effects are also possible, al-
though perhaps not for a resource as
fundamental and elemental as water.
This book is less than persuasive on the
topic of politics. In its final section,
which describes alternatives to war,
Klare sets up a straw man, arguing that
“it seems reasonable to ask whether a
resource-acquisition strategy based on
global cooperation rather than recur-
ring conflict might not prove more ef-
fective than guaranteeing access to
critical supply over the long run.” He
then answers his own question by
claiming that “such a strategy would
call for the equitable distribution of the
world’s existing resource stockpiles in
times of acute scarcity.” In short, Klare
suggests a utopian solution to a deeply
practical set of problems. It is more
likely that many, if not most, of the vari-
ous potential resource “wars” outlined
here will be settled short of war (or at
least of a major war) by various methods
of muddling through. Grand bargains
over potentially equitable distributions
of various resources seem unlikely given
the present state of international politics.
Even if one accepts Klare’s dire assump-
tions about the possibility of shortages
and conflicts, his list is very traditional.
Oil and water conflicts are old news. He
does not mention the possibility of new
competitions, for resources like satellite
“parking spaces” or access to ocean
fisheries, that might lead to clashes
among great powers. Nor does he ex-
plore in great detail demographic reali-
ties that underlie competition for water
and energy. For many of the water con-
flicts, for example, the key variable is
tremendous population growth, which
makes old agreements obsolete and in-
tensifies bargaining over future
resources.
Criticisms aside, Resource Wars offers
readers a great deal. Klare provides
thumbnail summaries of numerous
conflicts great and small, from the
South China Sea to the headwaters of
the Nile. He represents each case with
grace and economy. He reminds us of
the oft-forgotten histories and details of
geography that matter greatly in re-
source wars. More importantly, Klare
provides a useful corrective to the
ideational, historical, and political ex-
planations of international behavior so
popular today. Even the Arab-Israeli
conflict is linked to competition for
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land and water in ways that some who
focus on the religious conflicts, the
shadow of the past, and the various
weaknesses of the Israeli-Palestinian
and other Arab authority structures for-
get. In short, academics, policy makers,
and military officers should pay close
attention to those regions that have the
greatest potential for armed conflict




Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Age of
Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2002.
490pp. $25.95
Were you to begin with the last chapter
of this book, “A World of Terror,” you
would note that radical Islamists do not
have an exclusive hold on terror as a
strategic weapon. In fact, you might be
well advised to consider reading this
chapter first, to understand that ex-
tremist adherents of Christianity as well
as other faiths also have employed sa-
cred terror as a tool in the pursuit of
their aims. If, on the other hand, you
choose to begin with chapter 1, you will
receive a good overview of the terrorist
events of the past ten to twelve years,
with a focus on those of Islamic origin.
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,
senior staff members of the Clinton
administration’s National Security
Council, paint a coherent picture of the
genesis of sacred terror, the response to
it, and prospects for the future. The
time frame also includes the end and
the beginning of the two Bush adminis-
trations. Benjamin and Simon’s conclu-
sion points out the long-term nature of
the issue and recommends that the
West engage it with a view to the
postconflict possibilities. The book’s
purpose may include an attempt to in-
fluence history’s interpretation of the
data, particularly with regard to the
years of the authors’ involvement, but
that hardly negates its significance.
Benjamin and Simon offer three partic-
ularly valuable discussions. First, they
carefully tease three threads from the
history of radical Islamism. Second,
they give an airing to the workings of
government—probably always less than
transparent. In this, they do not hesitate
to parcel out responsibility for good
and for ill. Finally, they offer a strategic
reflection that goes beyond radical
Islamism.
That Islam was, and can be, a religion
of the sword should come as no sur-
prise. After Muhammad (d. 632), Taqi
al-Din ibn Taymiyya, born in 1269, an
accomplished Islamic jurist at age
twenty, established the intellectual un-
derpinning of today’s radical Islamism.
Ibn Taymiyya did more than anyone to
erect jihad—actual warfare—as a pillar
of Islam. From him descended in the
subsequent centuries serious intellectu-
als, hard men ready to commit vio-
lence, messianic figures whose zeal
seems most foreign to twenty-first-
century realities. Together, “they feed
into the eruption of jihadist Islamism
that has confronted the West, America
in particular, over the last decade.”
Now, the warrior prince Usama bin
Laden carries jihadism into the new
millennium.
“Exactly when the name Usama bin
Laden began appearing in American in-
telligence reports and FBI investigative
materials is something we are unlikely
to ever learn.” This observation,
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coupled with the truism that we judge
the unknown to be unlikely, points out
how it was that we only gradually gave
shape and definition to the terrorist
threat. When one considers that the
United States was riding the laurels of
the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War and that
its economy was steaming comfortably,
it seems almost understandable that no
one put all the pieces together earlier.
Nevertheless, Benjamin and Simon take
turns putting agencies and leaders in
the pillory. Interagency collaboration is
mostly a game of “I’ve got a secret.” Al-
ley politics overshadow intelligent anal-
ysis and policy making as the White
House and Capitol Hill threw punches
at each other; a president lacked per-
sonal credibility; and the news media,
aware of the public’s low interest for in-
ternational news, failed to pursue sto-
ries aggressively.
Before 9/11, “America was the prisoner
of an old paradigm for thinking about
terrorism, and it could be released only
through a revolutionary act of vio-
lence.” Herein lies a tragic blessing. As
its long-range response, the administra-
tion created a new cabinet-level depart-
ment for homeland security. Other
measures were also taken, and others
need to be taken once the technology
measures up. Additionally, citizens and
governments alike must become much
more attuned to the various currents
that have been shaped by the past and
that will shape the future. Developing a
sustainable strategy depends on it, lest
the tragedy become pathos.
The book concludes with a riveting
chapter on terrorism under the cloak of
other religions. Jewish messianism, the
quasi-Buddhist cult Aum Shinrikyo,
and Christian apocalyptic literature and
movements all point to more terrorism.
The Age of Sacred Terror will enlighten
leaders and citizens alike, and it should
be a must-read for midlevel officers, es-
pecially those aspiring to senior leader-
ship. It challenges the way we plan and
train, and it certainly provides grist for
the mill of doctrine development—
while pointing out, yet again, that this
is not the foe our parents and grand-
parents faced. If we learn no other lesson,
this book will have served us well.
S. DOUGLAS SMITH
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Kurspahic, Kemal. Prime Time Crime: Balkan
Media in War and Peace. Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003.
261pp. $19.95
Solving the puzzle of the destruction of
Yugoslavia is one of the dominant his-
torical and political questions of our
time. Prominent scholars, high-ranking
military officers, and noted politicians
all seem to be asking how an advanced
confederation could fail so quickly and
with such disastrous consequences.
Kemel Kurspahic, the award-winning
editor of the Sarajevo wartime daily
newspaper Oslobodjenje, provides some
important answers to this question with
his firsthand account of media in the
former Yugoslavia.
This book provides chilling, first-person
insight into the decline of the Yugosla-
vian media into nationalism and into
its contribution to the destruction of
the Yugoslav federation. Kurspahic, a
Bosnian Muslim, paints a picture of the
disintegration of the former republic
that, like many horror stories, is at once
riveting, revolting, and compelling.
This is a work that is riveting in its
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honesty, revolting in its facts, and ulti-
mately compelling in its insight. The
author’s journalistic style easily dis-
solves the complexity of politics and
personality, offering the reader a valu-
able glimpse into a political arena rarely
seen, much less understood, by West-
erners unfamiliar with the Balkans.
The first chapter’s treatise on the au-
thor’s thoughts and beliefs concerning
journalism during Josip Broz Tito’s so-
cialist revolution evokes an optimism
shared by many Yugoslavs during the
days of the “Balkan miracle.” This opti-
mism offers a starting point for the
reader’s compassion for the people of
the former Yugoslavia and their lost
dream. Many readers will find here an
illuminating perspective on the lost
opportunities during Tito’s regime—a
time of great hope for unity but ulti-
mate belief in nationalism, ethnicity,
and culture.
The importance of ethnicity became ex-
cruciatingly clear during the early
1990s, when, as the author describes,
the nationalist parties and leaders in
Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia managed to
capture the press. Playing on themes
and seams between cultures that had
been glossed over by Tito’s press,
journalists began an easy decline into
uncontested nationalist rhetoric. Ac-
cording to Kurspahic, “the Yugoslav
public . . . still had only one ruling
party and its ideology. What was once a
Communist controlled media became a
nationalist-controlled media. Milosevic
simply renamed his party—from Com-
munist to Socialist—and switched . . .
from ‘brotherhood and unity’ to ‘hatred
toward neighbors.’” These divisions
provided stronger focal points for the
parties and easier writing for the media,
and they reinforced the nationalist bias
of the people.
Not limiting his comments to Serbia,
Kurspahic thoroughly examines the
slide of Croatian and Bosnian media
into nationalist propaganda as well. He
paints a consistent theme of one-party
rule and its ability to control and focus
the press. The press, responding to the
call of nationalism, simply followed the
path it always had—support of the
party in power.
This point leads to an exceptionally
compelling aspect of the narrative, the
rise and suppression of the opposition
media. Kurspahic exhaustively catego-
rizes attempts in each republic to com-
bat the rampant nationalism. Most of
the attempts by a critical press to estab-
lish itself, regardless of location, met
disastrous ends. The work’s firsthand
accounts of resistance to nationalism
and its effects offer remarkable insights
into journalistic ethics and the strength
they offer editors and reporters, even at
the threat of their own lives. The deci-
sions made to crush the opposition
press provide more chilling evidence of
the strength of nationalism as a political
tool of control.
However, the work’s concern is not the
pathos of the opposition and its at-
tempt at critique but its inability to al-
ter the ethnic momentum of the
warring republics. Kurspahic’s contri-
bution to an understanding of the war
is his argument regarding the willing-
ness of the people to accept the crimes
of its leaders as a natural part of the pro-
gression to statehood. This was the true
media disaster in the former Yugoslavia.
In the eyes of the author, the media’s
crime was its unchallenged, biased, and
willing complicity with nationalist
rhetoric.
1 4 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
152
Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 35
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/35
The author’s attempt to weave a
straight course through the warfare of
three ethnicities suffers from a few
shortcomings. As the author seeks to
produce history, there is a great deal of
personal recollection. If the author is
attempting an autobiography, there is a
great deal of history. Some might say
his own ethnic identity prevents a bal-
anced account of Serb or Croatian me-
dia. Kurspahic understands this; his
damning indictment of his own coun-
try’s media and how Bosnian national-
ism translated into violence speaks for
itself. Nevertheless, the author also ac-
cepts the necessity to play the ethnic
card and laments that Oslobodjenje’s
“selected editing” in Sarajevo was nec-
essary for its survival.
Concluding with the current changes in
the Balkan media and a list of future
policy options to prevent media nation-
alism, Kurspahic returns to the opti-
mistic tone of the beginning of the
work. Reviewing the policy recommen-
dations of the last chapter, Kurspahic
yearns for a free and independent press,
one worthy of, and desiring, outside cri-
tique. The author would also welcome a
press that challenges the government.
This optimism, though warranted, may
be premature. It remains to be seen if
international media-watchdog groups
can bring about any of these changes.
Prime Time Crime commands an im-
portant place on the bookshelf of any-
one studying the former Yugoslavia.
Kemal Kurspahic trains an unblinking
eye on the nationalist Balkan press and
its contribution to the war. In particu-
lar, the first chapter and the appendices
should be required reading for any offi-
cer posted to duty in this troubled re-
gion. Although addressing just one
small piece of the puzzle that was the
fall of Yugoslavia, Kurspahic’s narrative
of the rise of a nationalist press answers
many questions about the society of
former Yugoslavia, its destruction, and
its ability to prosecute such a horren-
dous conflict. In a much broader sense,
Prime Time Crime reveals what may hap-
pen when any government, political
leader, or nationalist ideal captures or
co-opts the media.
CLEMSON G. TURREGANO
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College
Kennedy, Gregory C., and Keith Neilson, eds.
Military Education: Past, Present, and Future.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. 256pp. $64.99
This collection of ten essays is largely
historical. Only three deal with current
military education, and none focuses
substantially on the future. Six examine
European institutions, while three ad-
dress military education in the United
States and one recent change in Can-
ada. The editors and authors are sea-
soned historians; some teach at civilian
institutions, some at military schools.
The essays report the continuing ten-
sion between academic officer-
preparation and hands-on experience,
and the contrast of both approaches
with the military’s more usual method
of preparation—training. All agree that
technology and its continued develop-
ment mean education is required. History
is agreed to be crucial to military educa-
tion, but there are critiques here of how it
is used and of its tendency to direct
attention to the past rather than to con-
sider the past’s meaning for the future.
T. G. Otte discusses the influence of
the French Revolution and German
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philosophy on von Clausewitz’s discus-
sion of the development and value of
leaders with “genius.” Dennis E.
Showalter describes the evolution of
Prussian military education in the di-
rection of merit criteria for officer se-
lection and the resulting increase in the
number of officers who were common-
ers. Lori Bogle of the U.S. Naval Acad-
emy then addresses how Prussian
lessons were applied at the Military
Academy at West Point by Sylvanus
Thayer, superintendent from 1817 to
1833. She describes his emphasis on
moral education, which included reli-
gious revivals and rigorous mental and
physical discipline. Equality, honor,
competition, and formal training in
ethics were all part of Thayer’s efforts to
tame what Bogle calls “boy culture” and
its individualistic definition of personal
honor—characteristic of the antebel-
lum American South—in terms that en-
tailed military obedience.
Several essays consider British military
education. Andrew Lambert notes that
militaries believe experience is crucial,
but in fact many officers do not actually
have experience, so academics are im-
portant. Academics, he says, should
stimulate real thinking, but too often
that comes only after military defeat.
Further, the “edge” provided by critical
thinking is too often of short duration.
Lambert argues that selection for intel-
lectual prowess and assignments to
posts that use prowess is all-important
and that poor leadership leads to set-
backs. One example of poor leadership,
he says, was that of First Lord Winston
Churchill, “who would not listen to ad-
vice.” David French discusses officer
training in the regular British army be-
tween the two world wars. A not en-
tirely successful effort was made to
broaden the social class of officers,
broaden their education, expand their
view beyond that of the regiment, re-
cruit officers with university degrees,
and promote by examination as op-
posed to primarily by seniority. A
weakness of officer education that ap-
peared in the early years of World War
II was its lack of training in “all-arms
cooperation.”
Mark R. Grandstaff gets to tell the story
of the founding of the U.S. Air War
College in the heady days of the newly
created service after World War II. Its
motto? “Unhampered by Tradition”; its
education was to be “prewar not post-
war.” One goal was to develop military
strategists, but from the beginning
there were also some who argued that
the purpose was to develop “air states-
men” who could “stand up to the polit-
icos” and gain a “full share in the
formulation of national policies.”
Grandstaff credits the Air War College
with excellent methodology but finds
the value of its educational content
variable. He does not consider how
method, in fact, affects content.
The one important change in U.S. mili-
tary education since Vietnam has been
the emphasis given to joint education.
This shift was imposed by Congress.
Thomas A. Keany details the implemen-
tation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s
requirements, noting an assumption that
education on jointness can occur only in
a joint environment and arguing that
emphasis on campaigns diminishes the
attention given to the many other ways
in which the services should be cooper-
ating. Ronald G. Haycock explores an-
other example of civilian intervention,
recounting Canadian changes since its
military’s “Last Traumatic Experience.”
(Canadian troops murdered a Somalian
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teen in 1993.) The National Defense Col-
lege was closed, officers were required to
get college degrees, the content of their
education was greatly expanded, and the
publication of a new college journal was
ordered. Haycock’s essay on the changes
and their potential should be required
reading as Canada endeavors to find its
way out of the “colonial cringe” through
emphasized tactics and technology.
In his overview of current European
military education, Peter Foot describes
three types that exist today: “Jena”
schools, which look to professional,
in-house education; “Falkland” schools,
which “bolt on” new material; and
“Kosovo” schools, which address com-
plexity and ambiguity and seek exter-
nal, civilian accreditation. Foot notes a
trend toward commonality, including
more joint and combined training and
advanced distance learning. He gives
particular attention to military training
in Eastern Europe, noting in particular
developments in Bulgaria and in the
Baltic republics’ tristate institution.
In all, this is a collection worth read-
ing, especially to remind us of the im-
pediments to change and the perpetual
tension between training and educa-
tion (within its critical thinking), be-
tween tradition and innovation, and
between technology and strategy. The
debate over military education began
as early as Plato, and it will not end
with Kennedy or Neilson.
JUDITH STIEHM
Florida International University
Hackworth, David H., and Eilys England. Steel My
Soldiers’ Hearts. New York: Simon & Schuster,
2002. 444pp. $27.95
There are so many books about the
Vietnam War and the Vietnam experi-
ence that the message of one more risks
being lost amidst a vast ocean of tragic
tales told with great pain. However,
Hackworth and England have provided
something more than a reminiscence of
an Army combat unit in the post–Tet
Offensive world of Vietnam; they have
presented readers with a tactical reform
primer for infantry. All the information
is there in stark GI English, beginning
with the first sentence of chapter 1 (not
repeated here out of delicacy), and fin-
ishing up with the last sentences of the
last chapter: “We now need to fight
smart as much as we need to get even.
There is no other choice. We do it right
or we lose. We win—or we die.”
Hackworth and England are referring
to the new war against terrorism in the
post-9/11 world. The quotation applies
to the current day, and it applied to
Hackworth’s nightmare battalion in the
Mekong Delta in 1969.
His unit was the 4th Battalion, 39th In-
fantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 9th Infan-
try Division. The troops making up the
battalion were, as the authors state, citi-
zen draftee soldiers, not the volunteers
that had filled the first combat units
that went into Vietnam back in 1965.
These soldiers did not want to be in
Vietnam. They had come from a coun-
try where protests against the war had
become large-scale performance art,
widely publicized by news media and,
most importantly, were supported by a
large portion of the population. These
reluctant warriors were doubly cursed,
for they were part of an army the lead-
ership of which had started to unravel
in the face of the stubborn refusal of an
enemy to admit defeat, an enemy who
still could attack U.S. soldiers with skill,
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speed, and lethality. Hackworth and
England are unsparing in their depic-
tions of the martinets and incompetents
who made up a fair portion of the offi-
cer and noncommissioned officers’
corps that led soldiers into the Delta
swamps and rice paddies—beginning
with the battalion commander who
places his unit’s main base in the mid-
dle of a Viet Cong minefield, through a
commanding general more focused on
maximizing body counts for his own
career than on effectively fighting an
elusive enemy.
Despite determined opposition both
from the enemy and higher headquar-
ters, Hackworth achieved an organiza-
tional transformation of his hard-luck
battalion. The 4/39th became a skilled,
deadly foe of the Viet Cong in the
Delta, a unit that took the fight to the
enemy, taking away his initiative.
Hackworth did this through reimposi-
tion of a strict but fair discipline, intro-
duction of and training in proven and
successful fieldcraft, and leadership
from the front. There are no magic bul-
lets or technological fixes for this kind
of transformation, just simple success
on the battlefield—the enemy dies or
goes away. In the beginning of his com-
mand, Hackworth’s disciplinarian ap-
proach earned him a contract on his
head from his own soldiers. By the time
he left, one of these same soldiers
would write, “The most terrible thing
happened today. Colonel Hackworth
left. You remember the one everyone
hated, and wanted shot? Now there’s
another bounty out for him—to anyone
who can get him back.”
Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts contains the
collected practical wisdom of this suc-
cessful battalion commander. Curi-
ously, however, the wisdom that keeps
soldiers alive on the battlefield does not
necessarily contribute to the end of bat-
tles or wars. Hackworth and England
acknowledge as much in an account of
a conversation between Hackworth and
John Paul Vann. Hackworth and Vann
were compatriots and friends; Vann
had been Hackworth’s company com-
mander in Korea. Vann, now a civilian
advisor to the South Vietnamese re-
gime, told Hackworth that while his
battalion was improving the security of
the area, they were killing too many ci-
vilians. Vann added, “Once the 9th’s
out of here, I reckon that eighty to
ninety percent of the Delta’s population
will come to our side. You guys have
been the VC’s biggest recruiter. You kill
a boy’s mama, which side do you
reckon he’ll join?”
Therein lies the major lesson of this
frank, valuable book. A nation’s armed
forces can be exceptionally well trained,
exceptionally lethal, and full of esprit de
corps. They can win all the battles. They
can maximize the body count. But if the
end of the battle or war is flawed—or
worse, uncertain—no amount of cour-
age, steel, or personal battlefield leader-




Taubman, Philip. Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the
CIA and the Hidden Story of America’s Space Espi-
onage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.
441pp. $27
That the United States has conducted a
program of high-altitude and space-
borne photographic reconnaissance
since the mid-1950s is hardly a secret.
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With the public release of many previ-
ously classified source documents and
project histories, the time is right for
Philip Taubman’s history of the strate-
gic issues, politics, personalities, and
technologies that drove the develop-
ment of America’s extraordinary space
reconnaissance capability.
Taubman has reported on national secu-
rity and intelligence matters for the New
York Times for more than twenty years.
He is clearly a thorough researcher; his
list of consulted sources, documents,
and technical reports runs to eighteen
pages of small print. Much of it is mate-
rial new to the public domain.
Strange as it may seem today, when the
United States is rich in strategic intelli-
gence, in the early 1950s it had no reli-
able estimate of the numbers of
strategic bombers, missiles, or nuclear
warheads in the Soviet Union. As
Winston Churchill said, the USSR was
“a riddle wrapped in an enigma.” Bison
bombers flew circles around Moscow to
inflate the estimates of Western air
attachés of their numbers; Nikita
Khrushchev rattled rockets to add to
the noise.
In this murky but threatening environ-
ment, the Eisenhower administration
was struggling to develop a balanced
defense policy, one that would offer ef-
fective defense against an opponent
whose capabilities and intentions were
imperfectly known, but one that would
not break the nation’s economy. Hard
strategic intelligence—reconnaissance-
based counts of strategic things—was
key. However, the Soviet Union was
then what was picturesquely called “a
denied area.” RB-47s and similar air-
craft probed the borders but could not
see deeply into the Soviet Union, and
their reconnaissance flights often ended
in political embarrassment for the gov-
ernment and tragedy for the crews.
At this point, a collection of remarkable
men entered the game: Edwin Land of
Polaroid, a politically well connected
systems engineer; Kelly Johnson, head
of Lockheed’s fabled “Skunk Works”
and builder of extraordinary aircraft;
James Baker of Harvard, a most creative
camera-system designer; and Arthur
Lundhal of the CIA, a gifted photo-
graphic interpreter. Richard Bissell, the
CIA’s legendary manager of high-risk
projects, assumed the leadership of this
gang and with it brought the fabled U-2
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
and later the first photographic recon-
naissance satellites, Corona, to opera-
tional fulfillment.
Taubman paints these men unreserv-
edly as patriots, putting their consider-
able technical skills and imagination at
their country’s service. That they were.
More importantly, they grasped the
need for hard strategic intelligence and
had the perspective to see the promise
of new technologies and their applica-
tion to the problem of strategic
reconnaissance.
The author does a splendid job of inter-
preting the significance of the technical
problems encountered and the brilliant
ingenuity of the solutions. Aircraft had
never operated at the combination of
altitude (over seventy thousand feet)
and range (beyond three thousand
miles) that strategic overflight of the
Soviet Union would require. The solu-
tion from Johnson’s Skunk Works was
the U-2, a sort of jet-powered glider
with the climb characteristics of a
homesick angel. Baker designed cam-
eras with long focal lengths that folded
into tight fuselage and satellite spaces;
Kodak developed films that could
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survive the temperature extremes en-
countered at reconnaissance altitudes;
Lundhal organized a photographic
interpretation activity to receive and
analyze the pictures.
When satellite-borne cameras replaced
the U-2, new and even more demand-
ing technical problems arose. Just get-
ting a satellite launched and into orbit
was no mean trick. Choosing between
relaying television pictures from space
or returning exposed film was a subtle
and demanding technical choice. Re-
covery of the exposed film was selected
and became the coolest trick of all: film
capsules, ejected from the satellite, re-
entered the atmosphere and parachuted
down to where a specially equipped
C-130 snagged them out of the air.
All this seems quite ordinary today, but
in the 1950s these were innovative
technical accomplishments. Too often
strategic histories treat critical technical
accomplishments lightly and gloss over
their significance to strategic and policy
choices. To Taubman’s credit, he is at-
tuned to the importance of the enabling
technologies and brings their role and
impact to the reader’s understanding.
After getting the cameras aloft,
Taubman turns his attention to the
consequences of the pictures they re-
turned. The first flights captured stag-
gering numbers of detailed pictures
covering vast sweeps of the hidden inte-
rior of the Soviet Union. The pictures
revealed that Soviet Bison bombers
were as rare as the animal is today in
Montana and that Soviet intercontinen-
tal missiles, while large and ugly, were
few and in a low state of readiness.
This did not end the Cold War or put
America completely at ease, but it did
bring some balance and scope to
defense planning for the late 1950s. In
1960 a presidential candidate who
should be remembered for better things
rode to victory partly on claims that the
Eisenhower administration had allowed
a dangerous missile gap to grow. The
pictures from these satellites and air-
craft put paid to that.
Taubman’s book is twice valuable—
first, for its historical development of
the value and impact of strategic intelli-
gence, and second, for its insight into
the role of technology and technologists
in shaping strategic policy.
In his final pages, Taubman raises im-
portant questions about America’s cur-
rent reliance on technical intelligence
collection methods. He notes that little
about al-Qa‘ida’s activities or capabili-
ties is being revealed or forecast by sat-
ellite reconnaissance and that human
intelligence sources and the collection
of intelligence must play a central role




Bonds, John Bledsoe. Bipartisan Strategy: Selling
the Marshall Plan. Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
2002. 256pp. $64.95
When we look back on great historical
events, we often ascribe an inevitability
to things that were, in fact, anything but.
In this lucid and comprehensive study of
the formulation and enactment of the
Marshall Plan, John Bonds recounts how
this great pillar of American post–World
War II policy was anything but inevita-
ble. Bonds, a retired captain of the U.S.
Navy and professor of history at the
Citadel in Charlestown, South Carolina,
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concludes his penultimate chapter on
the final legislative approval of what
was to be Public Law 793 with the
words: “So it was finally done. The
country had made a significant com-
mitment to Europe and to internation-
alism in general, consciously and with
conviction, despite some difficult
holdouts like Mr. John Taber, Chair-
man, House Appropriations Commit-
tee. But to the last the issue had been in
doubt.” On that last sentence (emphasis
added) hangs the tale of this study.
The Republicans controlled Congress,
the president was seen as weak and was
opposed by prominent members of his
own party, and the Republicans smelled
a White House victory in 1948, for the
first time since 1928. On partisan
grounds alone, then, 1947–48 did not
seem a propitious time for a major bi-
partisan initiative. Beyond consider-
ations of party, however, there were
large substantive policy issues that di-
vided the nation: how best to deal with
the erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union; fear
of inflation and the ultimate cost of Eu-
ropean recovery; concern for balancing
the budget; and how to meet the public
desire for “normalcy” after years of de-
pression and war.
Bonds gives an impressive account of the
extraordinary skill of the Truman ad-
ministration and the rightly celebrated
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Re-
publican chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, in
mobilizing business, labor, intellectu-
als, and public opinion in support of
what many correctly perceived as a de-
cisive break with traditional American
foreign policy. In this mobilization of
external opinion and lobbying of con-
gressional support (at a time when such
lobbying was seen as improper), there
were mutually countervailing pressures
tending to minimize President Truman’s
public engagement, which was seen as
raising partisan hackles, but also to max-
imize the president’s public role, the
better to position him for the 1948 elec-
tion. Bonds correctly concludes, how-
ever, that such considerations and skills
were insufficient to account for the final
enactment.
A fundamental change of perspective
was required, and skillful alliance build-
ing and sales strategies were inadequate.
Indeed, the administration understood
this and sought to justify the shift in
American peacetime engagement by the
need to restore the European balance of
power and the international trading
system, ravaged by depression and war.
At the same time, there was a desire to
establish for the first time in American
history a program of universal military
training. In the mind of the president,
Secretary of State George C. Marshall,
and Secretary of Defense James V.
Forrestal, the European Recovery Pro-
gram and a new foundation for national
defense were inextricably linked.
In the event, none of these arguments,
or the general campaign to weld an alli-
ance of business, labor, academia, and
the public in support of America’s new
role, generated sufficient votes in Con-
gress to pass the Marshall Plan. Soviet
actions in Finland, Czechoslovakia, and
Berlin did.
All of this is particularly remarkable in
view of the fact that the administration
had consciously sought to downplay the
Soviet menace as the motive for its ini-
tiative. More abstract discussions of the
balance of power and international
commerce were consistently favored.
This stemmed from the desire neither
to slam the door on some renewed
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understanding with the Soviet Union (a
position favored by some influential
opinions in the United States) nor to cre-
ate trouble for the French government,
seemingly both dependent on and threat-
ened by the French Communist Party.
The Soviet-menace card was played on
several occasions in the unfolding de-
bate, but in general it was subordinated
to more abstract arguments of enlight-
ened self-interest. Moreover, it was
clear to many in the administration that
too great an emphasis on the immi-
nence of war with Russia would scuttle
both the recovery program and univer-
sal military training in favor of a gen-
eral wartime mobilization. In effect,
although Soviet pressures certainly pro-
vided the needed ingredient for legisla-
tive success, they also had the potential
to divert the country from the recovery
program itself. Later events would ulti-
mately modify the balance between eco-
nomic assistance and military
mobilization—but that is another story,
beyond the scope of this fine book.
Finally, it should be noted that Bonds
has the ability to tell a story clearly, at
times even breezily, and analyze with-
out cumbersome jargon. For clarity and
sophistication, this is likely to be a stan-
dard reference for some time to come.
ROBERT S. WOOD
Salt Lake City, Utah
Hore, Peter, ed. Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist,
Socialist. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2003. 330pp.
$59.50
Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett was a
key member of the international circle
of scientists who led the Allied defense
research efforts of World War II, and
he was the heart and soul of the Cold
War military-academic-industrial com-
plex. In this book, sixteen authors at-
tempt to shed light on Blackett’s role in
that story. The collection includes pa-
pers presented at a 1998 conference
commemorating Blackett at Cambridge
University, as well as other recent writ-
ings about him.
Not surprisingly, the compendium of-
fers a range of perspectives on events
and issues with which Blackett was as-
sociated, rather than a comprehensive
examination of his life and work. The
articles are arranged in roughly chrono-
logical order, but there is otherwise lit-
tle integration among them—a
characteristic only exacerbated by
Blackett’s wide-ranging interests and
expertise. However, it is clear that an
integrated whole was not the editor’s
goal. Instead, Hore’s intent was to aug-
ment the inadequate body of literature
on Blackett by encouraging new research
on him and publishing the results.
After an opening overview of Blackett’s
youth, compiled from Blackett’s own
autobiographical notes, the book cov-
ers his education in the Royal Navy’s
preparatory school system, his service
as a naval officer during World War I,
and his post-secondary and graduate
education in physics at Cambridge
University under the tutelage of Sir
Ernest Rutherford. After a summary of
Blackett’s contribution to Britain’s war
preparation efforts during the 1930s,
several chapters are devoted to his war-
time work on defense science, technol-
ogy, and policy. This material addresses
his widely acknowledged leadership in
the field of operational research and the
ways in which that research contributed
to high-level disputes over convoying
strategy and strategic-bombing policy.
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The final chapters examine the postwar
public controversy sparked by Blackett’s
vocal opposition to nuclear weapons,
his long association with Indian politi-
cal leaders and scientists, a summary of
his Nobel-winning career as a physicist,
and his role in the first administration
of England’s prime minister Harold
Wilson during the late 1960s.
Hore accomplishes his goal of facilitat-
ing and gathering new research on
Blackett. Rather than introduce brazen,
new concepts, the book’s primary con-
tribution to academic research will be
as a resource for those endeavoring to
examine elements of Blackett’s life in
the larger context. This is for the most
part a function of the biographical na-
ture of this work, the very practical
personality of the subject, and the
large number of contributors, each
with a particular perspective. Several
of the authors, however, have focused
too intently on specific, detailed narra-
tives, passing up the larger questions. In
some cases the focus is so narrow that
the book’s main subject—Blackett—is
conspicuous by his absence. In fact, ar-
guably, this is the general weakness of
the book; there is so much emphasis
on Blackett’s work that little attention
is paid to Blackett himself.
The two chapters on operational research
are useful examples. Jock Gardner’s
brief contribution, “Blackett and the
Black Arts,” analyzes wartime reports
from the British signals intelligence and
operational research departments to de-
termine the extent that the two groups
issued reports based on one another’s
data. The chapter by Richard Ormerod
is an institutional history of operational
research as a field of study, focusing on
the vagaries of the field’s attempts to
define itself. Blackett himself is rarely
mentioned in these chapters. Given
Blackett’s central role in the history of
operational research, this would have
been the perfect opportunity to learn
more about his contributions and to
understand the influence of operational
research during and after World War II.
Fortunately, several of the contributors
chose broader topics. For example,
Peter Hore’s own chapter offers a
thoughtful look at Blackett’s experi-
ences as a sailor during World War I,
using a variety of sources to place that
story within the wider circumstances of
the war and to consider how Blackett
weathered the ordeal. Mary Jo Nye’s
contribution, “A Physicist in the Corri-
dors of Power,” must also be singled
out for praise. Following Blackett
throughout his entire career, Nye de-
scribes the ebb and flow of Blackett’s
influence on both national policy and
science, demonstrating how Blackett’s
career expressed his character and po-
litical beliefs. It is contributions like





Sondhaus, Lawrence. Navies of Europe. London:
Longman, 2002. 256pp. $26.95
O’Brien, Phillips Payson. Technology and Naval
Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond.
Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 360pp. $63
Since the onset of the industrial revolu-
tion, navies have continuously strug-
gled with the challenges posed by
technological change. In Navies of Eu-
rope, Lawrence Sondaus examines this
problem from a European perspective.
Sondhaus chronicles the fortunes of
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both great and minor powers beginning
in 1815, at a time when the navies of
Europe still dominated the globe, up to
the present day.
Compressing nearly two hundred years
of naval history into a single volume is
a difficult task, but this work is a solid
introduction to the subject for the gen-
eral reader. The book provides a clear
overview of the major technological de-
velopments of the modern era, includ-
ing such important events as the
transition from sail to steam, the advent
of the armored warship, the dread-
nought revolution, and the rise of naval
aviation. It also offers a lucid account of
naval operations during these two cen-
turies. As might be expected, the two
world wars receive the most detailed
treatment, but the author is equally ad-
ept at recounting, and explaining the
importance of, numerous lesser-known
naval operations.
One of the book’s greatest strengths is
its attention to the navies of minor Eu-
ropean powers, which are usually over-
looked entirely in surveys of this
period. These small states were seldom
on the cutting edge of naval innovation,
but their fleets were still significant
from a national or regional perspective.
Minor powers could and did possess
navies for purposes that were often un-
related to those of their larger or more
powerful neighbors. Sondhaus never
lets these lesser navies dominate the
narrative—their inclusion sometimes
reads like an afterthought—but he con-
sistently strikes a fair balance between
Europe’s different states.
Europe may no longer be able to domi-
nate the world’s sea-lanes as it once did,
but this book provides a useful re-
minder that European naval forces,
though overshadowed by the United
States in both resources and
capabilities, remain at the forefront of
technology and innovation, and con-
tinue to be capable of performing a
wide variety of missions on relatively
short notice.
Technology and Naval Combat in the
Twentieth Century and Beyond exam-
ines some of these same navies in
greater depth but also includes chapters
on two non-European powers, the
United States and Japan. The title,
however, is somewhat misleading. The
fifteen articles in this collection actually
pay very little attention to naval combat
during the twentieth century—nearly
all the chapters focus on peacetime na-
val policy, warship construction, and
technology.
It is also worth noting that not all the
states examined receive equal treat-
ment. Italy and France drop out of the
volume after their entry into the First
World War, while Germany and Japan
disappear with the outbreak of World
War II. The United States, however,
does not appear until 1919, and the So-
viet Union is included only in the sec-
tion on the Cold War. Britain’s navy is
the only one to appear in all sections of
the book, and the period before World
War I is only partially covered with a
previously published article by Nicholas
Lambert on Admiral Sir John Fisher
and the concept of flotilla defense in
1904–1909.
None of this is meant as criticism, how-
ever, as the volume was clearly not in-
tended to serve as a comprehensive
naval history of the twentieth century.
Both the general reader and the special-
ist will find much of interest here.
Leading scholars in the field have writ-
ten the individual chapters, and the
overall quality of the contributions is
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high. The book’s highlights include in-
sightful overviews of the U.S. and Brit-
ish navies during the Cold War era by
George W. Baer and Eric Grove, and a
piece on the current and future direc-
tion of the Royal Navy by Geoffrey Till.
Because the authors are able to examine
specific navies and periods in some de-
tail, this volume illustrates more effec-
tively than Navies of Europe the full
range of political, economic, and tech-




Zimmermann, Warren. First Great Triumph:
How Five Americans Made Their Country a World
Power. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
2002. 562pp. $30
The path of America’s rise to global
dominance has always attracted the at-
tention of distinguished historians and
political scientists, ranging from Henry
Adams to Walter LaFeber to Stephen E.
Ambrose. Warren Zimmermann, a
thirty-three-year veteran of the Foreign
Service, joins the fray with First Great
Triumph, a provocative analysis of the
“fathers of American imperialism” at
the onset of the twentieth century.
Zimmermann examines how President
Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, naval theorist Alfred
Thayer Mahan, Secretary of State John
Hay, and Secretary of War Elihu Root
engineered American imperial expan-
sion in the decade from 1898 to 1908.
Why these five men? Zimmermann
claims not only that they were influen-
tial in establishing the United States as a
global power but that their characters
and beliefs helped determine how that
power would be used. In essence, this
book is about imperialism by “Roosevelt
and his friends.” Zimmermann also
gives due credit for constructing the
first overseas empire to Admiral George
Dewey, Leonard Wood, Philippine co-
lonial governor William H. Taft, and
President William McKinley. Regretta-
bly, he downplays the contributions of
Admiral Stephen B. Luce and Secretary
of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy, both of
whom influenced Mahan in the devel-
opment of his naval theories.
Graduates of the Naval War College
will find Zimmermann’s analysis of
Mahan’s career particularly interesting.
Zimmermann’s Mahan is the preemi-
nent American strategist of his genera-
tion, a “pen and ink sailor” who in
midcareer found himself “out of sorts
with the navy which accurately consid-
ered him a misfit and a complainer.” At
home in Newport, Rhode Island,
Mahan articulated a doctrine of
seapower as the controlling factor to
national greatness. Like George
Kennan, who authored the contain-
ment doctrine a half-century later,
Mahan inspired American foreign pol-
icy with his insightful analysis of Amer-
ica’s position among nations.
The centerpiece of this work, however,
is undoubtedly Roosevelt. Roosevelt
constructed the first true imperial presi-
dency and ushered in the “American
Century.” Fresh from his heroics during
the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt
was catapulted to the White House
upon the assassination of William
McKinley. By the time he departed
eight years later, the United States was
the dominant force in the Caribbean
and a major presence in Asia. On the
strength of his marshaling of public
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opinion and judicious use of America’s
economic and military power, Roosevelt,
not Woodrow Wilson, emerges as the
true “father of American diplomacy.”
During the Roosevelt administration,
American foreign policy combined na-
tional power with what Zimmermann
terms “high purpose.”
Zimmermann offers equally compelling
character sketches of the other mem-
bers of Roosevelt’s team. Lodge emerges
as a political manipulator who guides
imperialist policies through Congress.
Hay contributes to American hegemony
in the Western Hemisphere by develop-
ing closer ties with Great Britain, while
Root creates the first American colonial
administration, in the aftermath of the
Spanish-American War. Their com-
bined efforts made their country a
power to be reckoned with on the inter-
national scene.
However, Zimmermann’s crystal ball
looks far bleaker as the United States en-
ters the twenty-first century. Here
Zimmermann’s interpretation is based on
too much conjecture and too little fact.
Despite the massing of American mili-
tary might in the Middle East in the af-
termath of 11 September, Zimmermann
opines, this country faces an erosion of
its power due to a weakening of the
U.S. presidency and the reemergence of
congressional dominance in foreign
policy. Additionally, he sees a current
trend toward nonmilitary involvement
and an unwillingness to commit mili-
tary forces in support of foreign policy.
Lastly, Zimmermann posits that inter-
national terrorism has produced a
backlash against U.S. policies as well as
the cultural, ideological, and economic
principles that guide the United States.
In summary, Zimmermann offers a
provocative interpretation about Amer-
ican imperialism during the last century
and a chilling prognostication for the
current one. The reader is more likely to
concur with his thesis that the expansion
of the United States to an international
power was not an aberration but a cul-
mination of forces that had dominated
the political and economic scene since
its birth, than with the decline in the
power of the presidency, which is more
a function of personality than of the
reemergence of legislative authority.
COLE C. KINGSEED
Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired
New Windsor, New York
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FROM THE EDITORS
ELLER PRIZE FOR NAVAL HISTORY
The editors are delighted to learn that the U.S. Naval Historical Center in Wash-
ington, D.C., has awarded honorable mention in its annual Eller Prize in Naval
History competition to Edmund Morris’s “ ‘A Matter of Extreme Urgency’:
Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902,” which ap-
peared in our Spring 2002 issue. “This article,” commented Dr. Edward Marolda
of NHC, “presents an interpretation that is especially thought provoking and
instructive for naval officers and other readers interested in the connection be-
tween diplomacy and sea power.”
NEWPORT PAPER 18: TRANSFORMATION AND INDUSTRY
Yet another title in our rapidly growing Newport Paper series is available, in
print and online: Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next:
The Defense Industrial Implications of Network-centric Warfare, by Peter J.
Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross. As our editor, Dr. Catherine
McArdle Kelleher, observes in a foreword, the authors “offer groundbreaking
answers” to the challenge of “how, in a sea of new technologies, to craft a defense
industrial base that both supports a transformed military and adapts to the
dominant political and economic realities.”
To obtain copies of this Newport Paper or to subscribe (without charge) to
the series, contact the associate editor. It is also available online (Adobe Reader
required) at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np18/np18.pdf.
ARTICLE AND ESSAY INDEX
An index of all articles and essays from 1948 to the last completed publishing
year is available on compact disc from the editorial office, by mail (Naval War
College Review, Code 32S, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI, 02841-1207); by tele-
phone at (401) 841-2236 or by fax at (401) 841-1071, DSN exchange 948; or by
e-mail at press@nwc.navy.mil. Articles published in the Autumn 1996 issue or
later are available on the World Wide Web at www.nwc.navy.mil/press. Offprints
can be requested from the editorial office or, for recent issues, printed (Adobe
Reader required) directly from the website.
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
AN ONLINE GUIDE TO U.S. NAVAL HISTORY
Ever wonder what government office has a destroyer’s cruise book from its 1968
deployment to Vietnam? how to conduct research on the design of World War II
fighter planes? where to find museums displaying an array of Navy guns, uni-
forms, swords, and ship models? how to find art depicting the dramatic atomic
bomb tests at Bikini Atoll? what major historical programs are supported by the
Navy? Find the answers at the Naval Historical Center’s website, www.history
.navy.mil—the recently posted Guide to Naval History Organizations, Programs,
and Resources, compiled by Senior Historian Dr. Edward J. Marolda.
The guide provides detailed information on the composition, mission, func-
tions, and major artifact and documentary holdings of government institutions
dedicated to preserving the Navy’s past—the Naval Historical Center, the Ma-
rine Corps Historical Center, Navy Department historical offices, and the USS
Constitution, as well as the twelve official Navy museums, including the U.S.
Navy Museum in Washington, D.C., the National Museum of Naval Aviation in
Pensacola, Florida, and the Naval Undersea Museum in Bremerton, Washington.
In addition, the guide lists and describes governmental and nongovernmental
organizations—such as the Navy Cultural Resources Program, Naval Historical
Foundation, Historic Naval Ships Association, and U.S. Navy Memorial Foun-
dation—that promote naval historical programs. Finally, the guide identifies in-
stitutions that maintain sizable collections of naval historical materials,
including the National Archives, the Library of Congress, and the Naval War
College. Hours of operation, contact data, and other pertinent information ac-
company short descriptions of all these institutions nationwide.
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